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Executive summary
Finland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 20 September 1994 and it was adopted on 17 June 
1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came 
into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish National Report for the Eighth Re-
view Meeting in March/April 2020.
There are two operating nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The 
Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors of VVER type), operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units (boiling water reactors), operated 
by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). In addition, a new nuclear power plant unit (PWR) at the Olkiluoto 
site was granted operating license in March 2019 and is expected to start operation later in 2019. At both 
sites there are interim storages for spent fuel as well as final disposal facilities for low and intermedi-
ate level nuclear wastes. Posiva, a joint company of Fortum and TVO, submitted a construction licence 
application for the spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facility in the end of 2012. The 
Government granted the construction licence to Posiva in November 2015.
Finland is currently reviewing a construction licence application for Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 
1 (VVER type design) in Pyhäjoki. Since the review is underway, Hanhikivi unit 1 is discussed in this 
report mainly with regard to the licensing process,organisatorial matters and siting (see Articles 7, 10, 
11 and 17 and Annex 5).
Furthermore, there is a Triga Mark II research reactor, FiR 1 in Espoo operated by VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). The reactor was permanently shut down in the end of June 2015. 
VTT applied for a license for the decommissioning in June 2017. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) gave its statement on VTT’s application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
in April 2019. After this the first license application for decommissioning phase in Finland will proceed 
to the Government for the decision making process.
In this report, the latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained including safety assessment 
methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear power plants is also presented by 
using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guid-
ance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement are also covered.
Major developments in Finland since the Seventh Review Meeting are as follows: updating of leg-
islative and regulatory framework, granting operating license for Olkiluoto 3, renewing the operating 
license of Olkiluoto 1&2 nuclear power units in 2018 including Periodic Safety Review (PSR). Further-
more, STUK completed its safety assessment of the operating license for decommissioining for the 
FiR 1 research reactor. Latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is 
described in the relevant articles.
Most of the Fukushima Dai-ichi-related safety improvements presented in the Finnish national 
action plan have already been implemented. A few ongoing measures will be completed in 2019. Further 
information related to the actions taken in Finland following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant are described in more detail under Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
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Finland continues to host and to participate in the international peer reviews. The following mis-
sions have been performed or are planned for the period of 2017–2022:
• Olkiluoto 1&2 OSART mission. The mission was conducted from 27 February to 16 March 2017
• Loviisa NPP OSART mission. The mission took place in March 2018.
• Pre-Operational OSART mission for Olkiluoto 3. The mission took place in March 2018.
• WANO follow-up review at Loviisa NPP in 2017.
• WANO peer review at Olkiluoto NPP in October 2016 with follow-up in 2018
• IPPAS mission will be performed in 2020.
• ARTEMIS mission has been requested for 2022.
• IRRS mission will be requested for 2022.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is separately evaluated. 
Based on the evaluation, the following features emphasising Finnish safety management practices in 
the field of nuclear safety can be concluded:
• During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed, 
to take into account updates in international requirements, e.g. the Council Directive 2014/87/
Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the amendment (2014/52/EU) of Directive 
2011/92/EU, and the radiation safety directive (2013/59/Euratom). No deviation from the 
Convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish regulatory infrastructure including 
nuclear and radiation safety regulations.
• Due to the aforementioned updates of the legislation, and due the fact that since the renewal 
of YVL Guides in 2013 nearly all IAEA Safety Requirements have been revised, and updated 
WENRA reference levels have been published, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 
2017. Until now ( June 2019) 22 updated YVL Guides out of 47 are already published. Rest of the 
updated guides will be published later in 2019. The revised guides are applied as such for new 
nuclear facilities. Separate facility specific implementation decisions are made for the existing 
facilities and facilities under construction. Regular update and implementation of regulatory 
guides, particularly with regard to nuclear power plants in operation, are unique measures in the 
international perspective.
• The licensees have shown good safety performance in carrying out their safety related 
responsibilities in the operation and modernisation of existing NPPs. During recent years, only 
minor operational events (INES 1 and below) were reported and no major safety problems have 
occurred. After reorganising its activities in 2015, TVO experienced a decline in personnel job 
satisfaction that resulted in increased personnel turnover which challenged TVO’s management 
to retain organisational conditions for a good safety performance. Since then TVO has carried 
out various development actions to correct the situation and STUK has been able to verify proof 
of the positive effects of the measures taken by TVO. The licensees’ practices are considered to 
comply with the Convention obligations.
• Safety assessment is a continuous process and living full scope levels 1 and 2 probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. Periodic 
safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2015–2016, and the periodic safety review 
of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out in 2016–2018 in the connection of the operating license 
renewal. Several plant modifications have been carried out at the operating NPPs during the 
recent years to further improve the safety. Some of these modifications are originating from the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident lessons learned.
• The resources of STUK have been increased to meet the needs to oversee the construction of 
the new nuclear facilities in Finland. VTT supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety 
assessment work by performing safety analyses and providing safety analysis capabilities and 
tools. The national research programmes SAFIR and KYT develop and maintain the competencies 
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in nuclear safety and waste management to enable STUK to take measures in unexpected events 
at Finnish plants or elsewhere, and to support decision making for the benefits of society and the 
environment.
• STUK published a new strategy in 2018 covering the period of 2018–2022. The strategy is 
comprised of nine targets categorizied in three groups and supported by four core values as 
presented in Figure 1. The implementation of the strategy is underway.
FIGURE 1. STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022.
Challenges identified by the Seventh Review Meeting
The Seventh Review Meeting in 2017 identified some challenges and suggestions to improve nuclear 
safety in Finland. These issues are included and addressed in this report. The issues were as follows:
• To manage simultaneously the oversight of many on-going activities in different life-cycle phases 
of nuclear facilities. This is a situation that STUK has never dealt with before.
• Provisions for plant ageing; I&C and other system modernisations carried out at the existing 
NPPs (incl. safety improvements); ageing management programmes are in place and re-
reviewed in PSRs;
• Commissioning of Olkiluoto unit 3, review of the operating licence application, 
commissioning tests, and start of operation;
• Regulatory review of construction license application of Hanhikivi unit 1;
• Decommissioning of the FiR 1 research reactor.
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• To finalise STUK strategic communication plan for raising public awareness and knowledge in 
risks related to radiation and nuclear utilization.
Concerning the first challenge, the mentioned oversight activities are discussed specially in the context 
of Articles 14 and 19 and in Appendices 4 and 5. The review of the Olkiluoto 3 operating license appli-
cation, as well as the review of the FiR decommissioning license application have been completed. On 
the other hand, the review of the CL application of Hanhikivi-1 has been delayed because some of the 
required application material has not been yet submitted to STUK. Concerning ageing management, 
STUK completed the assessment of the periodic safety review of Loviisa NPP in 2017, and of Olkiluoto 
1&2 in 2018. The ageing management programmes were evaluated as a part of the assessment. The large 
I&C modernisation project (ELSA) at the Loviisa NPP was completed in the original timetable in 2018. 
STUK also participated in the Topical Peer Review under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EUR-
ATOM, completed in 2017. As the main the oversight tasks are known well in advance, STUK is able to 
consider them in resource planning and knowledge management and in the use of technical support 
organisations. STUK’s resources and the amount of oversight are discussed in more detail in Article 8.
Interest in nuclear power in Finland is increasing, due to on-going new-build projects and public 
debate about future prospects of so-called SMRs (Small Modular Reactors). With this in mind, commu-
nication and information sharing with media and the general public on nuclear and radiation safety has 
become an increasingly important success factor for STUK, relevant ministries and utilities. Regulatory 
processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable by the general public. Risks related to ra-
diation should be communicated realistically. Due to this challenge, STUK has carried out a number of 
development measures to improve its strategic communications and the use of modern communication 
tools. In particular, STUK has focused on the communication capacity of its personnel. STUK applies 
the principle that all STUK’s employees have both the right and duty to communicate with public and 
the media concerning their own area of expertise. For example, STUK’s personnel is encouraged to rep-
resent STUK in the social media. STUK has also developed key messages to communicate radiation and 
nuclear risks, and continued to develop its crisis communication capabilities. Furthermore, STUK has 
defined strategic goals for communication, and measures – not only the outputs but particularly the 
outcomes – how communication changes opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour.
In addition, in the Seventh Review Meeting, some common major issues were identified based 
on the Country Group discussions. It was recommended that these issues are taken into account when 
preparing the national reports. Out of these issues, ageing management and safety culture were chosen 
to be discussed in the Eighth Review Meeting.
The nine common major issues are listed below with reference to the Articles (in brackets) in which 
the issues are addressed. Summaries related to ageing management and safety culture are given below, 
more detailed discussion can be found in Articles 14 (ageing management) and 10 (safety culture).
• Safety culture (Article 10)
• International peer reviews (Annex 6)
• Legal framework and independence of regulatory body (Article 7, Article 8)
• Financial and human resources (Article 8, Article 11)
• Knowledge management (Article 8, Article 11)
• Supply chain (Article 13, Article 14)
• Managing of safety of ageing nuclear facilities and plant life extensions (Article 14)
• Emergency preparedness (Article 16)
• Stakeholder consultation & communication (Article 7, Article 8, Annex 6).
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Ageing management
STUK published in 2013 a YVL guide dedicated to ageing management. Up to 2013, the requirements for 
ageing management were covered by several different guides. In the guide published in 2013, some new 
requirements were introduced, mainly concerning the scope and content of the ageing management 
program, annual reporting and management of spare parts for long-lasting accidents. The guide has 
been updated since then, the latest version was published in February 2019. The implementation of the 
updated ageing management requirements is underway. The utilities have encountered some challeng-
es in complying with the new requirements. For example, inspections performed after publishing the 
new guide in 2013 revealed that the amount of spare parts can be inadequate for keeping the plant in a 
safe state also during prolonged transients and accidents, and that some of the spare parts in the stor-
age have either aged or became obsolete. Another challenge had to do with knowledge and resources 
allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs. An additional challenge 
is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify new ageing mechanisms to 
develop new inspection or monitoring technologies to detect degradation early enough. During recent 
years significant progress has taken place in the spare part management. Organisational arrangements 
have been made and a dedicated database (Proactive Obsolescence Management System) has been in-
troduced in both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. Dedicated groups consisting of necessary disciplines such 
as maintenance, quality control and procurement have taken charge of spare parts in terms of necessary 
availability and conditions.
A generic lesson learned is that the closer the nuclear power plants come to the end of their licensed 
operation, especially due to the low market price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licen-
sees to initiate modernisations or other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs. Instead of 
renewing a system or a component, modernisation may be rejected or a partial modification is planned 
resulting in ageing issues in the remaining parts. Finland has successfully applied periodic safety reviews 
(PSR) for the operating NPPs. The practice has been that the licensee is obliged to demonstrate that the 
safety of the operations can be ensured and improved also during the next 10 years. In order to do that 
the licensee has to commit to making safety improvements including necessary major modernisations 
to address the ageing of structures, systems and components (SSC).
An expert group dedicated to ageing management has been established in STUK to oversee how the 
licensees perform their duties in the ageing management of SSCs. The group, consisting of mechanical, 
electrical, I&C, civil structure, and human resource experts as well as resident inspectors, plans and co-
ordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equipment and 
structures. If any shortcomings are found, for example in the condition monitoring or maintenance, the 
group contacts the licensee for clarifications or corrective actions. The group also follows up findings 
from other countries and evaluates their possible applicability to the ageing management of the Finnish 
nuclear power plants.
Finland participated in the Topical Peer Review (TPR) “Ageing Management” under the Nuclear 
Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, carried out in 2017–18. The overall conclusion was that the ageing 
management has been satisfactory. However, some challenges and areas for improvement, as well as 
good practices, were identified and Finland is establishing a national action plan to address the findings. 
The results of the TPR are discussed under Article 14.
Safety Culture
The STUK Regulation sets a binding requirement for the licensees to maintain a good safety culture 
where safety is the priority. STUK revised the Guide YVL A.3 setting requirements for leadership and 
management for safety based on the IAEA GSR Part 2. 
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STUK carries out safety culture oversight by collecting and analysing observations from resident 
inspectors, documents, events and from other interactions with the licensee. STUK has implemented 
a tool for recording the observations. STUK also conducts specific inspections focusing on Leadership 
and Safety culture. STUK also follows the licensees’ safety culture self-assessments (e.g. results, possible 
changes in the methodology, actions decided based on the results). Furthermore, STUK has utilised VTT 
to carry out independent safety culture assessments in the licensee organisations. Independent safety 
culture assessments were done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 (2016) and Olkiluoto 3 (2017) to support STUK in the 
Licence Renewal of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and Operating Licence process of Olkiluoto 3. VTT also carried out 
an independent safety culture assessment for Fennovoima and its plant supplier and main contractor 
organisation in 2017.
The utilities employ several different means for maintaining good safety culture. Priority of safety 
is emphasised in the safety or company policies. In addition to high level policy, the licensees have safety 
culture programmes, road maps or development plans for implementing the measures for maintaining 
good safety culture. The licensees monitor the safety culture by regular surveys and in-depth assess-
ments. They also have in their organisations groups or functions independent of the line organisation 
to oversee and discuss safety and safety culture matters. Corrective action groups or functions exist. 
Training – including safety culture topics – is given to all newcomers and usually also to contractors. The 
safety significant contractors are required to familiarise their workforce with safety culture principles 
which is one of the topics of licensees’s audits on contractors and suppliers.
However, some challenges have appeard during the recent years.TVO reorganised its activities in 2015 
resulting also in personnel reductions. These changes led to a decline in personnel job satisfaction and 
working climate. To ensure that these conditions would not affect the safety culture and safe operation, 
TVO has during the period 2016–2018 carried out various development actions to correct the situation. 
The effective corrective actions and monitoring their effectiveness were required by STUK. In 2018 and 
2019, an improvement in the job satisfaction can be seen in TVO’s personnel surveys. Concerning Fen-
novoima, an independent safety culture assessment in 2017 revealed some deficiencies. The assessment 
covered also the plant supplier and the main contractor. The conclusion was that the safety culture at 
Fennovoima was at an acceptable level. However, several areas required improvements. These included 
e.g. the responsibilities for handling safety related issues, nuclear specific competencies, control of the 
supply chain and climate for raising concerns.The safety culture assessment also concluded that the 
safety culture at the plant supplier and at the main contractor need significant further development.
At STUK, safety is emphasised in the Management System. In 2013, all the departments made a 
self-assessment of their safety culture. The results were used in updating STUK’s safety and quality policy. 
In 2016 a safety culture survey was performed. In 2018 a comprehensive assessment of STUK’s safety cul-
ture was performed by external experts. The safety culture at STUK was considered to be at a good level 
and especially safety was considered to be a true value in STUK’s organization. Experts also identified 
several areas for improvement (e.g. learning from events and near misses, risk management, monitoring 
of safety culture), and these are addressed in a safety culture program which is under preparation. As 
a part of the preparation, a safety culture event was organised for STUK in April 2019 to discuss safety 
culture and particularly the risk management and learning from events and experience.
To better understand the ingrained conventions in the Finnish culture and their possible positive 
and/or negative impacts on safety culture, STUK has continued to explore the sociological factors in-
fluencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community within the Finnish nuclear research program 
SAFIR 2018. Furthermore, in March 2019 STUK hosted the OECD NEA and WANO managed Country-Spe-
cific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK 
discussed the country-specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety culture. 
Report is being prepared by the NEA.
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Challenges and good practices identified by Finland
Finland has identified the following challenges:
• Implementation of STUK’s strategic objective related to the implementation of more risk-
informed and performance-based regulation and oversight, and highlighting licensee’s 
responsibility for safety, including
• Changes needed to the nuclear energy regulations and regulatory guides, e.g. to be more be 
goal setting and enabling (also for emerging technologies, e.g. SMRs) and emphasising the 
licensees’ responsibility for safety.
• Developing the oversight activities to be more risk-informed and performance-based and 
emphasing licensees’ responsibility, e.g. by crediting licensees’ own oversight activities.
• Development of oversight practices and tools to take into account the possibilities offered by 
digitalisation, and ensuring that the personnel has the necessary related skills.
• Ensuring resources on the implementation of the strategic objectives as well as on the 
oversight of many ongoing activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities.
• Addressing the potential challenge related to the too stringent regulatory requirements 
preventing licensees to find suppliers to provide systems, structures and components needed 
for plant modifications and maintenance. Finnish licensees have established a project (KELPO) 
in which this challenge is partly being resolved by piloting the use of industrial standard 
components in safety class 3 applications.
• Long-term operation of the NPPs, including retention and renewal of the necessary competence.
• Ageing management should be proactive and consider also technological obsolescence. Early 
preparations (design, contracts, qualification, licensing) are advisable. The closer the nuclear 
power plants come to the end of their licensed operation, especially due to the low market 
price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licensees to initiate modernisations or 
other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs.
• Knowledge and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme 
at NPPs must be maintained.
• Additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to 
identify possible new ageing mechanisms and to develop new inspection or monitoring 
technologies for early enough detection of degradation.
• While new advanced inspection methods may reveal new defects, identification of the 
associated root or progress of the defecs over time is challenging
• Start of operation of Olkiluoto 3. A transition from a construction phase to operating phase can 
be a challenge both for the licensee and the regulatory body. The licensee should be ready to take 
the ownership of the plant, and the regulatory body should shift the focus of the oversight to 
ensuring safe operation which is different from overseeing a construction project.
A good practice is a practice, policy of program that makes a significant contribution to nuclear safety. 
It should be tired and proven in the country in question; not widely implemented in other countries 
but applicable to them. Good performance is otherwise similar, but may not be completely proven yet. 
Finland considers the following to be a good practice or a good performance:
• Improving culture for safety: Finnish nuclear community, including the regulator, has 
taken various actions to understand and improve culture for safety in their organisations. 
These include research activities in the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018 (e.g. the 
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sociological factors influencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community), licensees and 
licence applicant’s safety culture programmes complemented by independent safety culture 
studies conducted by VTT, STUK’s studies on its own safety culture programme and development 
of a safety culture programme for further improvement, and organisation of a Country-Specific 
Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK 
discussed the country specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety 
culture. (good practice)
• Requirement management at STUK: STUK has developed a systematic approach for regulatory 
requirement management. The requirement management database contains the requirements 
presented in the regulations and guides. In the tool, each requirement has attributes (links 
to higher level legislation, links to licensing phase like construction or operation in which 
the requirement is relevant etc). Furthermore, the information about the fulfilment of the 
requirements at the facilities and the possible approved exemptions are recorded in the tool. This 
enables STUK to have all the time an overall picture of the compliance with the requirements at 
the NPPs. In updating the regulations and guides, the justification for modifications as well as 
comments received from the stakeholders are recorded in the tool. Between updates, recognised 
needs for modifications are also entered into the tool. (good practice)
• Interpretation and implementation of the Vienna Declaration in the Finnish Regulations: 
The Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree stipulates that the radioactive releases resulting from a 
severe accident at a nuclear power plant shall not necessitate large-scale protective measures 
for the population nor any long-term restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land and 
water. This safety goal is similar to the first principle of the Vienna Declaration. In addition, the 
Decree states that in order to limit the long-term effects, the limit for atmospheric releases of 
Cs-137 is 100 TBq. The possibility of exceeding the set limit and of a release in the early stages 
of an accident requiring measures to protect the population shall be extremely small. STUK has 
included in the regulatory guides more detailed and more concrete interpretations for those 
safety goals of the Vienna Declaration. Guide YVL C.3 explains what is meant by “large-scale 
protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate that any release of radioactive 
substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the population beyond the 
protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency planning zone (appr. 
20 km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit shall be 
designed in a way that:
• the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during 
an accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 
5∙10-7/year;
• the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase 
of a severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency. 
(good practice)
• Radiation measurement team from volunteers: A large scale nuclear or radiological emergency 
like a severe accident at a nuclear power plant, an explosion of a nuclear weapon or an explosion 
of so called dirty bomb could threat the function of the society. STUK, The National Defense 
Training Association of Finland and National Emergency Supply Agency launched in 2017 a 
project to establish a radiation measurement team from volunteers. The persons are trained and 
equipped by the three above mentioned organizations. The purpose of the team is to support 
authorities during a large scale nuclear or radiological emergency. In such situations, STUK’s 
duty is to give recommendations to the domestic authorities. The recommendations are based, 
among other things, on the performed radiation measurements. The first training course for the 
volunteers was arranged in spring 2018, followed by another course in autumn of the same year. 
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The team is to consist of about 40 persons and it is assumed to start radiation measurements 
during the intermediate phase of radiation or nuclear emergency. (good practice)
• The national nuclear safety research programme SAFIR: SAFIR is a comprehensive nuclear 
safety research programme, where all relevant stakeholders are participating. It is a significant 
resource investment for a small country to ensure and develop national nuclear safety assessment 
capabilities and competencies. The results of the research projects in SAFIR are publicly available 
and can be used freely. All the results are reported in English, which enables using the results also 
outside Finland. (good performance)
• Collecting regulatory experience: STUK has further developed procedures and a dedicated 
database for collecting, recording and analysing findings of regulatory activities. The aim is 
to improve STUK’s regulatory processes and functions based on the regulatory experience and 
share our lessons learnt with interested parties. The procedure for managing STUK’s regulatory 
experience has been applied since the beginning of 2019. (good performance)
• Communication with the public and the media: STUK applies the principle that all STUK’s 
employees have both the right and duty to participate in communication with the public and 
the media concerning their areas of expertise. STUK, for example, encourages its personnel to 
represent themselves as experts and STUK in social media. STUK has focused on communication 
capacity of its personnel and has published guidelines for the principles and practices of 
communication. Furthermore, STUK has defined strategic goals for communication, and 
measures – not only the outputs but particularly the outcomes – how communication changes 
opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour. (good performance)
Consideration of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the Contracting Parties by consensus at the 
Diplomatic Conference on 9 February 2015. The Vienna Declaration contains three principles to guide 
the Contracting Parties.
The first principle concerning the safety goal for new nuclear power plant design, siting, construc-
tion and operation is included in the Finnish regulations (see Articles 17 and 18). Furthermore, the Nu-
clear Energy Decree stipulates that the radioactive releases resulting from a severe accident at a nuclear 
power plant shall not necessitate large-scale protective measures for the population nor any long-term 
restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land and water. In order to limit the long term effects, the 
limit for atmospheric releases of Cs-137 is 100 TBq. The possibility of exceeding the set limit and of a 
release in the early stages of an accident requiring measures to protect the population shall be extremely 
small. Also, the possibility of a release in the early stages of the accident requiring measures to protect 
the public shall be extremely small. Finnish regulatory guide YVL C.3 explains in more detail what is 
meant by “large-scale protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate that any release 
of radioactive substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the population beyond 
the protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency planning zone (appr. 20 
km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit shall be designed in 
compliance with the Government Decree principles in a way that:
• the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during an 
accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 5∙10-7/
year;
• the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase of a 
severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency.
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Regarding the second principle, on the implementation of safety improvements at the operating 
NPPs to meet, as far as reasonably practicable, the safety goal of the first principle, Finnish Nuclear 
energy Act states that a periodic safety review (PSR) shall be conducted at least every ten years. In ad-
dition, it states that safety shall be maintained as high as practically possible and for further develop-
ment of safety, measures shall be implemented that can be considered justified considering operating 
experience and safety research and advances in science and technology. Hence, the implementation of 
safety improvements has been a continuing process at both the Finnish NPPs since their commission-
ing. Especially the approach that STUK issues regulatory guides for new NPPs and regularly updates 
them, and then makes separate decision on the implementation and needed safety improvements at 
the operating nuclear facilities and facilities under construction, ensures reasonably practicable safety 
improvements at the Finnish nuclear facilities. Finnish regulations require also that licensees maintain 
an up-to-date and comprehensive plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and that they use 
the PRA to enhance nuclear facility safety, to identify and prioritise plant modification needs and to 
compare the safety significance of alternative solutions. The most significant plant modifications and 
modernisation projects carried out at the Finnish NPPs during the plant life time including backfitting 
of severe accident management systems during 1980’s and 1990’s are described in Annexes 2 and 3.
Regarding the third principle of the Vienna Declaration requiring that national regulations need 
to take into account the relevant IAEA safety standards and, as appropriate, other good practices, the 
Finnish nuclear safety regulations and guides are regularly updated taking into account operating and 
construction experience, safety research and advances in science and technology. The overall revision of 
the regulatory guides in end of 2013 took into account the international guidance (e.g. the IAEA safety 
standards and the WENRA safety reference levels) and the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident. Due to updates in the IAEA Safety Requirements and in the WENRA Reference Levels since 
then, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 2017. The updated guides will be published in 2019.
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the objectives 
of the Convention, including the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety are complied 
with. Safety improvements have been implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since their com-
missioning. Legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed. Additional safety assess-
ments and implementation plans for safety improvements have been made at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants based on the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The IRRS mission (the IAEA’s 
Integrated Regulatory Review Team) was carried out in October 2012 and the follow-up mission in 2015. 
No urgent need exists for additional improvements to upgrade the safety of the Finnish nuclear power 
plants in the context of the Convention.
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1 Introduction
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopted on 17 June 
1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came 
into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish National Report for the Eighth Re-
view Meeting in March/April 2020.
In Chapter 2 of this report, the measures related to each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention are 
separately evaluated. The evaluation is based on the Finnish legislation and regulations as well as on the 
situation at the Finnish nuclear power plants. The reference is made to the IAEA Safety Requirements 
and other safety standards as appropriate. IAEA’s Information Circular 572, Rev. 6, 19 January 2018, was 
used as a guideline for the context of the report. Furthermore, the guidance prepared by the 8th Review 
Meeting President and sent to the National Contacts by letter dated on December 13, 2018, has been 
taken into account.
In the report, latest safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained in detail including 
safety assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of Finnish nuclear power plants is also 
presented by using representative indicators. The actions taken with regard to lessons learnt from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are discussed under applicable Articles. Finnish regulatory practices 
in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement are also 
covered in detail.
This Eighth National Report is aimed to be a stand-alone document and does not require famil-
iarisation with the earlier reports. The fulfilment of the obligations of the Convention is described in 
general and the latest development since the Seventh Review Meeting is specifically described.
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2 Compliance with Articles 6 to 19 – 
Article-by-article review
Article 6. Existing nuclear installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear installations existing at 
the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary 
in the context of this Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are 
made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, 
plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the 
shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environ-
mental and economic impact.
There are two operating nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The 
Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors, of VVER type), operated by For-
tum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the Olkiluoto plant of two BWR units operated by Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO). A third unit at the Olkiluoto site, Olkiluoto 3 (pressurized water reactor with nominal 
thermal power 4300 MW), received operating license in March 2019 and is planned to start operation later 
in the year. At both sites there are fresh and spent fuel storage facilities, and facilities for storage and 
treatment of low and intermediate level nuclear wastes. Other existing nuclear installations in Finland 
are the disposal facilities for low and intermediate level nuclear waste at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plant 
sites. The disposal facility at Olkiluoto was taken into operation in 1992 and the facility at Loviisa in 1998.
For taking care of the spent fuel disposal, a joint company Posiva Oy has been established in 1995 
by Fortum and TVO. Research, development and planning work as well as construction for spent fuel 
disposal are in progress and the final disposal facility is envisaged to be operational in early 2020’s. The 
Decision-in-Principle (DiP) on the spent fuel disposal facility in deep crystalline bedrock was made by 
the Government in 2000 and ratified by the Parliament in 2001. In the connection of approving the DiP 
in May 2002 for the construction of the fifth power reactor in Finland, the Parliament also approved 
the DiP for expanding the capacity of the planned spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto to also in-
clude the spent fuel from this new reactor unit. The disposal facility will be constructed in the vicinity 
of the Olkiluoto NPP site. To confirm the suitability of the site, construction of an underground rock 
characterisation facility (ONKALO®) was commenced in 2004. The excavation of ONKALO® was com-
pleted during 2016. Posiva was granted a construction licence for the spent nuclear fuel facility by the 
Government in November 2015.
Finland is currently reviewing a construction licence application for Fennovoima’s NPP in Pyhäjoki. 
According to the set dead line in DiP, Fennovoima filed a construction licence application for Hanhikivi 
unit 1 (ROSATOM AES-2006 plant design) in June 2015 to the Government and submitted according to 
the Nuclear Energy Decree safety, security and safeguards documentation to STUK for regulatory review 
and assessment. It was noted that Fennovoima was not able to submit a complete licensing documen-
tation to the regulatory review and assessment at same time. Fennovoima was planning to complement 
its documentation during the years 2015–2017 according to a licensing plan. However, submitting the 
licensing documentation has been further delayed and in April 2019 the licensing documentation su-
mitted to STUK was still incomplete (see more details under Annex 5).
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Finland observes the principles of the Convention, when applicable, also in other uses of nuclear 
energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. in the use of a research reactor. In Finland, there is one TRIGA 
Mark II research reactor (250 kW), FiR 1, situated in Espoo. The research reactor was taken into operation 
in 1962, and it is operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). In 2012, VTT decided 
to commence the activities related to the planning of the decommissioning of the research reactor due 
to economical reasons. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure for decommissioning 
was conducted in 2013–2015. The reactor was permanently shut down in the end of June 2015. VTT 
applied operating license for the decommissioning phase in June 2017. At that time, decommissioning 
was not considered as a separate licensing step in the Finnish legislation, but decommissioning phase 
was to be carried out under an operating license. In beginning of 2018, decommissioning licence was 
added in the legislation as a new licencing phase for nuclear facilities. STUK gave its statement about 
VTT’s application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in April 2019. After this the 
first license application for decommissioning phase in Finland will proceed to the Government for the 
decision making process. This will be the first decommissioned nuclear facility in Finland representing 
a new challenge for the utility and the regulatory body.
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and enhancement approach is presented in the nuclear 
legislation. Nuclear Energy Act states that the safety of nuclear energy use shall be maintained at as high a level 
as practically possible. For the further development of safety, measures shall be implemented that can be considered 
justified considering operating experience and safety research and advances in science and technology. The imple-
mentation of safety improvements has been a continuing process at both Finnish nuclear power plants 
since their commissioning and there exists no urgent need to upgrade the safety of these plants in the 
context of the Convention, or Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.
FIGURE 2. FiR 1 research reactor.
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Loviisa NPP units 1 and 2
The reactor units at the Loviisa nuclear power plant were connected to the electrical grid in February 
8, 1977 (Loviisa 1) and November 4, 1980 (Loviisa 2). The nominal thermal power of both of the Loviisa 
units is 1500 MW (109% as compared to the original power of 1375 MW). The increase of the power level 
was implemented and licensed in 1998.
The licensee (Fortum Power and Heat Oy) holds the operating licences of the units, which are 
valid until the end of 2027 (Loviisa 1) and 2030 (Loviisa 2). The licence renewal of the plant took place in 
2005–2007. The Loviisa plant reached its original design lifetime in 2007–2010, but the technical, safe and 
economical lifetime of the plant is estimated to be at least 50 years according to the current knowledge 
of the plant ageing. The review was completed in July 2007 when STUK provided the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Employment with its statement on the safety of the plant. The Finnish Government 
granted the new operating licences as mentioned above in July 2007. The length of the operating licences 
corresponds to the current goal for the plant's lifetime, which is 50 years. According to the conditions 
of the operating licences, two periodic safety reviews are required to be carried out by the licensee (by 
the end of the year 2015 and 2023). STUK’s assessment of the first periodic safety review was completed 
in February 2017. Based on the assessment, STUK considered that the Loviisa NPP meets the set safety 
requirements for operational nuclear power plants. The second periodic safety review process has started 
in the end of 2018 and will be finalised before 2023. The licencee’s project also includes the evaluation 
of the possibility to continue operation beyond the current operating licence, but no decision on the 
lifetime extension has been made yet. Further information about periodic safety reviews at the Loviisa 
NPP is presented in Annex 2.
As a result of consistent plant improvements, the safety level of the plant has been increased as 
shown by the results of the probabilistic risk assessment (see Article 14). The latest large improvements 
– the renewal of the plant I&C safety systems and the renewal of the secondary circuit safety functions 
– were completed at the outages in 2018.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, safety improvements have been implemented at 
the Loviisa NPP. The most important improvements for the Loviisa 1 and 2 are:
• Flood protection. The licensee has estimated the effects of high sea water level on the plant 
safety. The licensee submitted a detailed plan of improved flood protection in 2015. The plan is 
based on strengthening of flood protection of the buildings most important to safety. Physical 
modifications have already been implemented and final updates for procedures will be finalized 
by the summer 2019.
FIGURE 3. loviisa nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. Source: Fortum.
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• Installation of diverse water supply to the spent fuel pools. STUK has approved the design plans. 
The plant modifications will be completed during 2019 outages. 
• The licensee has conducted an evaluation of the availability of cooling water and emergency 
diesel fuel in case of accidents at both units. The volumes on site have been considered adequate. 
Furthermore, the diesel fuel distribution capabilities (connections between different fuel tanks) 
have been improved.
• Ensuring the long-term decay heat removal in case of loss of seawater by implementing an 
alternative ultimate heat sink. The modification consists of two air-cooled cooling units per 
plant unit powered by an air-cooled diesel-generator. The other cooling unit would remove decay 
heat from the reactor and the other one ensures the decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool 
inside the containment and from the separate spent fuel interim storage pools.
The modifications related to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, as well as other latest ongoing 
improvements at the Loviisa NPP are described in more detail in Article 18 and in Annex 2.These also 
include the most significant plant modifications and modernisation projects carried out at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant during the plant lifetime, as well as STUK’s safety reviews. During recent years, only 
minor operational events have taken place and no major safety issues have occurred (see also Article 19).
Plant lifetime management includes adequate procedures for the follow-up of the plant ageing. The 
conditions of components which are practically impossible to be replaced by new ones (pressure vessel, 
steam generators, etc.) are monitored most actively. One specific issue with the Loviisa plant units is 
the risk of reactor pressure vessel brittle fracture. Several modifications to reduce this risk have been 
implemented, but some further improvements are to be introduced in 2019 at both units. During the 
latest operating licence renewal process Fortum submitted a comprehensive analysis based on which 
the brittle fracture risk can be managed until the end of the 50 years plant lifetime.
In addition to the regulatory oversight and safety assessment, there have been independent safety 
reviews conducted by international organisations such as IAEA and WANO (World Association of Nuclear 
Operators). IAEA OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) missions have been organised at the Loviisa 
NPP in November 1990, in March 2007 with the follow-up review in July 2008 and the last one in March 
2018. The WANO peer reviews have been carried out at the Loviisa NPP at the beginning of 2001, in March 
2010 with a follow-up review in 2012, and in March 2015 including also the WANO corporate review in 
January 2016 and the WANO follow-up review in 2017. The latest WANO peer review was in March 2019.
TABLE 1. Operational data of loviisa NPP in 2016–2018.
Year Net production LO1/
LO2 [GWh]
Load factor LO1/LO2 
[%]
Duration of refueling and main­
tenance outage LO1/LO2 [days]
Collective radiation dose 
LO1/LO2 [manSv]
2016 3863/4069 88,6/93.5 38/20 0.522/0.321
2017 4087/4072 93/92.9 21.4/17,6 0.237/0.276
2018 4229/3771 90.9/85.9 26.5/46.7 0.267/0.973
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Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2
The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units were connected to the electrical network in September 2, 1978 
(Olkiluoto 1) and February 18, 1980 (Olkiluoto 2). The nominal thermal power of both units is 2500 MW, 
which was licensed in 1998. The new power level is 115.7% as compared to the previous 2160 MW licensed 
in 1983. The original power level of both units was 2000 MW, thus the current power level is 125% of the 
original one. The Operating Licences of the units are valid until the end of 2038.
The latest periodic safety review (PSR) of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 was carried out in 2016–2018 
in connection of the licence renewal of the operation of the plant. Based on the application, STUK 
carried out a comprehensive review of the safety of the Olkiluoto plant. The review was completed in 
May 2018 when STUK provided the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment with its statement 
on the safety of the plant. The Finnish Government granted in September 2018 an operating licence for 
units 1 and 2 until the end of 2038. One periodic safety review has to be carried out by the licensee as a 
licence condition (by the end of 2028). The operating licence renewal of Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 is 
described in more detail in Annex 3.
The most important safety improvements due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident under 
planning and implemented at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are:
• Assessing possibilities to ensure cooling of the reactor core in case of total loss of AC supplies 
and systems. The resulting arrangement will consist of high and low pressure systems. The high 
pressure system is based on a steam driven turbine, and the low pressure system pumps coolant 
into the core from the fire fighting system. The modifications were implemented in 2016–2018.
• Ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water system pumps independently of the sea water 
cooling systems. The modification has been implemented at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. During the 
testing of one subsystem abnormal vibration and pressure oscillations were observed, and 
therefore the modification in Olkiluoto 2 was delayed. The vibration issue at Olkiluoto 1 has been 
solved and the modification will be implemented at Olkiluoto 2 in 2019.
• The diverse cooling water supply to the spent fuel pools in the reactor building have been 
completed in 2015. To support monitoring of the water level in the spent fuel pools a 
measurement system was implemented in 2017.The utility has acquired new mobile equipment 
(aggregates, pumps) to inject water into the pools.
• The availability of cooling water and emergency diesel generator fuel in case of accidents 
at multiple reactor units and other nuclear facilities at the same site has been evaluated as 
adequate.
FIGURE 4. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. Source: TVO.
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The modifications related to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, as well as other latest ongoing 
improvements at the Olkiluoto NPP are described in more detail in Article 18 and in Annex 3. These also 
include the most significant plant modifications and modernisation projects carried out at the Olkiluoto 
NPP during the plant lifetime, as well as STUK’s safety reviews. During recent years, only minor opera-
tional events have taken place and no major safety issues have occurred (see also Article 19).
In addition to the regulatory oversight and safety assessment, there have been independent safety 
reviews conducted by international organisations. The IAEA OSART missions has been conducted at 
Olkiluoto in 1986 and 2017. The WANO peer reviews have been carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant in 1999, in 2006 with a follow-up review in 2009, and in 2012 with a follow-up review in 2014 and 
in 2016. The WANO review 2016 also included the WANO corporate review.
TABLE 2. Operational data of Olkiluoto NPP in 2016–2018.
Year Net production OL1/
OL2 [GWh]
Load factor  OL1/OL2 
[%]
Duration of refueling and main­
tenance outage OL1/OL2 [days]
Collective radiation dose 
OL1/OL2 [manSv]
2016 7048/7301 91.4/94.6 21/10 0.64/0.24
2017 7158/6256 93.1/81.3 10/64 0.22/0.73
2018 6755/7334 87.8/94.3 41/14 0.84/0.26
Olkiluoto NPP unit 3
Construction licence for the fifth nuclear power plant unit in Finland on the Olkiluoto site was granted 
in February 2005. Olkiluoto 3 unit is a 1600 MWe European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), the design 
of which is based on the French N4 and German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn key delivery is provided by 
the Consortium Areva NP and Siemens
Construction work is almost completed and commissioning phase is on-going. TVO submitted 
the operating licence application in April 2016 to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. 
Operating licence is needed prior to loading nuclear fuel into the reactor core. STUK gave its statement 
and safety assessment in February 2019 and the Finnish Government issued the Operating Licence in 
March 2019. However, operating license alone does not allow starting fuel loading to the reactor. Some 
preparations for operation were still ongoing art the time the operating license was granted (e.g. some 
pre-operational tests, implementation of security arrangments, V&v of operating procedures) and before 
fuel loading STUK will verify that all preparations for safe operation have been complete. IAEA carried 
out pre-OSART already in March 2018, as at that time the fuel loading was expected to happen during 
spring 2018. Also, the WANO pre-startup peer review will be carried out before the fuel loading. Licensing 
and construction of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is described in more detail in Annex 4.
FIGURE 5. Olkiluoto NPP unit 3. Source: TVO.
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Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, additional safety improvements have also been in-
itiated for the Olkiluoto NPP unit 3. These include e.g. the possibility to add water to fuel pools from fire 
water distribution system as well as the possibility to move diesel fuel from emergency diesel generator 
storage tanks to station blackout diesel storage tanks. Additional mobile pumps to provide water injection 
into the fire fighting water system are to be acquired before the start of operation of the Olkiluoto unit 
3. With the mobile pumps, water can also be added directly to fuel pools with hoses. Preparations have 
also been made to enable restoring the AC distribution system functionality by replacing the internals 
of damaged cabinets in case of full loss of all electrical power.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 6.
Article 7. Legislative and regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the 
safety of nuclear installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
 i. the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;
 ii. a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear 
installation without a licence;
 iii. a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain compliance with 
applicable regulations and the terms of licences;
iv. the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licences, including suspension, modification or 
revocation.
Legislative and regulatory framework
The current nuclear energy legislation in Finland (see Annex 1) is based on the Nuclear Energy Act 
originally from 1987. The Act has been amended over twenty times during the years it has been in force: 
most changes are minor and originate from changes to EU or other Finnish legislation. In 2008, nucle-
ar energy legislation was updated to correspond to current level of safety requirements and the new 
Finnish Constitution which came into force in 2000. Together with a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree 
originally from 1988, the scope of this legislation covers e.g.
• the construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; nuclear 
facilities refer to facilities for producing nuclear energy, including research reactors, facilities for 
extensive disposal of nuclear wastes, and facilities used for extensive fabrication, production, use, 
handling or storage of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes
• the possession, fabrication, production, transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear wastes as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
In 2012, the Finnish regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed in the IRRS 
(Integrated Regulatory Review Service) peer review process. According to the IRRS recommendations, 
some amendments were made to the legislation aimed to increase the independence of STUK and to 
extend its authorities. The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2015. The Government, when making 
a decision in principle, and the licensing authority as giving a license, were obligated to take into ac-
count STUK’s proposals given in the preliminary safety assessment and safety proposals given by STUK 
in its license application statement. Regulations were added expanding STUK’s mandate in radiation 
monitoring in the immediate vicinity of nuclear facilities and giving STUK a mandate to issue binding 
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STUK Regulations concerning the areas of previous Government Decrees; the safety of nuclear power 
plants, safety of the disposal of nuclear waste as well as emergency and security arrangements of nu-
clear facilities, and a new area concerning mining and milling operations aimed to produce uranium or 
thorium. STUK issued the regulations on 1st January 2016. Updates were published and came into force 
on 15th December 2018.
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (STUK Y/1/2018)
• STUK Regulation on Emergency Arrangements of a Nuclear Power Plant (STUK Y/2/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy (STUK Y/3/2016)
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling Operations aimed at Producing Uranium 
or Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016).
STUK Regulations and their explanatory memorandums are published in Finnish and Swedish which 
are official. English translations are also published but their status is unofficial.
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2017 for implementation of the Council Directive 2014/87/
Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear 
safety of nuclear installations. The amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act entered into force on 1st 
January 2018 and supplemented also the former implementation (2013) of the Nuclear Waste Directive 
(2011/70/Euratom) due to the additional questions by the Commission. The most significant changes 
caused by the directives concerned transparency of activities, licensee’s obligation to provide information 
and responsibility for subcontractors, involvement of the population in decision-making concerning 
the nuclear facility licensing and international peer reviews. At the same time, the provisions of the 
act regarding pressure equipment were updated due to the new Pressure Equipment Act (1144/2016) 
that entered into force on 1st January 2017. In addition, national legislation was deemed to require dis-
ambiguation on matters related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste man-
agement, which is why further specifications were entered in the act regarding these matters, and the 
decommissioning licence was added as a new licencing phase for nuclear facilities, and changes were 
made regarding waste management.
The Nuclear Energy Act amendment proposals concerning security arrangements in the use of 
nuclear energy were started in conjunction with the preparation for the amendment that entered into 
force in the beginning of 2018, but were separated from the Nuclear Energy Act amendment bill based 
on the feedback received during the circulation for comments. Preparation of the bill was continued by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, STUK, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry 
of Justice separately, and the government bill for amending the act was sent for comments on 15 Novem-
ber 2018 and statements were requested by mid-January 2019. The amendment proposal concerns e.g. 
authorities of security personnel and the temporal dimension of the use of security personnel, specially 
the point of time when security organisation have to be established in new plant projects. Provisions 
on health examinations for security and control room personnel and the right to report of the doctor or 
other medical professional in relation to the health examinations are proposed to be added to the act as 
completely new items. New items also include rules of jurisdiction concerning defence against drones 
and unmanned aerial vehicles at nuclear power plant sites. This amendment of the Act will possibly 
enter into force by the end of 2019.
The amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act due to the amendment (2014/52/EU) of Directive 
2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment 
came into force on 1st May 2017. The new requirements in the Act concerned the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) responsibilities of the license applicant, informing about a pending application and 
measures that the licence shall include for preventing or reducing significant detrimental environmental 
impacts.
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The Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) was amended in 2017 and the amendment entered into force on 
1st January 2018. Due to the amendments made to the Nuclear Energy Act provisions further specifying 
the licencing procedure regarding decommissioning of nuclear facilities and oversight by STUK were 
added to the decree. Provisions regarding the minimum contents of the national nuclear waste man-
agement programme were also added to the decree. Due to the new Environmental Impact Assessment 
Act (252/2017) the references to the EIA procedure were updated. Furthermore, provisions regarding the 
phases of and documents related to the procedure were amended for compliance with the new act. Some 
minor technical corrections and specifications were also made to the Nuclear Energy Decree.
Implementation of STUK’s new strategy includes developing the regulations and guides to sup-
port the strategy. STUK has started the evaluation of needed modifications. In the same context, STUK 
evaluates if there are any needs to modify the present licensing model presented in the Nuclear Energy 
Act and Nucelar Energy Decree (Decision in Principle – Construction License – Operating License – 
Decommissioning License), for example considering the applicability of the present models to SMRs.
On 15 December 2018, the new Radiation Act (859/2018), the Government Decree on ionising radia-
tion (1034/2018), the Decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on ionising radiation (1044/2018) 
and the Decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on limiting public exposure to non-ionising 
radiation (1045/2018) entered into force. The new radiation legislation implemented the EU radiation 
safety directive (BSS, 2013/59/Euratom). The requirements of the BSS directive concerning the use of 
nuclear energy were implemented through the amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act (862/2018), which 
entered into force on 15 December 2018 as an annexed act to the Radiation Act. The new Section 2a on 
the application of the Radiation Act to the use of nuclear energy was added to the Nuclear Energy Act. 
New sections on the exemption of radioactive waste from regulatory control, clearance levels and dilu-
tion prohibition of nuclear waste were also added to the act.
When the radiation legislation was reformed, not only contents but also statutory levels were 
checked to ensure that they are in line with the requirements of the Constitution. In practice, this means 
that requirements that were previously included in radiation safety guides (ST Guides) and decisions 
issued by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority are now presented as binding provisions in acts, 
decrees and STUK Regulations issued by virtue of the Radiation Act.
The first regulations issued by virtue of the Radiation Act by the end of December 2018 concerned 
work-related radiation exposure, radiation safety deviations, security arrangements for radiation sources, 
and ionising radiation measurements relating to work-related exposure, public exposure and medical 
exposure. The regulations on radiation safety deviations and security arrangements for radiation sources 
are not applied to the use of nuclear energy referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987).
By virtue of the Radiation Act and the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK also issued on 15 December 2018 
a new common regulation on the exemption values for radioactive substances and the clearance levels 
of radioactive materials. However, the clearance values are not applied to the use of nuclear energy.
At the same time with the international negotiations to update the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
on Nuclear Liability also the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act was reviewed by a special governmental 
committee already in 2002. The financial provisions to cover the possible damage and resulting costs 
caused by a nuclear accident have been arranged according to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. A 
remarkable increase in the sum available for compensation of nuclear damages is expected in the future 
since international negotiations about the revision of the Paris/Brussels agreements on nuclear liability 
were successfully completed in 2004. In addition to the revised agreements, Finland decided to enact 
unlimited licensee liability by law. This means, that insurance coverage will be required for a minimum 
amount of EUR 700 million and the liability of Finnish operators shall be unlimited in cases where 
nuclear damage has occurred in Finland and also the third tier of the Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion (providing cover up to EUR 1500 million) has been exhausted. The revised law will also have some 
other improvements, like extending the claiming period up to 30 years for victims of nuclear accidents 
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(personal injuries). The law amendment (2005) has not taken effect yet. It will enter into force at a later 
date as determined by Government Decree. The entering into force of the amending act will take place 
as the 2004 Protocols amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions will enter into force.
As the ratification of the 2004 Protocols has been delayed, Finland made a temporary amendment in 
the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, implementing the provision on unlimited liability and require-
ment of insurance coverage for a minimum amount of EUR 700 million by the operator. The temporary 
law came into force in January 2012 and will be repealed when the 2005 law amendment takes effect. In 
Finland, the finishing off the international ratification process of the convention amendments without 
any undue delay is considered to be extremely important.
Provision of regulatory guidance
According to Section 7 r of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK shall specify detailed safety requirements 
concerning the implementation of safety level in accordance with the Act. These requirements are pre-
sented in regulatory guides which are called YVL Guides. STUK shall specify the safety requirements it 
sets and publish them as part of the regulations issued by the STUK.
The safety requirements in YVL Guides are binding on the licensee, while preserving the licensee's 
right to propose an alternative procedure or solution to that provided for in the requirements. If the 
licensee can convincingly demonstrate that the proposed procedure or solution will implement safety 
level in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act and STUK Regulations, STUK may approve this proce-
dure or solution.
New YVL Guides are applied to new nuclear facilities as such. The procedure to apply new guides 
to existing nuclear facilities and to facilities under construction is such that the publication of an YVL 
Guide does not, as such, alter any previous decisions made by STUK. Before an implementation decision 
is made by STUK the licensees are requested to evaluate the compliance with the new guide. In case of 
non-compliances the licensee has to propose plans for improvement and schedules for achieving com-
pliance. After having heard those concerns, STUK makes a separate decision on how a new or revised 
YVL Guide applies to operating nuclear facilities, or to those under construction. STUK can approve 
exemptions from new requirements if it is not technically or economically reasonable to implement 
respective modifications and if the safety justification is considered adequate. This is a case by case de-
cision. For example Finnish operating NPPs are granted excemptions from the requirements concerning 
protection against large airplane crashes.
In compliance with the national strategy and with expectations of IAEA the important references 
considered in the Finnish regulations for nuclear safety are the IAEA safety standards, especially the 
Safety Requirements. Finland as a member of WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Associa-
tion) has committed itself to implement Safety Reference Levels published by WENRA. Also the WENRA 
Safety Objectives for new reactors and the WENRA positions on some key technical issues are considered. 
Other sources of safety information are worldwide co-operation with other countries utilising nuclear 
energy, e.g. OECD/NEA, MDEP (Multinational Design Evaluation Programme), VVER Forum, and EU 
Clearinghouse. The Finnish policy is to participate actively in the international discussions on devel-
oping safety standards and adopt or adapt the new safety requirements into national regulations. The 
regulatory guides are updated based on advances in science and technology, results of safety research 
and on analysis of operational experience.
The regulatory guides are regularly re-evaluated for updating. If there is not any immediate need 
for corrections or updates of YVL guides (e.g. EU directives, new international requirements or update 
of pertinent national legislation) there are criteria in STUK’s management system guidance for the re-
view and updating of the regulations. The preparation process of the regulatory guides includes internal 
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and external commenting of STUK and the stakeholders and hearings of relevant advisory committees. 
The public participation is made possible through the website of STUK where the drafts for external 
commenting are available.
After amending the nuclear energy legislation in 2008, also the revision of all YVL Guides was 
commenced to reflect the enhanced safety requirements. The thorough revision and update of the YVL 
Guides aimed at more goal-based and more user-friendly set of requirements. The updating integrated 
the lessons learnt from the regulatory oversight especially the lessons learnt from the Olkiluoto unit 3 
project. The set of YVL Guides covers safety, security and safeguards.
A Safety management 
of a nuclear facility
B Plant and system 
design
C Radiation safety of 
a nuclear facility and 
environment
D Nuclear materials 
and waste
E Structures and equipment 
of a nuclear facility
A.1 Regulatory 
oversight of safety 
in the use of nuclear 
energy
A.2 Site for a nuclear 
facility
A.3 leadership and 
management for safety
A.4 Organisation and 
personnel of a nuclear 
facility
A.5 Construction and 
commissioning of a 
nuclear facility
A.6 Conduct of 
operations at a nuclear 
power plant
A.7 Probabilistic risk 
assessment and risk 
management of a 
nuclear power plant
A.8 Ageing 
management of a 
nuclear facility
A.9 Regular reporting 
on the operation of a 
nuclear facility
A.10 Operating 
experience feedback 
of a nuclear facility
A.11 Security of a 
nuclear facility
A.12 Information 
security management 
of a nuclear facility
B.1 Safety design 
of a nuclear power 
plant
B.2 Classification of 
systems, structures 
and components 
of a nuclear facility
B.3 Deterministic 
safety analyses for 
a nuclear power 
plant
B.4 Nuclear fuel 
and reactor
B.5 Reactor coolant 
circuit of a nuclear 
power plant
B.6 Containment 
of a nuclear power 
plant
B.7 Provisions 
for internal and 
external hazards at 
a nuclear facility
B.8 Fire protection 
at a nuclear facility
C.1 Structural radiation 
safety at a nuclear 
facility
C.2 Radiation 
protection and 
exposure monitoring 
of nuclear facility 
workers
C.3 limitation and 
monitoring of 
radioactive releases 
from a nuclear facility
C.4 Assessment of 
radiation doses to the 
public in the vicinity of 
a nuclear facility
C.5 Emergency 
arrangements of a 
nuclear power plant
C.6 Radiation 
monitoring at a nuclear 
facility
C.7 Radiological 
monitoring of the 
environment of a 
nuclear facility
D.1 Regulatory control 
of nuclear safeguards
D.2 Transport of 
nuclear materials and 
nuclear waste
D.3 Handling and 
storage of nuclear 
fuel
D.4 Predisposal 
management of low 
and intermediate 
level nuclear waste 
and decommissioning 
of a nuclear facility
D.5 Disposal of 
nuclear waste
D.6 Production of 
uranium and thorium 
in the mining and 
milling industry
D.7 Release barriers 
of spent nuclear fuel 
disposal facility
E.1 Authorised inspection 
body and the licensee’s 
in-house inspection 
organisation
E.2 Procurement and 
operation of nuclear fuel 
and control rods
E.3 Pressure vessels and 
piping of a nuclear facility
E.4 Strength analyses of 
nuclear power plant pressure 
equipment
E.5 In-service inspection 
of nuclear facility pressure 
equipment with non-
destructive testing methods
E.6 Buildings and structures 
of a nuclear facility
E.7 Electrical and I&C 
equipment of a nuclear 
facility
E.8 Valves of a nuclear 
facility
E.9 Pumps of a nuclear 
facility
E.10 Emergency power 
supplies of a nuclear facility
E.11 Hoisting and transfer 
equipment of a nuclear 
facility
E.12 Testing organisations 
for mechanical components 
and structures of a nuclear 
facility
E.13 Ventilation and air 
conditioning equipment of a 
nuclear facility
Collected definitions of yVl Guides: same data is shown both as the collection and within the guides.
FIGURE 6. The structure of regulatory guides (yVl Guides).
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Considering the WENRA Safety Reference Levels published in 2007 and 2008, the Finnish policy was 
to include all of them in the revised regulatory guide system. This was done during the work through a 
systematic approach to earmark all the Reference Levels to certain guides.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident it was decided to include lessons learnt from the 
accident into the revised YVL Guides, which delayed the completion of the new guides. The most im-
portant changes that were included in the new YVL Guides due to the TEPCO Fukushima accident deal 
with the design of NPPs and spent fuel storages, consideration of severe external hazards and with 
the requirements concerning on-site emergency preparedness including multi-unit accidents. STUK 
participated WENRA’s work on the update of the Safety Reference Levels after the Fukushima accident 
and most of the updated Reference Levels were already taken into account in the finalisation of the 
revised YVL guides.
The new set of YVL guides was published 1st December 2013 (see Annex 1). The publication of 2 
guides out of 45 guides took place during 2016. These were left to wait for publication due to the needed 
changes in the legislation and upper level regulations. Unofficial English translations of YVL Guides 
were also published. Justification memorandums were published in connection of each guide in Finnish.
Systematic training on application of new YVL Guides were provided to the licensees by STUK’s 
personnel involved in preparation of guides. Furthermore several training courses on YVL Guides directed 
for stakeholders, have been arranged also in English.
The guidance has since 2013 a new structure: guides are grouped under 5 topical areas. Single 
guides have a standard format and compact presentation of numbered requirements. Descriptive text 
in requirements is avoided. Additional clarification of requirements is written in justification memoran-
dums (separately for each guide). Guides use consistent terminology, in Finnish and in English, which 
is collected into a glossary.
Using numbered requirements enables systematic requirement management. STUK uses a com-
mercially available software (Polarion). In the tool, each requirement has attributes (links to higher level 
legislation, in which phase of a life cycle of the facility the requirement is relevant etc). The attributes 
enable performing different searches. Furthermore, the information about the fulfilment of the require-
ments at the facilities and the possible approved exemptions are recorded in the tool.
With regard to operating nuclear facilities and those under construction, the Guides shall be en-
forced through a separate decision to be taken by STUK. After publishing the new YVL guides at the 
end of 2013 STUK asked in January 2014 licensees to make their assessments concerning fulfilment of 
requirements: requirement by requirement assessment, justifications for the fulfilment and references 
to plant documentation. Requests for these assessments concerned separately the operating NPP units, 
the unit under construction (Olkiluoto 3) and the research reactor as well. Deadlines for submittals were 
for operating nuclear power plants by the end of 2014 and for the unit under construction the operating 
licence application (April 2016).
STUK’s target was to create a common view on application of requirements in new YVL Guides 
for existing nuclear facilities and store the information in the requirement management system to be 
utilised in STUK’s oversight activities in future. STUK made requirement by requirement assessment 
in the requirement management tool and based on this work an overall assessment of the safety of the 
nuclear power plant and planned safety improvements.The implementation decisions were given by the 
1st of October 2015 for operating plants and by the 1st of January 2016 for the research reactor.
STUK started the evaluation work for Olkiluoto unit 3 in 2016 together with the review of the 
operating licence application. The implementation decisions were finalised and sent to the licensee in 
2017 and the YVL Guides published at the end of 2013 entered into force for Olkiluoto 3 as the operating 
license was granted on 7th March 2019.
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STUK made in 2017 policy decisions regarding the application of the YVL Guides to Posiva’s spent 
fuel encapsulating and disposal facilities during their construction phase and during the future licens-
ing phases.
The YVL Guide implementation decisions covered 45 YVL Guides and the around 6400 requirements 
included in them. STUK assessed guide-specific reports by the licensees, focusing on the processing of 
non-conformances and measures proposed by the licensees. According to STUK’s evaluation, the revised 
guides did not contain notable technical modification needs with regard to operating facilities since 
several plant improvements were already initiated after the Fukushima accident (Fukushima related 
improvement measures were in line with the updated requirements). Several plant modifications had 
also been implemented during last decades or were under implementation based on previously updated 
regulatory requirements, PRA results and periodic safety review (PSR) results. Operating NPPs had never-
theless, during the next few years, to expand the scope of their accident analyses, to improve measures 
related to the facilities’ ageing management and to develop facility documentation that advances the 
traceability of modification plans. More than 60 people participated in the preparation of STUK’s im-
plementation decisions, using 6 man-years.
After the renewal of YVL Guides in 2013 nearly all IAEA Safety Requirements documents were re-
vised. Just because of TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident IAEA had updated Requirements documents 
concerning site selection, design, operation, safety analysis, and regulatory oversight of nuclear power 
plants, and additionally General Safety Requirements on response to emergencies. The updated WENRA 
Safety Reference Levels for Existing Reactors taking into account the lessons learnt and the insight from 
the EU stress tests were published in fall 2014. WENRA had also published Safety Reference Levels for 
Waste and Spent Fuel Storages in 2014, and both for Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities and De-com-
missioning in 2015. The national regulators were committed to improve and harmonize their national 
regulatory systems by implementing the new Safety Reference Levels until the end of 2017.
The updated international requirements were reviewed and assessed by STUK to clarify the need for 
further modifications of STUK’s regulations (STUK Regulations and Regulatory Guides, YVL Guides, see 
Annex 1). In this connection also the new requirements of Council Directive (2014/87/Euratom) amend-
ing Nuclear Safety Directive (2009/71/Euratom) and BSS directive (Basic Safety Standards Directive, 
2013/59/ Euratom) were reviewed and assessed their impact on the Finnish nuclear energy regulations; 
the legislation and STUK’s regulations.
The YVL Guide update work began in 2017 using STUK’s requirement management system. Extend 
of the revision of each YVL Guide was assessed and decided (minor or major changes). In most of the 
YVL Guides only minor changes were needed. In 2017 a total of 13 and in 2018 24 YVL Guides were sent 
for comments and statements. The five remaining YVL Guides under update and two totally new YVL 
Guides (YVL D.6, YVL E.13) will be sent for comments in 2019. Changes in YVL guides were mainly clar-
ifications, updates to references to regulations and minor changes to requirements. Also the feedback 
from licensees received in the implementation of YVL Guides published in 2013 was taken into account 
in the update. Special objective in this YVL Guide update was to reduce licensee’s and regulators admin-
istrative burden where possible. STUK processed together 5000 comments and proposals for changes, 
60 per cent of which were approved for implementation in this revision round. Both in 2017 and in 
2018 more than 100 persons at STUK participated in the updating of STUK regulations and YVL Guides 
using approximately 10 person-years within these 2 years. Updated YVL Guides and their explanatory 
memorandums are published on web (Stuklex and Finlex) in Finnish and English by the end of 2019. 
Until now ( June 2019) 22 YVL Guides are already published.
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System of licensing
The licensing process is defined in the Finnish legislation. The construction, operation and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility is not allowed without a licence. The licensing process is lead by the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs and Employment and licenses are granted by the Government. The conditions 
for granting a licence are prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act Chapter 5 (Sections 16-27). For a nuclear 
power plant, nuclear waste disposal facility, or another significant nuclear facility the process consists 
of four steps (see Figure 7):
• Decision-in-Principle – made by the Government and ratified by the Parliament
• Construction licence – granted by the Government
• Operating licence – granted by the Government
• Decommissioning license – granted by the Government.
Bidding & site preparation
Construction
Operation
Decommissioning License
Decision-in-Principle
Construction License
Operating License
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (utility)
Feasibility studies (utility)
Nuclear safety
Energy policy
FIGURE 7. Four steps of licensing of nuclear facilities.
Before a construction licence for a nuclear power plant, nuclear waste disposal facility, or other significant 
nuclear facility can be applied for, a Decision-in-Principle (DiP) by the Government and a subsequent 
ratification of the DiP by the Parliament are required. DiP-process is prescibed in the Nuclear Energy Act 
Chapter 4 (Sections 11–15). An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure has to be conducted 
prior to the application of the DiP and the EIA report has to be annexed to the DiP application. Nuclear 
Energy Decree has been complemented in 2017 with a requirement that the applicant shall submit as a 
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part of DiP application a reasoned conclusion by the competent authority on the EIA assessment report 
as a conclusion of successful EIA process. The admendment was introduced as a lesson learned from 
Fennovoima Hanhikivi 1 DiP and EIA processes. A condition for granting the Decision-in-Principle is 
that the construction of the facility in question is in line with the overall good of society. Further con-
ditions are as follows: the municipality of the intended site of the nuclear facility has to be in favour of 
constructing the facility and no factors have appeared which indicate that the proposed facility could 
not be constructed and operated in a safe manner.
The entry into force of the Decision-in-Principle further requires ratification by the Parliament. 
The Parliament can not make any changes to the Decision; it can only approve it or reject it as it is. The 
stakeholders involved in the Decision-in-Principle process and their tasks are described in Figure 8. In 
Decision-in-Principle phase STUK prepares a statement on safety and preliminary safety assessment 
concerning the applicant, the proposed plant designs and plant sites. STUK asks also a statements e.g. 
from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety and from the Ministry of the Interior concerning the 
emergency preparedness and physical protection arrangements.
For the construction, operating and decommissioning licence application, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment asks STUK’s statement on safety. Construction and operating licence documents 
to be submitted to STUK for approval in this phase are defined in Sections 35 and 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. STUK asks also statements e.g. from the Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety and 
from the Ministry of the Interior on emergency preparedness and security arrangements. After receiving 
all statements for the construction, operating or decommissioning license, the Government will make 
its decision. In the construction, operating and decomminnioning licence phases the acceptance of the 
Parliament and the host municipality are no more needed.
Parliament:
Confirms Decision in Principle
Government:
Makes licensing decisions
Ministry of Economic Aairs 
and Employment:
Conducts preparations
Four step 
licensing:
• Decision in Principle
• Construction Licence
• Operating Licence
• Decomissoning Licence
Public, other authorities, and 
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STUK 
(regulatory body)
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Nuclear safety  
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Safety documents
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review and 
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Application
Advice
Statement on safety 
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FIGURE 8. Stakeholders in the licensing process.
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The Finnish process of licensing was assessed in the IRRS mission conducted in Finland in October 
2012. The IRRS team gave a recommendation that the Finnish Government should seek to modify the 
Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly and unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal authorities in 
the authorization process for safety. In particular, the changes should ensure that STUK has the legal 
authority to specify any licence conditions necessary for safety. Due to the recommendations, the Nu-
clear Energy Act was amended in 2015 and 2017. Based on these changes the Government has to take into 
account the proposals included in the STUK’s statements when considering the (licensing) conditions 
of the Decision-in-Principle and licences for nuclear facilities.
The Decision-in-Principle procedure has been applied several times. The first DiP concerning the 
encapsulation and disposal facility for spent fuel in Olkiluoto was ratified by the Parliament in May 
2001. Most recently the DiP procedure was applied during the period April 2008 – July 2010 when three 
applications for new nuclear power plants (Fennovoima Oy, Fortum Power and Heat Oy and TVO), and 
two applications for expanding the planned capacity of the future spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto 
were handled by the Government. The Government approved TVO’s and Fennovoima’s applications but 
Fortum’s application regarding the proposed new Loviisa unit 3 and the corresponding DiP application 
to expand the capacity of the spent fuel disposal facility were not approved. The DiP set a schedule for 
Fennovoima and TVO to submit the construction licence applications to the Government by mid 2015. 
In March 2014 Fennovoima started a complementary DiP process to introduce a new plant alternative 
(Rosatom AES 2006), which was not mentioned in Fennovoima’s original DiP application in 2009. The 
Government approved the application and the Parliament ratified it at the end of 2014 and Fennovoima 
submitted the construction licence application according the conditions by the end of June 2015.
In May 2014, also TVO started a complementary process with the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment in order to extend the schedule for the submission of the construction licence appli-
cation. The Government did not grant the requested extension of time to Olkiluoto unit 4 project and 
the project ended in June 2015.
In accordance with Section 108 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the different phases of construction of 
a nuclear facility may be begun only after STUK has, on the basis of the construction licence application 
documents and other detailed plans and documents it requires, verified in respect of each phase that 
the safety-related factors and safety regulations have been given sufficient consideration.
Review of the detailed design of structures and equipment can be begun after STUK has found dur-
ing the construction licence phase that the plant and system-level design data of the plant and systems 
concerned are sufficient and acceptable.
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of 
the facility in detail. The purpose is to ensure that the safety and quality requirements, regulations for 
pressure equipment and approved plans are complied with and that the nuclear facility is constructed 
in other respects in accordance with the regulations. In particular, the oversight is aimed to verify that 
working methods ensuring high quality are employed for the construction.
Before loading fuel into the reactor, an operating licence is needed. The operating licences are 
granted for a limited period of time, generally for 10–20 years. In case the operating licence is granted 
for a longer period than 10 years, a periodic safety review (PSR) is required to be presented to STUK. 
The periodic re-licensing or review has allowed good opportunities for a comprehensive, periodic safety 
review. Current operating licences of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto units are valid for about 20 years, but 
PSRs at least every ten years are required in the licenses as a condition of continued operation.
In addition, the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 112) requires that if the licensee intends to carry 
out such modifications to the nuclear facility systems, structures, nuclear fuel or the way the facility 
is operated, which influence safety and involve changes in the plans or documents approved by the 
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STUK, the licensee shall obtain approval from STUK for such modifications before they are carried out. 
Decommissioning licensing (Section 20a) was introduced into Nuclear Energy Act during 2017 revision 
as the need for nuclear facility decommissioning has become actual in Finland with research reactor 
FiR in Espoo.
System of regulatory oversight and assessment
The legislation provides the regulatory control system for the use of nuclear energy. According to the 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for the regulatory oversight of the safety of the use of nuclear 
energy. The rights and responsibilities of STUK are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55). 
Safety review and assessment as well as inspection activities are covered by the regulatory oversight.
Oversight during operation
STUK's oversight during plant operation includes a periodic inspection programme, continuous over-
sight performed by STUK’s resident inspectors, regular reporting and reporting of events and oversight 
performed at the plant site during operation, as well as refuelling and and maintenance outages.
STUK’s periodic inspection programme is focused on the licensee’s main working processes and 
covers the most relevant areas of nuclear power plant safety. The objective of the inspection programme 
is to assess the safety level at the plants as well as safety management. Possible problems at the plants 
and in procedures of the operating organisations are to be recognised. Each year STUK defines the in-
spections within the programme for the next year, including additional inspections as necessary.
STUK has put special emphasis on the management of the entire inspection programme, including 
the timely conduct, resource allocation and accurate reporting of results, but there are some issues which 
can be further improved. Periodic inspection programme was assessed in the IRRS mission conducted 
in Finland in October 2012. The IRRS mission team suggested that STUK can further enhance the effec-
tiveness of its inspection activities by enhancing the focus of inspection on the most safety-significant 
areas, by defining more concrete criteria for reactive inspections and conducting higher number of 
unannounced inspections.
STUK has modified the inspection programme during the years. Latest changes were made in 2015, 
when the whole inspection programme was re-assessed and the internal guidance was updated taking 
into account the recommendations and suggestions of IRRS mission. According to updated internal 
guide, many of the yearly conducted inspections have been decided to be carried out every two years. 
The inspections focusing on the most safety-significant areas are still carried out annually. In addi-
tion, reactive inspections can be carried out based on the oversight results and proactive inspections 
can be added focusing on ongoing or coming activities at the plant. The aim is to have more flexible 
inspection programme to optimize its effectiveness and focus and to be able to conduct inspections in 
the areas and at times considered necessary. In addition, unannounced inspections are included in the 
annual inspection programme, e.g. inspection focusing on the conduct of operations is always carried 
out unannounced.
In the event review, the safety significance of the event is first evaluated based on the information 
given by the operator and STUK’s resident inspectors. The operating experience is reported to STUK 
later as an event report, which STUK evaluates and may require additional information or actions. 
STUK maintains internal database for events which disseminates operating experiences and provides 
easy access to operational event reports. STUK may assign own investigation team for events deemed to 
have special safety importance, especially when the operations at the nuclear power plant have not been 
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performed as planned or expected. It is also possible to nominate an investigation team to investigate a 
number of events together in order to look for possible generic issues associated with the events. These 
inspections are usually conducted by a leadership of the STUK’s event investigation manager, and an 
investigation team includes normally 3–5 experts from STUK or from external organisations nominated 
on case-by-case basis.
Numbers of operational events are followed through STUK’s plant performance indicator system. 
Risk significance of operational events is followed by PRA based indicators.
STUK’s oversight and safety assessment concerning plant modifications is described under Article 14.
Oversight during construction
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of the 
facility in detail. Oversight consists of inspections within the frame of the Construction Inspection 
Programme and inspections on manufacturing and construction of systems, structures and components 
important to safety. In addition, STUK has four resident inspectors overseeing the construction, instal-
lations and commissioning work at the Olkiluoto site. Licensee reports regularly about the progress of 
the construction.
To oversee the licensee’s performance in a construction project, STUK has established a Construction 
Inspection Programme. The purpose of the programme is to verify that the performance and organisation 
of the licensee ensure high-quality construction and implementation in accordance with the approved 
designs while complying with the regulations and official decisions. The Construction Inspection Pro-
gramme is divided into two main levels: the upper level assesses the licensee’s general operations to 
manage the construction, such as safety management and safety culture, organisation, corrective actions 
programme, the licensee’s expertise and use of expertise and project quality management. The next level, 
known as the operation level, assesses e.g. project quality assurance, training of the operating personnel, 
utilization of the PRA, radiation safety issues, and licensee’s review and assessment process for system, 
structure and component-specific design reviews and inspections in the various fields of technology. 
Furthermore, the emergency response arrangements during construction, physical protection, fire pro-
tection and nuclear waste treatment are subjects of the Construction Inspection Programme as far as 
the scope is considered necessary by STUK. In addition to the above-mentioned inspections, of which 
the licensee is informed in advance, STUK carries out inspections without prior notice at its discretion. 
Construction Inspection Programme was also assessed in the IRRS mission and the recommendations 
and suggestions given for the periodic inspection programme of the operating plants concern also the 
Construction Inspection Programme. STUK has updated the internal guidance of the Construction 
Inspection Programme in 2014 to take into account the recommendations of IRRS mission, and again 
in 2015 and 2016 in order to cover e.g. changes in STUK’s organization. In 2017, the guidance was supple-
mented to include inspection program covering the period of construction license application review.
STUK performs construction inspections of pressure equipment, mechanical components as well as 
steel and concrete structures as specified in the YVL Guides. These inspections are performed according 
to structure or component specific construction plans that have been assessed and approved before 
start of manufacturing. The objective of the inspections is to verify that manufacturer, vendor and the 
licensee have performed their duties as expected and that QC results of manufacturing and construction 
are acceptable. The licensee is responsible for inviting STUK to perform the inspection at a right time.
In addition, STUK performs inspections on installation and commissioning of systems, structures 
and components. Safety significance of systems, structures and components are taken into account when 
determining the scope of inspections. STUK inspects safety class 1 and most safety important cases in 
safety class 2–3. Authorised Inspection Organisations (AIO) performs other inspections in safety class 2–3.
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Enforcement
The Nuclear Energy Act defines the enforcement system and rules for suspension, modification or 
revocation of a licence. The enforcement system includes provisions for executive assistance if needed 
and for sanctions in case the law is violated. The enforcement tools and procedures of the regulator are 
considered to fully meet the needs.
In practice, STUK’s enforcement tools include: oral notice or written request for action by the in-
spector, order for actions by STUK. Actions can include stopping the plant operation immediately or 
decrease of reactor power for unlimited time. Legally stronger instruments would be 1) setting a condi-
tional imposition of a fine, 2) threatening with interruption or limiting the operation and, 3) threatening 
that STUK enforces the neglected action to be made at the licensee’s expense. 
The repertoire of these tools together with some practical examples for implementing them has 
been presented in an internal policy document as part of STUK’s Quality System.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 7.
Article 8. Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of 
the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence 
and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the functions 
of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of 
nuclear energy.
STUK in the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy is the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Employment. The Ministry prepares matters concerning nuclear energy to the 
Government for decision-making. Among other duties, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employ-
ment is responsible for the formulation of a national energy policy.
The mission of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is “to protect people, society, 
environment, and future generations from harmful effects of radiation”. STUK is an independent gov-
ernmental organisation for the regulatory control of radiation and nuclear safety as well as nuclear se-
curity and nuclear materials. STUK is administratively under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
Interfaces to ministries and governmental organisations are described in Figure 9. It is emphasised 
that the regulatory control of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy is independently carried 
out by STUK. No Ministry can take for its decision-making a matter that has been defined by law to be 
on the responsibility of STUK. STUK has no responsibilities or duties which would be in conflict with 
regulatory control. 
The current Act on STUK was given in 1983 and the Decree in 1997. According to the Decree, STUK 
has the following duties:
• regulatory oversight of safety of the use of nuclear energy, emergency preparedness, security and 
nuclear materials
• regulatory control of the use of radiation and other radiation practices
• monitoring of the radiation situation in Finland, and maintaining of preparedness for abnormal 
radiation situations
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• maintaining national metrological standards in its field of activity
• research and development work for enhancing radiation and nuclear safety
• informing on radiation and nuclear safety issues, and participating in training activities in the 
field
• producing expert services in the field of its activity
• making proposals for developing the legislation in the field, and issuing general guides 
concerning radiation and nuclear safety
• participating in international co-operation in the field, and taking care of international control, 
contact or reporting activities as enacted or defined.
STUK – Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority
Independent regulatory and expert organisation.
Ministry of Social Aairs 
and Health
Administrative authority for 
the use of radiation.
Ministry of the Interior
Rescue and protection duties in 
emergency conditions.
Security and physical protection.
Ministry for Foreign Aairs
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Ministry of Economic Aairs 
and Employment
Administrative authority for
the use of nuclear energy. 
Advisory 
Committee
Expert advice and
service
Budget and supervision
FIGURE 9. Co-operation and interfaces between STUK and Ministries and other organisations.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regulatory oversight. The responsibilities and rights of STUK, 
as regards the regulation of the use of nuclear energy, are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. They cover 
the safety review and assessment of licence applications, and the regulatory oversight of the construc-
tion, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear facility. The regulatory oversight of nuclear power 
plants is described in detail in the Guide YVL A.1. STUK has e.g. legal rights to require modifications to 
nuclear power plants, to limit the power of plants and to require shutdown of a plant when necessary 
for safety reasons, as described in Article 7. Furthermore, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2015 to 
give STUK a legal authority to carry out environmental monitoring as a regulatory activity. This change 
was based on the recommendation given in the IRRS mission in 2012.
STUK does not grant construction or operating licences for nuclear facilities. However, in practice 
no such licence would be issued without STUK’s statement where the fulfilment of the safety regulations 
is confirmed as described in Article 7.
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STUK’s Advisory Committee was established in March 2008. Advisory Committee helps STUK to 
develop its functions as a regulatory, research and expert organisation in such a way that the activities 
are in balance with the society’s expectations and the needs of the citizens. Advisory Committee can 
also make assessments of the STUK’s actions and give recommendations to STUK.
An Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety was established in 1988 by a Decree. This Committee 
gives advice to STUK on important safety issues and regulations. The Committee also gives its state-
ments on licence applications. The Committee has now two international committees, one for reactor 
safety (RSC) and one for nuclear waste safety and decommissioning (NWSC). In addition, an Advisory 
Committee on Radiation Safety has been established. The committee gives statements on important 
radiation safety issues and regulations. The members of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety and 
the Advisory Committee on Radiation Safety are nominated by the Government.
To assist STUK's work in nuclear security, an Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was estab-
lished in 2009. The members of the committee come from the various Finnish authorities, and the nuclear 
licensees also have their representatives as experts. The duties of the committee include the assessment 
of the threats in the nuclear field as well as consultation to STUK in important security issues. The 
committee also aims to follow and promote both the international and domestic co-operation in the 
field of nuclear related security issues. The members of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security 
are nominated by the Government.
STUK is responsible communicating with the public and media on radiation and nuclear safety. 
STUK aims to communicate proactively, openly, timely and understandably. A prerequisite for success-
ful communication is that STUK is known among media and general public and the information given 
by STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication is based on best available information. STUK’s web 
site is an important tool in communication. STUK also uses social media platforms for two-way public 
communication. Internal communication provides the personnel information about STUK’s activities 
and supports its capability in participating in the external communication.
STUK’s role and responsibilities have been assessed by a peer review. Full-scope IRRT mission (IAEA’s 
International Regulatory Review Team) was carried out in 2000 and a follow-up mission in 2003. IRRS 
mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service) was carried out in October 2012 and the follow-up 
mission in June 2015. The next IRRS mission is planned for 2022.
In June 2015 the follow-up mission, 5 international experts and 4 IAEA staff members reviewed 
regulatory activities in Finland on the basis of IAEA Safety Standards, international best practices and 
experiences and lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The purpose of the IRRS 
follow-up was to review the measures undertaken following the recommendations and suggestions of 
the 2012 IRRS mission. The scope of the follow-up mission was the same as in 2012 i.e. nuclear facilities, 
except the research reactor FiR 1 (due to decision of decommissioning), radiation sources and transport.
As the result of the follow-up mission the review team concluded that the recommendations and 
suggestions from the 2012 IRRS missions have been taken into account systematically by a comprehen-
sive action plan. Significant progress has been made in most areas and many improvements have been 
implemented in accordance with the action plan. The IRRS team determined that 7 out of 8 recom-
mendations and 19 of 21 suggestions made by the 2012 IRRS mission had been effectively addressed and 
therefore could be considered closed.
The recommendation left open in 2015 follow up mission deals with the STUK’s position in the 
Government which has been discussed further in Finland, however, without any changes in STUK’s 
position. One of the suggestions left open is related to STUK’s management system. According to the 
IRRS team in 2012, STUK should consider further improving its management system. After the follow 
up, STUK planned all the needed corrective actions and implementened them. At the end of 2018 STUK’s 
management made a decision that an in depth evaluation of STUK’s management system will be per-
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formed and after the evaluation a development plan for a management system with more integrated 
approach will be prepared and implemented.
Two new recommendations were raised to amend the legislation to clarify that decommissioning 
of a nuclear installation and closure of a disposal facility require a licence amendment; and to address 
the arrangements for research in radiation safety. 
Recommendation on clarifying the legislation related to decommissioning of nuclear installations 
and closure of a disposal facility is partly addressed. Decommissioning license was introduced to the 
Finnish legislative framework in the beginning of 2018. Future work needs still to be carried out for 
clarifying the licensing of closure of disposal facilities.
To establish a sound base for radiation protection research, the co-operation with Finnish univer-
sities and international research platforms has been reinforced. Research funding opportunities have 
been exploited and STUK is in an active role in shaping research agendas of many of these platforms 
to ensure that national aspects of research funding are taken into account at European level. STUK has 
also set up an internal research funding mechanism. The income from expert services is partly reserved 
for research projects and researchers can apply funding for their projects biannually.
IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was carried out in Finland 
in 2009 and the follow-up in 2012. The next IPPAS mission has been invited and will be carried out in 2020.
Finance and resources of STUK
The organisational structure and the responsibilities within STUK are described in the Management 
System of STUK. Also processes for regulatory oversight and other activities of STUK are presented in 
the Management System. The organisation of STUK is described in the Figure 10.
STUK receives about 32% of its financial resources through the government budget. However, the 
costs of regulatory oversight are charged in full to the licensees. The model of financing the regulatory 
work is called net-budgeting model and it has been applied since 2000. In this model the licensees pay 
the regulatory oversight fees directly to STUK. In 2018, the costs of the regulatory oversight of nuclear 
safety were 17,8 million €.
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its responsibilities. The net-budgeting model makes it possible 
to increase for example personnel resources based on needs in a flexible way.
Nuclear reactor 
regulation
Nuclear waste and 
material regulation
Radiation practices 
regulation
Environmental 
radiation surveillance 
and emeregency 
 preparedness
Administration
Director General
Public Affairs
FIGURE 10. Organisation of STUK. The total number of staff at the end of 2017 was 326 and at the end of 2018 it was 
333.
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At the end of 2017, number of staff in the department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was 126. The 
expertise of STUK covers all the essential areas needed in the oversight of the use of nuclear energy. As 
needed STUK orders independent analyses, review and assessment from technical support organisations 
to complement its own review and assessment work. The main technical support organisation of STUK 
is the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd., but also Lappeenranta University of Technology 
(LUT) and Aalto University (former Helsinki University of Technology) are important. Also international 
technical support organisations and experts have been used, especially to support review and inspection 
activities related to Olkiluoto unit 3 and Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1.
New personnel have been recruited since 2003 mainly for the safety review and assessment and 
inspection activities related to the Olkiluoto unit 3 and for provision for retirements. STUK is also 
prepared for the safety review of the new NPP construction project (Hanhikivi unit 1). The number of 
personnel in the department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation over the period of 2009–2018 is shown in 
Figure 11. The resources used for the oversight of operating nuclear power plants (Loviisa units 1 and 2 
and Olkiluoto units 1 and 2), Olkiluoto unit 3 which is under construction and new plant projects (Loviisa 
unit 3, Olkiluoto unit 4 and Hanhikivi unit 1) are shown in Figure 12. Annual volume of the oversight of 
the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction was about 19 person-years in 2018. Starting from year 2003, inspection 
organisations have been performing construction inspections in lower safety classes.
The number of staff at the department of Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation, taking care of 
oversight of safeguards and nuclear waste management, was 27 at the end of 2018.
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FIGURE 11. Number of staff in the department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
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FIGURE 12. Man-power used for the regulatory oversight in full time equivalents.
Ensuring competence
The management of STUK highlights the need for competent workforce. STUK has adopted a systematic 
approach to competence management and e.g. nuclear and radiation safety and regulatory competen-
cies are also emphasised in STUK’s strategy. One of the strategic targets is to enhance STUK’s ability 
to understand complex entities. Implementation of the strategy is reflected into the annual training 
programmes, on-the-job-training and new competence-driven workforce planning and recruitments.
The national nuclear safety and waste management research programmes have an important role 
in the competence building of the nuclear energy industry in Finland. These research programmes 
ensure the availability of the latest research results, the high-level expertise and the development of 
tools for e.g. regulatory oversight. Furthermore,ensuring the online transfer of the research results to 
the organisations participating in the steering of the programmes – and fostering the expertise. STUK 
has an important role in the steering of these research programmes.
Most of the STUK’s professional staff conducting safety assessments and inspections have a uni-
versity level degree. The average experience of the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear field. The com-
petence analysis is carried out on regular basis and the results are used as the basis for the training and 
competence development programmes and e.g. to support the new recruitments. The STUK’s training 
programme includes internal courses as well as courses organised by external organisations. The personal 
development plans include various methods of competence development based on personal needs and 
targeted outcomes. On an average 5% of the annual working hours are used to enhance the competencies.
An introduction training programme is prepared for all new recruited inspectors at STUK. In ad-
dition to administrative issues, the programme includes familiarisation with legislation, regulatory 
guidance and regulatory oversight practices. Furthermore, the programme includes general technical 
training. The introduction training programme is tailored to each new inspector and its implementa-
tion is followed by the supervisor of the newcomer. STUK has also participated in the preparation and 
execution of a basic professional training course on nuclear safety with other Finnish organisations in 
the field (described in more detail in Article 11). During the past few years the national training courses 
on nuclear safety and on nuclear waste management have been harmonized and combined as one joint 
training course.
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National research programmes
In Finland, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd is the largest research organisation in the 
field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 200 experts are working in the field of nuclear energy, about half 
of them full-time. The total volume of the nuclear energy research in Finland in the year 2014 was 90 
million € (estimate of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment). This figure includes research 
related to use of nuclear energy conducted in all the stakeholder organisations. Two thirds of the re-
search is focused on the disposal of the spent fuel. The largest individual organizations are VTT, LUT 
(Lappeenranta University of Technology), GTK (Geological Survey of Finland), and Aalto University 
(former Helsinki University of Technology, HUT).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 to ensure funding for a long-term nuclear safety and 
nuclear waste management research in Finland. Funds are collected annually from the licence holders 
to a special fund. Regarding nuclear safety research the amount of money is proportional to the actual 
thermal power of the licensed power plants or the thermal power presented in the Decision-in-Princi-
ple. For the nuclear waste research, the annual funding payments are proportional to the current fund 
holdings for the future waste management activities. In 2016 the Nuclear Energy Act was amended and 
a temporary increase of the payments collected to the nuclear safety research fund was introduced. The 
purpose of the temporary increase of the research funding is to renew the ageing infrastructure for the 
nuclear safety related research. The increased funding is collected in between the years 2016 and 2025. At 
the first stage the additional funding has been allocated for the hot cells at VTT Centre of Nuclear Safety 
(CNS) and at the second stage it will be allocated for the thermohydraulic laboratory at Lappeenranta 
University of Technology. The investment for the VTT CNS hot cells capacity has been about 18 million €.
The research projects are selected so that they support and develop the competences in nuclear 
safety and to create preparedness for the regulator to be able to respond on emerging and urgent safety 
issues. These national safety research programmes are called SAFIR and KYT. The structure for SAFIR2018 
(2015–2018) enhanced multidisciplinary co-operation within the research programme. Research areas were 
1) Plant Safety and Systems Engineering, 2) Reactor Safety and 3) Structural Safety and Material. The key 
topics of the recent nuclear safety research programme (SAFIR2018) were automation, organisation and 
human factors, severe accidents and risk analysis, fuel and reactor physics, thermal hydraulics, structural 
integrity and development of research infrastructure. The amount of money collected from the licensees 
since year 2016 has been about 9 million € for nuclear safety research. Out of this 4 million € is used to 
research projects and the rest is for the enhancement of the infrastructure. The research projects have 
also additional funding from other sources. The total volume of the programme in 2016 to 2018 has been 
between about 7 million € each year. An international evaluation of the programme was performed at the 
beginning of the year 2018. The scientific level and performance of the programme was found very good.
The new period for the national publicly funded nuclear safety research programme SAFIR2022 was 
planned and initiated in 2018. The research issues of the new programme continue the main areas of 
previous SAFIR2018 research programme. However, new research issues concerning the changes in the 
operating environment are integrated into the programme such as use of 3D-printing for components 
important to safety, small modular reactors, machine learning etc.
The objective of KYT (Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear Waste Management) is to ensure the 
sufficient and comprehensive availability of the nuclear technological expertise and other capabilities 
required by the authorities when comparing different nuclear waste management ways and implemen-
tation methods. KYT2018 was divided into three main categories:
• new and alternative technologies in nuclear waste management
• safety research in nuclear waste management and
• social science studies related to nuclear waste management.
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The main emphasis in the research programme will continue to be devoted to safety related research. 
The funding of the research programme is provided mainly by the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund (VYR) into which those responsible for nuclear waste management pay annually 0.13% of their 
respective assessed liability. The current level of annual funding is 1.9 million €.
Similar to SAFIR, the new period for the Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment, KYT2022, was planned and initiated in year 2018. The programme continues the traditions of 
previous periods with the main research areas of:
• safety research in spent nuclear fuel management
• near-surface disposal
• low and intermediate nuclear waste management
• decomissioning
• new and alternative technologies in nuclear waste management and
• social science studies related to nuclear waste management.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 8.
Article 9. Responsibility of the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the 
holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its 
responsibility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. Accord-
ing to Section 9 of the Act, it shall be the licensee’s obligation to assure safe use of nuclear energy. That 
responsibility cannot be delegated or transferred to another party. Furthermore, it shall be the licensee’s 
obligation to assure such physical protection and emergency planning and other arrangements, necessary 
to ensure limitation of nuclear damage, which do not rest with the authorities. In addition, a licensee 
whose operations generate or have generated nuclear waste shall be responsible for all nuclear waste 
management measures and their appropriate preparation, as well as for their costs.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to verify that the licensees fulfil the regulations. This 
verification is carried out through continuous oversight, safety review and assessment as well as inspec-
tion programmes established by STUK. In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s commitment 
to the strong safety culture. The obvious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these responsibilities 
are strict adherence of regulations, prompt, timely and open actions towards the regulator in unusual 
situations, active role in developing the safety based on improvements of technology and science as 
well as effective exploitation of experience feedback. In addition to inspections and safety assessment, 
the follow-up of licensee’s efforts in achieving results is based on safety indicators. This system includes 
indicators e.g. for plant availability, incidents, probabilistic risk assessment results, safety system op-
erability, radiation doses to personnel as well as releases to the environment and resulting radiation 
exposures to the general public.
Based on Chapter 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act, to ensure that the financial liability for the future 
management and disposal of nuclear wastes and for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is covered, 
the nuclear power companies are every third year obliged to present estimates for future costs of these 
operations and take care that the required amount of money is set aside to the State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund. In order to provide for the insolvency of the nuclear utilities, they shall provide se-
curities to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment for the part of financial liability which is 
not yet covered by the Fund. At the end of 2018, the fund contained 2657 million euros (see also Article 11).
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The arrangements for the nuclear waste management liabilities related to the Olkiluoto unit 3 will 
follow the same lines after the start of the operation. The licensee with a waste management obligation 
shall submit the waste management scheme and the calculations of waste management costs, which are 
based on the scheme, to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment for approval for the first time 
early enough before beginning the operations producing nuclear waste, and at the latest in connection 
with the operating licence application. The waste management scheme shall cover all phases of waste 
management including the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities and the disposal of all arising nu-
clear wastes. The scheme must be sufficiently detailed to allow the calculations for the assessed liability.
The financial provisions to cover the possible damages to third parties caused by a nuclear accident 
have been arranged in Finland according to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to the revision 
of the Paris and Brussels Conventions in 2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited licensee’s liability 
by law (see Article 7). The revised law will also have some other modifications, such as extending the 
claiming period up to 30 years for victims of nuclear accidents. As the international ratification of the 
2004 Protocols has been delayed, Finland made a temporary amendment in the Finnish Nuclear Liability 
Act in 2012, implementing the provision on unlimited liability and requirement of insurance coverage 
for a minimum amount of EUR 700 million. The temporary law came into force in January 2012 and will 
be repealed when the 2005 law amendment takes effect after the international ratification of the Paris 
and Brussels Conventions.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 9.
Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in activities directly 
related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.
Regulatory requirements regarding safety culture and safety management
The priority of safety is emphasised in the Nuclear Energy Act and in the STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2018) Section 25. The STUK regulation sets a binding requirement for the licensees to maintain a 
good safety culture where safety shall be a priority. It states that when designing, constructing, operating 
and decommissioning a nuclear power plant, a good safety culture shall be maintained by making sure 
that the decisions and activities of the entire organisation reflect commitment to operational practices 
and solutions that promote safety. An open working atmosphere must be promoted to encourage iden-
tification, reporting and elimination of factors endangering safety, and the personnel must be given 
opportunity to contribute to the continuous enhancement of safety. The licensees have to ensure that 
these requirements are applied in all organisations that participate in safety significant activities.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, a responsible manager has to be appointed for the construc-
tion, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant. The appointment is subject to approval 
by STUK. The responsible manager has a duty to ensure the safe use of nuclear energy and to see that 
the arrangements for physical protection and emergency preparedness and the safeguards control are 
complied with.
STUK has revised the STUK’s Guide YVL A.3 that sets requirements for management systems. 
The new guide YVL A.3, published in March 2019, is based on IAEA GSR Part 2 and it includes detailed 
requirements for promoting good safety culture. The revised guide also describes what the good safety 
culture includes, e.g. that safety is the overriding priority in decision making and that safety is consid-
ered comprehensively. The YVL A.3 requires that the management must demonstrate its commitment 
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to safety. Safety culture expertise must be available for developing the safety culture. The development 
of the safety culture must be target oriented and systematic. The licensee has to also establish a process 
to measure, assess and improve its safety culture.
STUK has revised also the Guide YVL A.5 concerning nuclear facility construction, commissioning 
and modifications. The safety culture requirements from the previous version has been moved to the 
Guide YVL A.3 to clarify and ease the usability of the guide documents. Still during construction and 
modification projects the licensee must ensure that the contributing parties are able to perform according 
to safety requirements and there must be training on safety culture issues for the personnel taking part 
in the activities. The licensee must have procedures for evaluating and developing the safety culture of 
the contributing parties according to Guide YVL A.3.
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident has highlighted the importance of safety culture and its con-
tinuous assessment and improvement. The Diet report in 2012 concluded that “fundamental causes of 
the accident are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture; our reflexive obedience; 
our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and 
our insularity”. These ingrained conventions were seen as factors preventing necessary stakeholders 
(Licensee, Regulatory Body and Government) to take needed actions to ensure safety and therefore 
also contradicting with good safety culture. The influence of ingrained conventions in national culture 
was considered in Finland to be one of the key messages in the Diet report. To better understand the 
ingrained conventions in the Finnish culture and their possible positive and/or negative impacts on 
safety culture, STUK has continued to explore the sociological factors influencing safety culture in the 
Finnish nuclear community within the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018 (the ORSAC and 
ORSAP project). Furthermore, in March 2019 STUK hosted the OECD NEA and WANO managed Coun-
try-Specific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki, were personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and 
STUK discussed the country specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety 
culture. A report is being prepared by the NEA.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa NPP
Loviisa power plant is operated by Fortum Power and Heat Ltd, which is part of a large Fortum corpo-
ration. Fortum has a quality and safety policy for the Nuclear Operations. The policy emphasises the 
priority of safety and requires commitment to high level safety culture from all parties involved in the 
activities. Fortum has an internal Nuclear Safety Oversight function that supports the senior manage-
ment in maintaining an overview on, and responding to the high level safety issues. In addition, the 
Loviisa NPP has an independent nuclear safety committee with external expert members.
The licensee follows a safety culture programme and a roadmap with which it coordinates some of its 
safety culture development activities. However, a guiding principle at Fortum is that safety is integrated 
into all activities and the safety culture development activities are mainly practical improvements that 
the line organisations carry out by themselves. Loviisa power plant has a Corrective Action Programme 
group which collects and trends various types of observations concerning the safety performance of the 
organisation. Based on the findings a statement concerning the level of safety culture and corresponding 
development needs are summarised annually. Loviisa power plant monitors the safety culture also with 
a personnel survey and analyses whether operational events point to any safety culture related issues. 
The nuclear safety oversight group carries out in-depth assessements of management system approxi-
mately once in every three years. Safety culture induction training is given to all newcomers and regular 
refresher trainings are arranged.
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Safety significant contractors are required to familiarize their workforce in safety culture principles 
and this expectation is communicated to the contractors e.g. in supplier audits. Practical behavioural 
expectations are covered in the induction training. In some of the major modification projects the sup-
plier safety culture is analysed more comprehensively. The supplier personnel is, for example, invited 
to respond to Fortum safety culture survey. 
The safety culture self-assessments carried out by the licensee have not identified any major issues 
in the key areas of a safety culture. Based on the safety culture assessments Fortum has paid attention 
e.g. to communication of the management expectations. Also STUK has in its oversight emphasised that 
Fortum’s leadership shall improve the prioritisation and follow up of development actions to ensure their 
effectiveness. There have been recurring operating events in some activities. Fortum has also improved 
the reporting of low level safety observations. 
Olkiluoto NPP
TVO, the licensee operating the Olkiluoto NPP’s has a corporate policy which shows commitment to 
create conditions to produce electricity in a safe manner. The corporate policy also emphasises com-
mitment to high level safety culture. TVO has a safety committee which is independent from the line 
organisation and which reviews TVO’s major safety relevant decisions and topical issues.
TVO reorganised its activities in 2015. After the reorganization and staff reduction TVO had a decline 
in personnel job satisfaction and working climate that resulted in increased personnel turnover in the 
company. STUK intensified its oversight to ensure that TVO takes such actions that these conditions 
would not affect the safety culture and safe operations. TVO has carried out various development actions 
to correct the working climate situation during the period 2016–2018. The effective corrective actions and 
monitoring their effectiveness was a requirement by STUK. During the last years TVO’s safety culture 
improvement activities have been incorporated into a larger corporate-wide development programme 
which strives towards improved job satisfaction, leadership and safety culture at TVO. TVO has paid 
attention to, for example, clarity of decision making and personnel resources. Leaders, from senior 
management downwards have participated in a leadership development programme. Organisational 
structures and processes were modified in 2017 to resolve issues caused by the previous major reorgan-
isation and to respond to the needs of the forthcoming Olkiluoto 3 operational phase. In 2018 TVO’s 
safety culture survey showed improvements in areas such as management commitment to safety. TVO 
has started to use Operational Decision Making practices more systematically and communicates the 
reasons for decisions to the entire organisation. Senior managers practice new ways of interacting with 
their subordinates. Clear improvement of the job satisfaction and working climate was seen based on a 
broad personnel survey conducted in 2018. TVO has recruited around 250 new employees in 2016–2018 
and safety relevant positions in maintenance and engineering are fulfilled. Personnel turnover rate is 
currently normal. Some organisational changes are still conducted in 2019 to clarify responsibilities.
TVO carries out regular safety culture surveys (biannually) and more in-depth safety culture self-as-
sessments (in three or four year intervals) to monitor the level of safety culture and to identify needs 
for improvement. TVO has a Corrective Action Program (CAP) group that works independently from 
line organisation. It is led by the director of the nuclear safety department and it consists of specialists 
from quality management, nuclear safety, risk management, human resources and occupational health 
areas. The objective for the CAP group is to support the continuous improvement of TVO’s performance 
by giving recommendations to the management.
TVO has carried out safety culture monitoring and continual development also at the construction 
site of Olkiluoto unit 3. TVO has a specific plan for monitoring and developing the safety culture during 
the commissioning stage. Safety culture of OL3 activities is assessed through a questionnaire (twice a 
year), interviews and analysis of all other safety observations. TVO has identified a need to improve the 
permit to work procedures, roles and responsibilities at the main control room and overall coordination 
of the commissioning schedules and activities.
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TVO follows up the competence of contractors that work at the plant regularly or for longer terms. 
These contractors have to complete the same basic training as licensee’s own personnel, as appropriate. 
Introductory nuclear and radiation safety training is a prerequisite for all persons working at the site. 
Based on the lessons learned from recent plant modifications and outage performance TVO has devel-
oped the site access training. Priority to safety is addressed in the training. TVO regularly audits and 
evaluates contractors and suppliers to ensure that they fulfil the regulatory and safety requirements.
Fennovoima
Fennovoima has a safety culture program that describes the elements needed to establish, monitor and 
to facilitate a good safety culture in the nuclear power plant construction project. Fennovoima requires 
its key partners to develop a safety culture programme and to appoint a safety culture coordinator for 
the Hanhikivi 1 project. Fennovoima organizes regular safety culture related workshops with the supplier 
and sub-suppliers to enhance their knowledge and commitment to shared practices and Finnish require-
ments concerning safety culture and leadership. Fennovoima conducts specific safety culture focused 
audits in the supply chain and monitors the performance of the key partners based on other observations.
Fennovoima has nominated a Responsible Director for the construction phase. A nuclear safety 
committee, that is independent from the line organization, reviews and provides recommendations on 
nuclear safety related questions.
In 2017, an independent safety culture assessments was carried out at Fennovoima. The assessment 
covered also the plant supplier RAOS Project Oy and main contractor Titan 2. The conclusion was, that 
at Fennovoima, the safety culture was at an acceptable level. However, several areas have required im-
provements. These include e.g. the responsibilities for handling safety related issues, nuclear specific 
competencies, control of the supply chain and climate for raising concerns. The safety culture assessment 
also concluded that the safety culture at the plant supplier and at the main contractor need significant 
further development.
In 2018, several investigations and analyses on the operations of Fennovoima were performed by 
STUK and Fennovoima itself. These exhibited development needs in the operations and organisational 
structure of Fennovoima. Fennovoima has started an extensive development program concerning the 
whole organization and all operations to address the challenges met in the project.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has continued to regularly inspect the management systems of both licensees (Fortum and TVO) 
and the license applicant Fennovoima to ensure that they fulfill the requirements of the legislations 
and the Guide YVL A.3. Based on the inspections, there is still need for development actions to fulfil 
the requirements concerning both the process based management system, project management and 
supply chain management.
STUK carries out safety culture oversight by collecting and analysing observations from resident 
inspectors, documents, events, and from other interactions with the licensee. STUK also conducts specific 
inspections focusing on Leadership and Safety culture. STUK also reviews the licensees’ safety culture 
self-assessments. Furthermore, STUK has utilised VTT to carry out independent safety culture assess-
ments at the licensee organisations. Independent safety culture assessments were done at Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 (2016) and Olkiluoto 3 (2017) to support STUK in the processes Licence Renewal of Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 and Operating Licence of Olkiluoto 3. In 2017 VTT also conducted an independent safety culture as-
sessment of the key organizations of the Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant project. STUK’s has conducted 
inspections and participated into the supply chain audits to assess the readiness of Fennovoima and the 
supply chain for the construction phase.
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During 2016–2018 specific Leadership and Safety culture inspections have dealt with topics such as 
management of organisational changes, management expectations, leadership awareness of the safety 
culture issues in their organisations, the rationale and effectiveness of safety culture improvement 
actions and (operational) decision making practices. Safety culture related findings from different in-
spections are discussed in regular meetings in STUK and between the top management of the nuclear 
power plants and the regulatory body.
In order to improve the safety culture oversight process STUK has developed a tool (HAKE) for 
gathering information about issues related to Human and Organisational Factors (HOF) from all over-
sight activities at all licensees or licensee applicants. The tool was implemented during 2015 and based 
on experience and a development project the improved version is implemented 2019. STUK has also 
developed the process to create an overall picture of the licensee’s overall safety including HOF topics 
utilising a database to maintain this overall picture. The HAKE tool and the developed process for 
creating the picture of the overall safety at licensee organisations are responding to the IRRS mission 
team’s suggestion to have a more systematic method for collection and assessment of indications of the 
licensee’s safety culture. STUK is continuing to improve the processes.
STUK co-operates with VTT on safety culture related research. The researchers have carried out 
research e.g. concerning safety culture and governance of large projects in the nuclear domain.
Means used by regulatory body in its own activities
Safety is emphasised in STUK’s Management System as well as in the framework contract between 
STUK and its technical support organisation VTT. STUK’s Safety and Quality Policy was revised in 2018 
to conform STUK’s new strategy and to include STUK’s data security policy. The policy includes STUK’s 
values that give the highest priority to keeping the radiation exposure of people as low as reasonably 
achievable and preventing radiation and nuclear accidents. STUK has taken an active role in this area 
and both developed its own culture and taken the initiative in the assessment of cultures of the licen-
see organisations. The IRRS mission was carried out in fall 2012 and the reviewers suggested that STUK 
could emphasize safety culture also in its quality manual in a more detailed way as well as to assure the 
safety consciousness of the staff. In 2015 the IRRS follow-up team considered the suggestion to be closed 
as STUK had enhanced its activities aimed at developing, assessing and improving its safety culture. In 
2018 a throughout assessment of STUK’s safety culture was performed by outside consultants. As a whole 
the safety culture at STUK was considered to be at a good level and especially safety was considered to 
be a true value in STUK’s organization. Recommendations to strengthen certain areas at STUK included 
assessment and management of risks related to the function of the organization, follow-up of STUK’s 
own safety culture as well as utilizing lessons to be learned from incidents.
STUK conducts self-assessments and personnel questionnaires to follow up the internal opinions 
regarding the priority devoted to different topics of nuclear safety. STUK arranges regularly training for 
the inspectors and an introduction programme is set up for all new recruited inspectors.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 10.
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1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial resources are available 
to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with 
appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear 
installation, throughout its life.
Financial resources
Nuclear Energy Act defines as a condition for granting a construction or operating licence that the 
applicant has sufficient financial resources, necessary expertise and, in particular, that the operating 
organisation and the competence of the operating staff are appropriate. According to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the licensee shall also have adequate financial resources to take care of the safety of the plant. In 
addition, Nuclear Energy Act provides detailed regulations for the financial arrangements for taking 
care of nuclear waste management and decommissioning. The Act on Third Party Liability provides 
regulations on financial arrangements for nuclear accidents, taking into account that Finland is a party 
to the Paris and Brussels conventions.
The financial preconditions are primarily assessed by authorities other than STUK (mainly by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment). The financial position and business environment of the 
licensee also affect the safety of plants, and STUK therefore follows licensees’ plans to improve safety 
of nuclear power plants, as well as organisational reforms, safety research conducted by licensees, the 
number of employees and the competence of personnel. The annual reports of Fortum Corporation 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oyj provide financial information on the utilities. Both utilities have annually 
invested typically about 40–50 M€ for maintaining the plant and improving safety. For example, When 
TVO started to renew all emergency diesel generators the overall investment was more than 100 M€.
A financing system for the costs of future waste management and decommissioning exists to 
ensure that the producers of nuclear waste bear their full financial liability on the coverage of those 
costs and that the costs can be covered even in case of insolvency of the waste generator. The pertinent 
licence-holders submit every three years for regulatory review the technical plans and cost calculations 
on which the liability estimates are based. After confirmation of the financial liabilities, the licensees 
pay fees to a State controlled Nuclear Waste Management Fund and provide securities for the liability 
not yet covered by the funded money. At the end of 2018, the fund contained 2657 million euros.
The national education system for the university level studies (MSc, PhD) in nuclear sciences (and 
similar) is based on the training programs of the Lappeenranta University of Technology, Aalto Uni-
versity and University of Helsinki. These universities have a strong tradition of providing education 
programs with the nuclear (and other relevant topic area in engineering and sciences) specific content. 
In general, the funding of these programs rely on two main sources: about a half of the funding is from 
the basic national funding driven by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The rest of the funding is 
acquired from various competitive sources of funds such (as European Commission, Academy of Finland 
etc.) by each of the universities.
Regulatory requirements regarding human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensuring that its employees are qualified and authorised to 
their jobs. The regulatory requirements for human resources are stated in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sec-
tions 7 and 20), STUK Regulation STUK Y/1/2018 and Guide YVL A.4. The Nuclear Energy Act Section 7 k 
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was modified in 2017 in order to demand appointing a responsible manager also for the decommissioning 
phase of a nuclear facility. According to Section 25 of STUK Regulation STUK Y/1/2018, the licensee shall 
have a sufficient number of competent personnel suitable for the related tasks for ensuring the safety 
of the nuclear facility. Significant functions with respect to safety within nuclear power plants must be 
designated, and the competences of the persons working in such positions must also be verified. The 
operation of the organisation shall be evaluated and continuously developed and the risks associated 
with the organisation’s operation are to be evaluated regularly. The safety impacts of significant organ-
isational changes are to be evaluated in advance.
Guide YVL A.4 sets requirements for training, competence management and for qualifications 
of personnel working in functions that are important for plant safety. In this Guide there are specific 
requirements for positions, defined in the Nuclear Energy Act, i.e. responsible manager and persons re-
sponsible for nuclear safeguards, emergency arrangements and security arrangements and nuclear facility 
operators (Appendices A–E). The guide also has specific requirements on management and leadership 
competencies. The YVL A.4 is under revision during 2018–2019 and it will include the requirements to 
respond to the revised Nuclear Energy Act (2017) and Radiation Act (2018).
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa NPP
Human resource planning at the Lovisa NPP is subject to annual management review and updating. The 
succession plan for the most critical positions is updated yearly. Lovisa NPP has a project management 
procedure which includes a resource management approach that will support the NPP in evaluating and 
following up the resources needed for accomplishing the projects.
The training activities and procedures at the Lovisa NPP are constantly developing. The training 
unit’s main responsibility is to develop the human resource management procedures and organize 
the general training. The training unit personnel support the line managers with their expertise, but 
the responsibility for developing the specialist competence lies on the line organisation. Fortum has 
a procedure for setting up individual development plans for all newcomers and for persons changing 
positions. Lovisa NPP is currently developing the systematic competence management procedures and 
tools to be able to ensure also the long-term resource needs. Qualification needs for different positions 
are based on evaluations performed by line managers. Lovisa NPP has during 2016-2018 conducted one 
major and a few minor organisational changes. Organisational changes are evaluated from safety point 
of view prior to change and the evaluation report is sent to STUK for review. The safety-significant or-
ganisational changes are also evaluated after implementation. Loviisa NPP has during this period also 
improved the contractor training for personnel taking part in the outages.
Olkiluoto NPP
TVO has updated the personnel plan regularly according to the phases of Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 con-
struction. In 2015 TVO made a big organizational change including the change of the business model, 
completely rearranging the organisation structure and also reducing the number of staff. Due to this 
organizational change TVO also faced challenges concerning working atmosphere, and retention of 
personnel and competence. TVO made also some smaller organizational changes and had extensive re-
cruitments in 2017 and 2018. This resulted in need for development and strengthening of the induction 
training arrangments and procedures. Furthermore TVO developed a “rolling” resource planning proce-
dure and a strategic compentence management model. TVO also has an ongoing development program 
for developing people management and leadership to ensure a good working atmosphere. Due to these 
TVO’s challenges STUK intensified the oversight of resource management and leadership. 
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TVO has a training program and procedures taking into account the commissioning of the Olki-
luoto 3 and the training has been intensified as the commissioning is coming closer. All operators for 
Olkiluoto 3 have been licensed during 2018. 
TVO's new strategic competence and resource management procedure is supported by IT and is 
similar to the IAEA systematic approach to training (SAT) approach.
TVO has further developed the mandatory outage training for contractors to so that it also can be 
made by a web application, and introduced a mandatory “mock up-tent session” at the site before the 
person gets the works pass.
Fennovoima, Hanhikivi project
Fennovoima has developed its process and procedures for ensuring competence. For example, it has in 
use a tool or evaluating the available and needed competences and has continued developing system-
atic approach to training. The resource needs at the different phases of the project are compiled in an 
integrated staffing plan. The development work is still ongoing.
Fennovoima has continued to increase the size of its organization. The amount of personnel in-
creased from 270 in 2016 to more than 310 at the end of 2018.
Fennovoima is planning to move its offices to the site, Pyhäjoki, in the near future. This may be 
a challenge for preserving competence, if all the personnel do not want to move to Pyhäjoki from the 
capital area. STUK has requested Fennovoima to order an independent assessment of the move, as it 
can be comparable to major change of organization.
Development should be continued especially concerning the processes to ensure resources and 
competencies of the most significant suppliers, and the processes to identify the tasks and positions 
important to safety, and the related competences needed.
Regulatory oversight
Personnel and human resources related issues are included in STUK’s periodic and construction in-
spection programmes at the nuclear power plants. The construction inspection program covers also 
the construction license review phase of Fennovoima. The inspection “Human Resources and Compe-
tence” includes assessment of human resource management, competence development and training 
programmes. It also covers the licensee’s procedures for managing human resources and competence 
of suppliers. During the years 2016–2018 STUK has paid attention to organisational changes and their 
management, strategic competence and resource management procedures, induction training for new 
recruitees and for those changing position, and competences of responsible persons according to the 
Finnish Nuclear Act paragraphs 7i and 7k that STUK approves (e.g. the responsible manager and her/
his deputies). STUK has participated in examinations of shift personnel, where the operators working 
in the control rooms show that they are conversant with all salient matters related to plant operation 
and safety. STUK also have made follow-up visits to training events conducted by licence holders. STUK 
has also used TSO for independent evaluations of human resource and competence management of 
TVO NPP:s due to the commissioning phase of OL3 and the integration of the project organisation to 
TVO organization.
Strengthen and maintain competence building in Finland
Ensuring an adequate national supply of experts in nuclear science and technology and high quality 
research infrastructure is recognised as a continuous challenge in Finland because of the construction 
of the Olkiluoto unit 3 and the new reactor project of Hanhikivi unit 1.
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During 2010–2012 a committee set up by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy worked on a 
report aiming at giving recommendations and steps to be taken until the 2020’s for ensuring competence 
and resources needed for the nuclear sector. STUK was an active part in this committee.
The committee report indicated the importance of the continuous development of the nuclear 
competence on national and organizational levels. Furthermore, the report indicated that the need for 
nuclear experts with a higher university degree (in engineering or natural sciences) would increase by 
38 percent by the year 2025. The general age structure of the Finnish nuclear workforce was also a matter 
of concern as the demographics indicated a two-peak curve where the industry had many senior experts 
and young professionals but lacked professionals with 10–20 years of experience. The report also indi-
cated some need for minor adjustments in the education system to ensure the availability of adequate 
number of potential suitable newcomers to the industry. 
One of the recommendations by the committee in 2012 was that the future needs and focus areas of 
Finnish nuclear energy sector research must be accurately defined and a long-term strategy drawn up for 
further development of research activities. This called for a separate joint project among research organ-
isations and other stakeholders in the Finnish nuclear sector. At the end of January 2013 the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment set up a working group to prepare a national research and development 
strategy for the Finnish nuclear energy sector. The working group was chaired by a representative of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. The nominated members of the working group include 
experts from STUK, VTT, Finnish Academy, Aalto University, Technical University of Lappeenranta, 
University of Helsinki, Fortum, TVO and Posiva. Results of the research and development strategy work 
were published at the end of April 2014. The report “Nuclear Energy Research strategy” emphasizes the 
importance of the research in the competence building. The working group recommended the following:
1. The areas of focus in nuclear energy research must be compiled into wide-ranging national 
programmes.
2. The scientific level of Finnish nuclear energy research needs to be raised.
3. Active participation is needed on international research that is important for Finland through 
broad-based national multidisciplinary collaboration.
4. To secure the quality and quantity of researcher education, a broad and comprehensive doctoral 
programme network needs to be established for the nuclear energy field.
5. Building, maintaining, and utilizing infrastructure requires coordination at the national level. 
Financing needs to be considered strategically and the roles of national financiers need to be 
clarified.
6. In research activities input is needed into the development of innovations. The growth of busi-
ness operations and internationalisation are supported by bringing the players together under 
Team Finland.
7. It is proposed that an advisory committee be set up in connection with the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment linked with nuclear energy research and co-operation as a permanent 
expert body to support decision-making in national questions related to the nuclear energy.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment started the implementation of the recommenda-
tions. In 2015 the Nuclear Energy Act was changed to ensure the financing for the enhancement of the 
nuclear safety research infrastructure.
During 2012–2015, the three Universities: Aalto, Helsinki University and Lappeenranta University 
of Technology set up a Doctoral programme YTERA (Doctoral Programme for Nuclear Engineering and 
Radiochemistry), which was funded by the Academy of Finland, the universities and the industry (the 
NPP utilities and Posiva). The aim was to ensure supply of high-level expertise of nuclear engineering and 
radiochemistry and to create a permanent network for nuclear post-graduate education. The programme 
covered all fields of nuclear engineering and radiochemistry and it involved close collaboration with 
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Finnish research bodies, industry and authorities that deal with nuclear energy generation. In general, 
the YTERA doctoral programme reached the goals it was given at the time. During the programme 21 
new doctors were graduated. YTERA came to an end in 2015 and similar, active, jointly coordinated and 
funded programmes do not exist at the moment. New doctors are graduated through national research 
programs.
The main organisations in the nuclear energy sector in Finland develop and organize the basic 
professional training course on nuclear safety, which is a annually held approximately 6-week training 
programme for students and staff members of the participating organisations (STUK, the licensees, 
VTT, Aalto University and Lappeenranta University of Technology, Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment, main TSOs in the area of nuclear waste management). The first course commenced in 
September 2003. In 2017 the original training course was updated by including the modules of (previous-
ly separate) nuclear waste management course as part of the curriculum. So far, over 1000 newcomers 
and junior experts have participated in these courses. The content and the structure of the course has 
been enhanced according to the feedback received from the participants – and also by reflecting the 
development and changes of the nuclear sector (nationally and globally).
The update of the national level competence review was conducted in 2017 in order to reflect the 
current changes in the operating environment. The national competence review update was carried out 
by VTT and the final report was published in 2018. The summarized results of the review indicate that 
the overall age structure of the Finnish nuclear sector has improved from the year 2010. The ‘two-peak’ 
shape of the nuclear sector’s age structure has become more evenly balanced profile. Between 2010 and 
2017 the number of nuclear experts has grown in line with the initial plans (exceeding by 2%). However, 
due to the changes in the operating environment (e.g. Olkiluoto 4 project was terminated), the estimated 
number of new experts needed during the following years has been decreased when compared to the 
estimates of 2011 (2020: by –16% and 2025: by –14%). Yet, by the year 2030 the demand for personnel is 
expected to return to moderate growth.
The report of the national competence review update indicates that the adequate competence 
resources for the Finnish nuclear sector will available also in the near future. However, Finnish nuclear 
sector needs to continue to pay attention in educating, training and introducing new experts to certain 
competence areas of the nuclear sector. 
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 11.
Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limitations of human 
performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements regarding human factors
In the Finnish regulation management of human factors is recognized in the Nuclear Enegy Act which 
further refers to the STUK Regulation (Y/1/2018) for consideration of human factors. STUK regulation 
section 6 “Management of human factors relating to safety” was renewed in the update of the whole 
regulation in 2018. The main modification to section 6 was that as the previous version was very focused 
on human errors now this perspective has been widened to cover also support for good performance i.e. 
take into account both the capabilities and the limitations of human performance. In the present format 
section 6 requires that human factors relating to safety shall be managed with systematic procedures 
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throughout the entire life cycle of the nuclear facility. Human factors shall be taken into account in the 
design of the nuclear facility and in the planning of its operations, maintenance and decommissioning 
in a manner that supports the high-quality implementation of the work and ensures that human activ-
ities do not endanger plant safety. It is further required that attention shall be paid to the avoidance, 
detection and correction of human errors and the limiting of their effects.
According to section 16 of the STUK regulation (Y/1/2018) A nuclear facility shall contain equipment 
that provides information on the operational state of the facility and any deviations from normal op-
eration. A nuclear power plant shall be equipped with automatic systems that actuate safety functions 
as required, and that control and supervise their functioning during operational occurrences to prevent 
accidents and during accidents to mitigate consequences. These automatic systems shall be capable of 
maintaining the nuclear power plant in a controlled state long enough to provide the operators with 
sufficient time to consider and implement the correct actions. In order to control the nuclear power plant 
and enable operator actions, the nuclear power plant shall have a control room, in which the majority of 
the user interfaces required for the monitoring and control of the nuclear power plant are located. The 
scope of monitoring and control duties performed outside the control room shall be designed according 
to their feasibility. The nuclear power plant shall have a supplementary control room independent of the 
main control room and the necessary local control systems for shutting down the nuclear reactor and 
for removing decay heat from the nuclear fuel in the reactor and the spent nuclear fuel stored.
The STUK regulations are detailed in the YVL guides in which the main requirements concerning 
human factors are presented in guides YVL A.3, A6, and B.1. Guide YVL A.3 “Management system for a 
nuclear facility” requires e.g. that systematic methods shall be incorporated in the management sys-
tem in order to identify and manage human and organisational factors affecting safety. And further 
that human and organisational factors shall be handled together with technical matters, and that the 
personnel’s individual competence shall be developed as regards the identification and management 
of human factors and potential errors. YVL A.6 requires that the emergency and abnormal operating 
procedures of a nuclear power plant shall enable the operator to quickly identify the relevant procedure 
for responding to the plant state at hand. Entry and exit conditions shall be defined in the operating 
procedures for enabling operators to select the appropriate operating procedure, navigate the different 
operating procedures, and proceed from operating procedures to severe accident management guide-
lines when necessary. It is further required that the procedures and guidelines shall be systematically 
validated and verified. Validation shall also address the role of human factors in the procedures. Guide 
YVL B.1 “Safety design of a nuclear power plant” requires e.g. that the design of manual control, testing, 
inspections and maintenance of systems and components important to safety shall be based on a task 
and reliability analysis. And that the results of this analysis shall be used as a basis for designing the 
systems so as to ensure sound preconditions for reliable operation, for avoiding errors to the extent 
possible, and for the prompt detection of possible errors. In addition YVL B.1 requires that with new 
projects and extensive modifications to the control room, design and implementation shall be governed 
by a Human Factors Engineering (HFE) concept.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Fortum evaluates human reliability aspects and their effect on nuclear safety as part of the probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA). PRA is further described under Article 14.
In 2018 Loviisa power plant finished the automation renewal project (ELSA), which had implica-
tions also on the main control room of the plant. From human factors perspective the ELSA project was 
governed with a human factors engineering (HFE) program with which the control room upgrade was 
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guided and monitored. The V&V (verification and validation) process of ELSA HFE program was conduct-
ed by an independent consultant providing human engineering discrepancies (HED) to be resolved by 
the design organization at several points in the project. In addition, human engineering consistencies 
(HEC) were sought for. HFE program of the ELSA renewal ended in an integrated control room system 
validation (ISV) which took place in the spring of 2018. The conclusion of the ISV was that the renewed 
control room is safe to take into use but there were also issues to be followed in the forthcoming simu-
lator trainings of the operating crews.
Simultaneously, Loviisa power plant continued the implementation of the human performance 
program the concrete result of which is the implementation of the so called human performance tools 
(HuP-tools). The HuP-tools in use at the Loviisa power plant are: pre-job-briefing, de-briefing, peer 
checking and clear communication. The main objective of Loviisa power plant in this phase of the 
implementation of the tools has been to encourage teams and other orgnisational units to specify the 
relevant HuP-tools from the perspective of their own work and its relevant risks. This work is on-going.
In the analysis and reporting of operational events Loviisa nuclear power plant has a procedure of 
always considering whether human (and/or organizational) factors are involved in the reported event. All 
personnel of the plant are involved in creating observations, some of which will lead to investigations. 
Majority of the observations are made by personnel during the annual outages. In the yearly analysis 
of operational events for 2016, 2017 and 2018, human factors was the most prevalent primary cause of 
events. The most prevalent performance shaping factor in 2016, 2017 and 2018 was work practices. In 2018 
also work planning and procedures were as prevalent as work practices. Loviisa power plant identifies 
corrective actions and lessons learnt based on operational events and follows their implementation. The 
licensee is currently developing its procedures to monitor the effectiveness corrective actions.
One aspect of management of human factors relating to nuclear safety in the power plant is con-
ducted via proceduralisation of the human activities which are most relevant for safety. These actions 
include both operations and maintenance related human activities although proceduralisation is not 
limited to aforementioned functions. The power plant monitors the extent to which procedures are ad-
hered by e.g. management follow-up and self reporting of the personnel. In addition, all the procedures 
are reviewed and updated on a regular basis. Procedure non-adherence also comes up in the outcomes 
of event investigations.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
TVO evaluates human reliability aspects and their effect on nuclear safety as part of the probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA). PRA is further described under Article 14.
The licensee has a human performance program (HU-program) under which all personnel groups 
of the plant have had the possibility to part take a human performance training. One of the essential 
contents of the training is the introduction of the human performance tools (HU-tools) which are in 
use at the Olkiluoto power plants. These tools are: Pre-job briefing, pair working, peer-checking, en-
sured communication, and post-job-briefing. All personnel of TVO have the possibility to take part in 
a training involving use of HU-tools.
TVO plans and implements modifications which have effect on the main control room according 
to the same principles which are used in any modification project. In addition, there is a special organi-
satorial group named Control room development group which deals with the modifications which have 
effect either on the main control room or on the work of the operators in some other way. The control 
room development group is lead by the head of the operational unit and consists of experts from i&c, 
electrical engineering, training, control rooms, simulators, nuclear safety, and modification design. The 
group meets at minimum once a year and its objective is to evaluate the modifications and give guidance 
and recommendations concerning the HFE activities necessary in the modifications.
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OL3 NPP unit is currently in commissioning and the HFE program concentrating on the interface 
between human and automation is in its final phases. In total OL3 HFE program has been a full HFE 
program starting from analyses of operating experiences and concentrating heavily on different HFE 
V&V activities towards the end of the project. The Integrated System Validation (ISV) was conducted 
by a design independent consultant in the spring of 2019. TVO will continue monitoring the human 
performance in OL3 plant utilizing the processes of training, operating experience and modifications.
TVO takes human factors into account systematically when it investigates operational incidents 
and events. Human factors are one of the prevalent causes of the events. Most human errors are slip-
type errors or they are related to inadequate competence or induction training. TVO has implemented 
corrective actions related to ensuring competence and it will evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective 
actions in the near future.
TVO conducts oversight of human factors e.g. procedure adherence as part of the line organisation’s 
day-to-day leadership activity. In addition, comprehensive work permit system and related procedures 
prevents occurrence of human errors in e.g. maintenance work.
TVO has many practices for monitoring and assessing their procedures. These include, for example, 
management reviews, internal audits, non-conformance reports and root causes analyses. An extensive 
self-assessment of safety culture has been conducted every three years since 2004, and the latest one 
was completed in early 2017. In addition to this, attitudes are monitored via a questionnaire which can 
be answered by any TVO staff member. The state of organizational aspects is monitored by TVO’s safety 
culture group and the CAP (Corrective Action Program) group.
Regulatory oversight
In 2017 and 2018 STUK has utilised an independent TSO (VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland) to 
conduct a study on the management of human factors in both Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs respectively. 
The study at Olkiluoto operating units was conducted mainly in 2017. In conducting the study the TSO 
also created an approach to study and assess the practices of managing human and organisatorial fac-
tors. This approach aims at assessing the availability, sufficiency, quality, and effectives of HOF practices. 
The results of the Olkiluoto study showed that TVO as a company has personnel which are devoted to 
maintaining high level of safety but simultaneously there are practical issues such as high workload 
and negative work climate which may show as issues to be tackled with proper human factors and other 
management practices. The results of the study in Loviisa NPP showed that plant personnel and top 
management view human factors development work as an operative measure the aim of which is to im-
prove e.g. work conditions and leadership in general. In addition, Loviisa NPP has developed metrics to 
monitor status of human factors program. Most important development areas at Loviisa NPP are on-go-
ing development of the HuP-program and developing measues to include HFE in plant modifications.
At the Loviisa NPP STUK has conducted oversight of the ELSA project from a HFE perspective, as 
well. The HFE validation plans have been reviewed and approved and the events of ISV were all observed 
by STUK.
Significant efforts of STUK's human factors oversight have been dedicated to the design and com-
missioning of Olkiluoto 3, where STUK has paid special attention to the planning and conducting of the 
HFE program. As oversight of the HFE program STUK has observed significant amount of V&V activities 
of control room systems and operating manuals. At Olkiluoto 3 STUK has also conducted oversight of 
the training and learning of the operating personnel and supervised the oral examinations of all the 
control room operators.
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In addition, STUK reviews the status of the nuclear power plants human factors management prac-
tices via several other information sources. For example, all STUK personnel involved in the oversight of 
nuclear power plants are encouraged to report observations concerning human and organizational factors 
at the plants in the observation data base of STUK. In addition, STUK reviews the operating experience 
reports of from the point of view of human and organizational factors. Further, significant plant updates 
and modifications are reviewed from human factors perspective. In 2019 STUK will release an update of 
the YVL guides which mandates the licensees to utilize a HFE program when modifying systems which 
are important to safety. According to the forthcoming regulation the HFE program shall be graded 
according to the significance that the modification has on the work conducted by humans in the plant.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 12.
Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance programmes are estab-
lished and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important 
to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements regarding management systems
According to Section 25 of STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), organisations participating in the design, 
construction, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear facility shall employ a management system 
for ensuring safety and the management of quality. The objective of such a management system shall 
be to ensure that safety is prioritized without exception, and that quality management requirements 
correspond to the safety significance of the activity and function. The management system shall be 
systematically assessed and further developed. The quality management system must cover all func-
tions influencing plant safety, and the licensees are further required to ensure that all their suppliers, 
sub-suppliers and other partners participating in functions that affect nuclear and radiation safety 
adhere to the quality management system. Along with the management system, the STUK Regulation 
sets requirements for the documentation of the lines of management and monitoring of the operations.
STUK’s Guide YVL A.3 sets general requirements for management systems regarding quality and 
safety management. Guide YVL A.3 refers to the ISO 9000:2015 definition of quality management ac-
cording to which quality management consists of quality planning, quality control, quality assurance 
and quality improvement. Guide YVL A.3 adheres to IAEA Safety Requirements GSR Part 2 Leadership 
and management for safety. Requirements for quality management of system design are established in 
the Guide YVL B.1. Further requirements related to specific technical areas are presented in the corre-
sponding technical guides. STUK also has a dedicated YVL guide concerning nuclear facility construc-
tion and modifications, i.e., Guide YVL A.5. In this guide, there are requirements on construction and 
modification phases in addition to requirements concerning for example project and risk management. 
The management systems of the licensees and applicants are subject to high level approval by STUK. 
According to the Guide YVL A.3, any safety-significant revisions to the management system must be 
submitted for approval to STUK, but minor revisions are only submitted for information prior to their 
use. STUK has during the period 2016–2018 revised the YVL requirements concerning management sys-
tems and quality management taking into account experiences, feedback and development of quality 
standards (e.g. ISO 19443).
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Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Fortum’s Policy Commitment to Quality in the Nuclear Power Operations was revised and confirmed by 
the management of Fortum in 2015. The structure and content of the Fortum Power & Heat Management 
System for Loviisa NPP is presented in the “Quality Assurance Manual”. The development of Loviisa NPP’s 
quality management system is based on the principle of continuous improvement in accordance with 
the observations and remarks made in quality audits and assessments. The management system of the 
plant is compatible with the ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 standards. The quality management system 
for the Loviisa NPP complies with the requirements of the Guide YVL A.3.
During the years 2016–2018 Fortum has developed the process based management system by de-
scribing the main processes and process indicators. The responsibilities for developing the management 
system are clearly defined and Fortum has revised the procedures for reviewing the management system 
and the procedures and documents are evaluated periodically. Defined quality and safety assurance 
related meetings are held on regular bases. The integrated Management System ensures that nuclear 
safety significance is recognised and considered when making decisions and determining procedures.
The functions and responsibilities of Fortum Power & Heat organisations and personnel are de-
scribed in detail in the Administrative Rules, in the Organisational Manual and in the manuals and 
instructions of individual organisational units. Self-assessments, internal audits, management reviews 
and feedback from peer-reviews are methods used regularly to gain information for development needs. 
Loviisa NPP keeps up a supplier auditing program and aims at ensuring the supply chain quality assur-
ance by auditing suppliers and manufacturers and continuously evaluating the supplier experiences 
according to their procurement procedures.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
TVO’s management system documentation consists of a general section and functional section. The 
general section presents, TVO’s vision, mission and values, company policies, organisation and areas of 
responsibility, general operational principles, quality assurance principles for functional processes, and 
general descriptions of resources. The functional section comprises more detailed descriptions of the 
functional processes, manuals and instructions. TVO’s management System complies to the requirements 
of the Guide YVL A.3 and ISO 9001:2015.
The functions and responsibilities of TVO’s organisations and personnel are described in detail in 
the TVO’s Administrative Rules, in the Organisational Manual and in the manuals and instructions of 
individual organisational units.
TVO is actively developing the management system due to the commissioning of OL3 and the 
growing organisation. For the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction phase, STUK has approved “The Quality 
Plan for Olkiluoto 3 Project”. The Olkiluoto 3 project quality plan is valid until the end of the project 
before the transfer of the plant by the plant supplier. After that Olkiluoto 3 unit’s management system 
shall be implemented completely to Olkiluoto 1 and 2 unit’s management system.
The TVO integrated Management System ensures that nuclear safety significance is recognised 
and considered when making decisions and determining procedures. TVO has recently developed, for 
example, its decision-making procedures, communication of the justifications for the decisions, report-
ing of safety observations as well as the manner the supervisors collect information and interact with 
the personnel. These measures also affect the operational processes and personnel groups related to the 
Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit.
TVO aims at ensuring the supply chain quality management using a document specifying the 
requirements set for the quality management systems of the subcontractors and by auditing suppliers 
and manufacturers.
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Fennovoima, Hanhikivi project
Fennovoima has worked on developing its operations and management system during the recent 
years. Developing licensee competences and capabilities has been challenging in part due to a limited 
resource pool of experienced nuclear professionals. Management of safety issues and project management 
in general has suffered from fragmentation. High level issues have remained unsolved and without clear 
visible leadership. The developed of the management system has not focused sufficiently in correcting 
these high level issues whereas lower level process development has been performed.
Due to the project challenges Fennovoima has started an extensive development program concern-
ing the whole organization and all operations to improve the situation The development programme 
perceives the operation as four entities: safe plant design, readiness for construction, implementation 
quality and readiness for operation. The development of certain key organisations is considerably in-
complete. The procedures of the plant supplier and main contractor and their practical application are 
still in significant need of development. The plant supplier has faced similar challenges as Fennovoima 
concerning competence and management of safety and project issues.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has followed up the implementation of the Guide YVL A.3 requirements in the management 
systems of the licensees by means of the periodic inspection programme. The yearly inspection of the 
STUK’s periodic inspection programme for operating NPPs Loviisa 1&2 and Olkiluoto 1&2, “Functioning 
of the Management System”, includes assessment of functioning, development and assessment of the 
management system as well as assessment of the organisation for quality management. The “Leadership 
and Safety Culture” inspection (see Article 10) also contains items concerning management systems. 
During 2016–2018 the management system inspections in Olkiluoto 1&2 and Loviisa 1&2 have especially 
dealt with the process management and indicators, project management, quality assurance competence 
in procurement and supply management. The management systems of the main suppliers are also re-
viewed and assessed and their implementation is verified through inspections and audits mainly by the 
licensee where STUK is taking part as an observer.
STUK has participated as an observer in the licensee’s and vendor’s quality audits at the subcon-
tractors. STUK has also increased visits on site with discussions, interviews and observations on safety 
management topics to follow up the development actions of the licensee also by other means than 
inspections.
Concerning the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction project, STUK has performed two quality manage-
ment and quality assurance inspections every year as a part of the construction inspection programme. 
STUK’s inspections have been focused on the ongoing integration of Olkiluoto unit 3 to TVO’s operations.
Concerning Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi project, STUK has performed regularly quality management 
and quality assurance related inspections. The inspections has covered not only Fennovoima’s processes 
and performance, but also those of the main suppliers. STUK has also participated as an observer in 
several quality audits performed by Fennovoima.
Management system of the regulatory body
STUK’s management system documents include safety and quality policy, description of the management 
system, organisation and management, roles and responsibilities, personnel policy as well as descrip-
tion of processes and procedures. The results of management reviews, internal audits, self-assessments 
and international evaluations are used as lessons learned and inputs for the continuous improvement 
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of the management system at STUK. STUK’s regulation of nuclear facilities has recently developed its 
internal procedure and a supporting tool further to improve regulatory processes and functions based 
on regulatory experience gathered from various sources. These have been applied since the beginning 
of 2019 and the experiences seem promising. In the future, the established procedure will developed be 
further e.g. including practices for sharing the lessons learnt with interested parties.
At the end of 2018 STUK’s management made a decision that an in depth evaluation of STUK’s 
management system will be performed and after the evaluation a development plan for a management 
system with more integrated approach will be prepared and implemented.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 13.
Article 14. Assessment and verification of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
i. comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction and commissioning 
of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shall be well documented, subsequently updated 
in the light of operating experience and significant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the 
regulatory body;
ii. verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state 
and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance with its design, applicable national safety 
requirements, and operational limits and conditions.
Regulatory approach to safety assessment
The prerequisite of the construction and operating licences is that the licence applicant has made its 
own safety assessment on the facility and in particular how the facility meets Finnish safety require-
ments. The fulfilment of the safety requirements is demonstrated in the construction and operating 
licence documentation. STUK makes an independent safety assessment concerning the application and 
STUK’s assessment is required in the Nuclear Energy Act. Conditions for granting a licence are provided 
in the Nuclear Energy Act. In Section 20 of the Act it is further stated that the operation of the nuclear 
facility shall not be started until STUK has ascertained that the nuclear facility meets the prescribed 
safety requirements.
The Nuclear Energy Decree requires that when applying for a construction licence, the applicant 
must submit to STUK the following documents: a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, a design phase 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a proposal for a safety classification document, a description of Quality 
Management during the construction of the nuclear facility, preliminary plans for periodic inspections, 
for the arrangements for security and emergency preparedness, and a plan for arranging the safeguards 
control. For the operating licence, the applicant must submit to STUK: the Final Safety Analysis Report, 
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment, the safety classification document, the quality management pro-
gramme for the operation of the nuclear facility, Operational Limits and Conditions, a programme for 
periodic inspections, security and emergency plans, a description on administrative rules for safeguards, 
a programme for radiation monitoring in the environment of the nuclear facility, a description of how 
safety requirements are met, and a programme for the management of ageing. In addition, the Decree 
gives STUK a possibility to ask for other documents considered necessary for safety demonstration.
Design of the facility is described in the Preliminary (PSAR) and Final (FSAR) Safety Analysis Re-
ports. PSAR/FSAR forms the basis to STUK´s safety assessment which is required before granting the 
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Construction/Operation Licence (see Article 7). According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR has to 
be continuously updated, and changes to FSAR have to be submitted to STUK for approval. Require-
ments for the plant modification process are presented in the Guide YVL B.1. The main principle in plant 
modification process is that conceptual design plans and system-specific pre-inspection documents of 
Safety Class 1, 2 and 3 systems must be submitted to STUK for approval. STUK reviews and approves the 
modification prior to its implementation at the plant. In connection with a system modification, the 
Final Safety Analysis Report shall be amended accordingly without delay.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the operating licence is granted for a fixed term. However, 
legislation has not prescribed the length of the term. The term is proposed by the licensee in the applica-
tion, and must be justified on the basis of the ageing and planned future operation of the nuclear facility. 
Particular attention is paid to licensee´s processes and activities and planned safety improvements to 
ensure safety for the estimated duration of operation. The procedure for operating licence renewal is in 
general the same as in applying for an operating licence for a new nuclear facility. Specific requirements 
on the documents to be submitted to STUK for the renewal of the operating licence are described in the 
Guide YVL A.1. Renewal of the operating licence always involves a periodic safety review of the facility. 
If a licence is granted for a significantly longer term than ten years, STUK requires the licensee to carry 
out a periodic safety review within about ten years of receiving the operating licence or of conducting 
the previous periodic safety review. For a separate periodic safety review, STUK must be provided with 
similar safety-related reports as in applying for renewal of the operating licence. Periodic safety review 
of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2014–2016, and the renewal of operating license of the Olkiluoto 
plant was carried out in 2016–2018 (see Article 6).
According to the STUK Regulation nuclear power plant safety and the technical solutions of its 
safety systems shall be assessed and substantiated analytically and, if necessary, experimentally. The 
analyses shall be maintained and revised as necessary, taking into account operating experience from the 
plant itself and from other nuclear power plants, the results of safety research, plant modifications, and 
the advancement of calculation methods. The analytical methods employed to demonstrate compliance 
with the safety requirements shall be reliable, verified and qualified for the purpose. The analyses shall 
demonstrate the conformity with the safety requirements with high certainty. Any uncertainty in the 
results shall be considered when assessing the meeting of the safety requirements.
Detailed requirements concerning transient and accident analyses, including sensitivity analyses, 
are presented in the Guide YVL B.3 and requirements for failure tolerance analyses are presented in 
YVL B.1. Acceptance criteria for the deterministic analyses are presented in Guides related to reactor 
and nuclear fuel, primary circuit pressure boundary and containment (YVL B.4, YVL B.5 and YVL B.6). 
Requirements for probabilistic risk assessments are given in the Guide YVL A.7. Acceptance criteria for 
limitation of radioactive releases and public exposure in the environment of a nuclear power plant or 
other nuclear facility are given in the Nuclear Energy Decree 1988/161.
Deterministic safety assessment
As mentioned above, detailed requirements concerning transient and accident analyses, including 
sensitivity or uncertainty analyses, are presented in the Guide YVL B.3. Requirements for the analyses 
and their acceptance critera are graded according to the frequency of the event; The event categories 
are shown in the Table 3 with related criteria for limitation of readioactive releases and public exposure.
Accident and transient analyses of the operating nuclear power plants, as well as the analysis meth-
ods, have been updated and developed throughout the operation of the plants.
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TABLE 3. Event categories and related acceptance criteria.
DiD level Event category Frequency Acceptance criterion (doses)
level 1 Normal operation (DBC1) 0.1 mSv
level 2 Anticipated operational 
occurrences (DBC2)
f > 10-2/a 0.1 mSv
level 3a Postulated accidents Class 1 
(DBC3)
10-2/a > f > 10-3/a 1 mSv
Postulated accidents Class 2 
(DBC4) 
f < 10-3/a 5 mSv
level 3b Design extension conditions 
(DEC)
Multiple failures
DEC A – CCF combined with DBC2 / DBC3
DEC B – Complex failure combination
DEC C – Very rare external event
20 mSv
level 4 Severe accidents (SA) Release limit
Fortum has revised almost all of the safety analyses in connection with the I&C renewal, periodic 
safety review and renewed YVL guides. Fortum supplemented the deterministic safety analyses by anal-
yses by analyse of design extension conditions. Deterministic assessment of extreme external events 
has been updated to correspond to renewed requirements and was submitted to STUK in early 2019. 
TVO revised the accident and transient analyses in conjunction with the application for the renewal 
of its operating licence which was granted in 2018. In addition to revising previous accident and tran-
sient analyses to take into account plant modifications and development of analysis methods since the 
previous periodic safety review (in 2007–2009), the analyses for design extension conditions without 
core melt were added to the scope due to the revised YVL Guides.
The analyses of Olkiluoto unit 3 were presented to STUK in connection with the application for 
the construction licence. These analyses have been updated during construction and commissioning 
phase to correspond the as-built plant. The analyses have been reviewed as a part of the Olkiluoto unit 
3 operating licence application, and the operating license was granted in early 2019.
Fennovoima has submitted some of the deterministic analyses for construction license application 
of Hanhikivi 1 plant. Full scope of the analyses is expected to be delivered.
To support in the review of deterministic safety analyses of Finnish NPPs, STUK contracts technical 
support organizations, e.g. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, to carry out independent analyses 
to verify the results given by the utilities and to conduct sensitivity analyses.
Probabilistic risk assessment
Regulatory requirements on PRA
In the Nuclear Energy Decree, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been included since 1988 in the 
list of documents to be submitted to STUK for the review of the operating licence application. Since 
2008 the design phase PRA has been in the list of documents to be submitted to STUK for the review of 
the construction licence application according to the Nuclear Energy Decree, but a limited preliminary 
PRA has been required in Regulatory YVL Guides since 1996. PRA for construction licence application 
is based on design information presented in PSAR. Generic reliability data for components can be used 
if data from similar plant designs are not available. PRA for operating licence application is based on 
essentially final design information (FSAR) and vendor or plant design specific component reliability 
data, where available, and more detailed modelling of systems.
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), nuclear power plant safety and the technical 
solutions of its safety systems shall be assessed and substantiated analytically and, if necessary, exper-
imentally. The analyses shall be maintained and revised as necessary, taking into account operating 
experience from the plant itself and from other nuclear power plants, the results of safety research, plant 
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modifications, and the advancement of calculation methods. The detailed requirements on the use of 
PRA are set forth in the Regulatory Guide YVL A.7. Detailed requirements on risk-informed applications 
are included in several other YVL guides.
STUK required in 1984 that the Finnish utilities Fortum (former Imatran Voima Oy) and TVO shall 
make extensive probabilistic risk assessments for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. The 
objective of these assessments was to determine the plant-specific risk topographies of the essential 
accident sequences. Another important objective was to enhance the plant personnel’s understanding 
of the plant and its behaviour in different situations. Therefore STUK also required that the PRAs are 
performed mainly by the utility personnel and external consultants are used only for special topics.
In 1987 STUK published the Regulatory Guide YVL 2.8 on PRA. The Guide was updated in 1996 and 
2003. In Nov. 2013 it was replaced by the new Regulatory Guide YVL A.7. Currently the Guide requires 
a full-scope (including internal events, fires, floods, seismic events, harsh weather and other external 
events) PRA for power operation and low-power and shut-down states. PRA shall cover the analysis of 
the probability of core damage (Level 1) and large release of radioactive substances (Level 2). PRA shall 
be updated continuously to reflect plant and procedure modifications and changes in reliability data.
Guide YVL A.7 includes the following probabilistic safety goals:
• Core damage frequency less than 1∙10-5/year
• Large radioactive release (> 100 TBq Cs-137) frequency less than 5∙10-7/year.
In addition, it is also required that the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or 
is lost in the early phase of a severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage 
frequency.
These safety goals apply as such to new NPP units. For operating units, instead of the numerical 
safety goals, the SAHARA (safety as high as reasonably achievable) principle and the principle of con-
tinuous improvement are applied.
Guide YVL A.7 also includes requirements on several risk informed applications, such as analysis 
of plant modifications, risk-informed in-service inspections and testing, development of emergency 
operating procedures and training programmes and review of safety classification and Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
For a new NPP unit, a preliminary PRA covering Levels 1 and 2 shall be submitted to STUK for the 
review of the construction licence application (design phase PRA) and the updated and complemented 
PRA (Levels 1 and 2) shall be submitted for the review of the operating licence application.
PRA´s computer models shall be submitted to STUK. PRA is routinely used by STUK to support 
its decision making, for example, in the review of plant modifications and applications for exemption 
from Operational Limits and Conditions and in the analysis of operating events.
Main developments in risk informed regulation and safety management during the reporting 
period
During the reporting period the role of risk informed regulation and safety management has been fur-
ther strengthened by STUK and the licensees. The following activities can be given as examples of the 
increased role of risk informed methods:
• Use of PRA in OL3 operating licence application review process (full scope updated PRA and 
commissioning risk assessment)
• Development of security PRA methodology - vital area identification
• Analysis of brute force sabotages (explosion) already required and applied PSA application
• Protection strategy assessment against insider threat: tool under development
• Intermediate Spent fuel storage PRAs
• Spent fuel encapsulation plant PRA
• Use of PRA in practical elimination of early or large releases
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• More systematic use of PRA to support regulatory decision making
• Development project ongoing at STUK to explore methods and tools for risk informed 
decisions making (RIDM).
The use of PRA in several well-established applications has been continued and the methods have been 
further refined.
In addition to the risk informed applications based on regulatory requirements, the licensees use 
PRA in applications supporting their operating activities, for example availability analysis and reliability 
centered maintenance. 
Further development of the PRA computer code software (FinPSA) developed at STUK has been 
continued by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The software is used in the review of the PRAs 
submitted by the licensees and in support of risk informed decision making at STUK.
Probabilistic risk assessment of Loviisa NPP
Fortum provided STUK with Level 1 internal events PRA in 1989. Since 1990 Fortum has extended PRA 
by analysing risks related to fires, floods, earthquakes, severe weather conditions and outages, as well as 
by conducting Level 2 PRA. Plant modifications have been carried out continuously at the Loviisa NPP, 
including safety system improvements, fire safety improvements, implementation of Severe Accident 
Management systems and a major modernisation programme in mid 1990’s (see Annex 2). By means of 
these modifications risks have been decreased and the risk topography of the plant has been balanced. 
Technical solutions of the modifications have also been often justified with PRA.
The development of the core damage frequency since 2008 is shown in Figure 13. Until year 2014, 
PRA was done only for Loviisa NPP unit 1 and the small differences between the NPP units were as-
sessed on case by case basis. Thereafter unit-specific PRA models have been kept up-to-date reflecting 
the small differences between unit 1 and unit 2. At the end of year 2018 the calculated estimate for the 
total frequency of reactor core damage was about 1.2∙10-5 per reactor year for unit 1 and 1.4∙10-5 per reactor 
year for unit 2. The relative contribution to the annual core damage frequency from different groups 
of initiating events is shown for NPP unit 1 in Figure 14. There are no major differences between unit 1 
and unit 2 risk profiles.
The most significant initiating events at full power (power operation, PO) are fires in the control 
building and loss of off-site power due to strong wind combined with heavy snow fall or algae in the 
sea water intake. At shutdown (SD) the most significant initiating events are drop of heavy loads and 
various fire events.
Fortum has also provided STUK with the Level 2 PRA, in which the integrity of the containment 
and the release of radioactive materials from the plant to the environment are evaluated. In the latest 
update in 2018, it was estimated that the total frequency of a large release to the environment is about 
7.8∙10–6 per reactor year. The estimate includes all initiating event groups, except for seismic events. 
The following modifications have decreased core damage frequency and large release frequency: the 
independent air-cooled cooling units for decay heat removal from the reactor core and from the spent 
fuel pools, enhanced protection against extreme high seawater level, renewal of auxiliary service water 
system, modifications in power distribution for some containment systems, renewal of Pressuriser 
Overpressure Protection Valve (PORV), renewal of pressuriser spray system and new procedures for sump 
recirculation in shutdown states.
The results of STUK’s review show that Fortum has applied in its analyses commonly accepted 
methods in modelling transient and accident situations of the plant and in collecting and analysing 
reliability data. The reviews also show that the assessments provide an adequate basis for risk informed 
decision making.
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Loviisa NPP Unit 1 Core Damage Frequency
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FIGURE 13. Development of the estimate of annual core damage frequency of the loviisa NPP unit 1 in 2009–2018.
Loviisa NPP relative risk profile 2018, total = 1.2E-5
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FIGURE 14. Relative contribution of different initiating event types to the 
annual core damage frequency in 2018 for loviisa NPP unit 1. Note: “Flood” 
includes only internal flooding from process systems and external flooding 
is included in “Weather”.
PRA has been used by the licensee in the risk-informed applications as required by YVL Guides, for 
example in evaluation of plant modifications, review of safety classification, development of Risk-In-
formed In-Service Inspection programme, risk informed review of the Operational Limits and Conditions, 
including optimisation of testing intervals, and optimisation of Operational Limits and Conditions 
(allowable outage times). In the Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection programme for piping, the num-
ber of inspections was increased but the focus shifted from higher safety classes to lower safety classes. 
This shift is due to the fact that some lower safety class pipings have relatively large risk significance as 
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they belong to vital support systems, or leaks in lower class pipelines may lead to consequential damage 
to safety systems. The radiation doses to inspection personnel have decreased as a result of the new 
inspection programme.
Probabilistic risk assessment of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2
TVO submitted to STUK the first version of Level 1 internal events PRA in 1989. Since then, the PRA has 
been updated several times and the scope has been extended. TVO has now practically full-scope PRA 
covering levels 1 and 2 for full power operation and for low power and shutdown states.
Annual core damage frequency since 2008 is shown in Figure 15. Plant modifications have been 
carried out continuously at the Olkiluoto plant, including backfitting with severe accident management 
systems and power uprate and modernisation in the 1990’s (see Annex 2). Until year 2013, PRA model was 
done only for Olkiluoto unit 1 and the small differences between NPP units 1 and 2 were assessed on case 
by case basis. Thereafter unit-specific PRA models have been kept up-to-date reflecting the differences 
between Olkiluoto unit 1 and unit 2.
At the end of 2018 the overall core damage frequency was approximately 6.4∙10–6 per reactor year 
for Unit 1 and 1.1∙10–5 per reactor year for unit 2, including all operating states and all groups of initiat-
ing events. The higher risk for unit 2 can mainly be explained by the fact that plant modifications that 
improve safety were not implemented at the same time. In 2014, a new recirculation line modification 
in auxiliary feedwater system was implemented. The modification reduced the system’s dependence 
on seawater cooling. A similar modification will be implemented at unit 2 in 2019–2020. The relative 
contributions to annual core damage frequency from different groups of initiating events are shown 
in Figure 15.
The risk estimate increase in 2009 is due to a more detailed analysis of the capacity of decay heat 
removal by diverse systems. The risk estimate increase in 2011 is due to the change of the method used to 
determine fire ignition frequencies and update of external hazards study that contains a new man-made 
hazard “marine oil-spill”. Risk increase in 2015 estimate is due to more realistic modelling of operator 
and operating staff actions during shutdown. Risk decrease in 2016 is due to the new recirculation line 
modification in auxiliary feedwater system which removed the dependency from sea water cooling.
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FIGURE 15. Development of the estimate of annual core damage frequency for Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2009–2018.
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Olkiluoto NPP relative risk profile 2018, total = 6.4E-6
 2.0% Seismic
 12.1% Weather
 6.0% Fire
 0.3% Flood
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 17.1% Shutdown
FIGURE 16. Relative contribution of different initiating event types to 
the annual core damage frequency in 2018 for Olkiluoto unit 1. The most 
significant internal initiating events at full power are the loss of off-site 
power and loss of feedwater. Note: “Flood” includes only internal flooding 
from process systems and external flooding is included in “Weather”.
In 1996, TVO submitted to STUK the Level 2 PRA. The analysis has been updated a few times since 
then. According to the latest PRA model the frequency of the large release to the environment (>100 TBq 
Cs-137) is 2.1∙10–6 per reactor year, which is approximately one third of the core damage frequency at OL 1. 
The large release frequency has decreased in the updates mainly due to the decrease of the core damage 
frequency, but the severity of the release has decreased significantly mainly due to modifications in 
procedures.
TVO has used PRA in the risk-informed applications required by the Guide YVL A.7, for example in 
evaluation of plant modifications, review of safety classification, development of Risk-Informed In-Ser-
vice Inspection programme, optimisation of testing intervals, and optimisation of Operational Limits 
and Conditions (allowable outage times).
Probabilistic risk assessment of Olkiluoto unit 3
The vendor of Olkiluoto unit 3 conducted a design phase PRA, which TVO submitted in 2004 to STUK 
for the review of the construction licence application as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. The 
design phase PRA already included analysis of internal initiating events, internal hazards and external 
hazards for power operation and refuelling outage. STUK approved the Olkiluoto unit 3 PRA for the 
construction licence in January 2005. The PRA of Olkiluoto unit 3 has been continuously updated by the 
plant vendor during the construction phase and STUK has closely followed the completion of the PRA.
The PRA for operating licence application was submitted to STUK in April 2016 and an update 
in October 2016. The modelling was improved in several areas taking into account the detailed design 
information. Main improvements were related to the modelling of internal fires and the extension of 
the PRA to cover seismic events. PRA review was finalised in the beginning of 2018.
Olkiluoto unit 3 Level 1 and Level 2 PRA covers transients and LOCAs as well as internal and external 
hazards in all operating modes, as required by YVL guides. Level 3 PRA, which assesses the potential risk 
to people and the environment, is not required in Finland.
According to the Level 1 PRA results, Olkiluoto unit 3 fulfils with a wide margin the probabilistic 
safety goals. The total core damage frequency estimate is approximately 3.0∙10–6 per reactor year.
Results of the Level 2 PRA show that large release frequency of Olkiluoto unit 3 is very small, ap-
proximately 1.0∙10–7 per reactor year. Level 2 covers both the reactor core and the spent fuel pool.
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PRA has been used by TVO and plant vendor in the risk-informed applications in accordance with 
YVL Guide requirements, for example in evaluation of system design, review of safety classification, 
development of Risk-Informed Pre- and In-Service Inspection programme, optimisation of testing in-
tervals, optimisation of Operational Limits and Conditions (allowable outage times), and planning of 
plant commissioning tests.
 37.0% Fires
 29.0% Transients
 8.0% LOCAs
 7.0% Other
 4.0% External Hazards
 4.0% Loss of O-site Power
 1.0% Floods
 12.0% ATWS
Olkiluoto 3 relative risk profile, total CDF = 3.0E-6 
FIGURE 17. Relative contribution of different initiating event types to the annual core  
damage frequency in 2016 for Olkiluoto unit 3. Note: “Floods” includes only internal  
flooding from process systems.
Assessment of safety as a result of TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of March in 2011, safety 
assessments in Finland were initiated after STUK received a letter from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment on 15 March 2011. The Ministry asked STUK to carry out a study on how the Finnish 
NPPs have prepared against loss of electric power supply and extreme natural phenomena in order to 
ensure nuclear safety. STUK asked the licensees to carry out assessments and submitted the study report 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment on 16 May 2011. Although immediate actions to 
ensure safety of public and environment were not considered necessary, STUK required the licensees to 
carry out additional assessments and present action plans for safety improvements. Assessments were 
conducted and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 15 December 2011. STUK reviewed the 
results of national assessments, and made licensee specific decisions on 19 July 2012 on the suggested 
safety improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests and submitted the national report to European 
Commission at the end of 2011. An EU level peer review on the report was completed by April 2012. The 
recommendations of the EU peer review have been taken into account in the regulatory decisions as well 
as included in the development of national regulations. A National Action Plan was prepared address-
ing the measures initiated on a national level and at the nuclear power plants as a result of the TEPCO 
Fukushima Daiichi accident. The National Action Plan was sent to the European Nuclear Regulators 
Group (ENSREG) and peer reviewed in April 2013 and April 2015. In addition, Finland participated in the 
second Extraordinary Meeting of the Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) in August 2012 and prepared 
a report introducing all Fukushima related actions. All STUK’s related decisions, the national report to 
European Commission, the report to the Extraordinary CNS, and the Finnish National Action Plan have 
been published on STUK’s website.
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Based on the results of assessments conducted in Finland to date, it is concluded that no such 
hazards or deficiencies have been found that would require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. 
However, areas where safety can be further enhanced have been identified and there are plans on how 
to address these areas, some of which have already been implemented. The experiences from the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are also taken into consideration in the renewal of the legislation and Finn-
ish Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides) and in the nuclear safety research programme SAFIR (see Articles 
7 and 8). Implemented safety improvements as well as the ones under planning and implementation 
due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are described more detailed under Articles 16, 17, 18 and 
19, and in Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
Information collected in connection with external events PRAs has been used in the national and 
EU stress tests after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident, although mainly deterministic ap-
proach has been used. Seismic events and other off-site external events have been included in the PRAs 
in the 1990’s and the analyses have been updated regularly. The input data and plant response analyses 
used in the external events PRAs have been reviewed after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident 
in connection with the stress tests and no essential shortcomings have been found. Further updates of 
the analyses and hazard estimates will be continued. 
Verification of safety
Verification programmes
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) includes several requirements which concern the verification of the 
physical state of a nuclear power plant. For instance, in all activities affecting the plant operation and 
the availability of components, a systematic approach shall be applied for ensuring the operators’ con-
tinuous awareness of the state of the plant and its components. The reliable operation of systems and 
components shall be ensured by adequate maintenance as well as by regular in-service inspections and 
periodical tests. General requirements on verification programmes and procedures are provided in the 
YVL Guides (e.g. Guide YVL A.8 and YVL E.5).
Main programmes used for maintaining and verification of the operability of a nuclear power plant 
are
• periodic testing according to the Operational Limits and Conditions
• preventive and predictive maintenance programmes
• in-service inspection programmes for pressure retaining components
• time limited analyses and qualifications
• surveillance programme of reactor pressure vessel material
• research programmes for evaluating the ageing of components and materials.
Activities for verifying the physical state of a power plant are carried out in connection with normal 
daily routines and with scheduled inspections, testing, preventive maintenance etc. Activities are per-
formed by the licensee and in the case of certain inspections by contractors approved separately. Detailed 
programmes and procedures are established and approved by the licensee. They are also reviewed and, 
when needed, approved by STUK. The results of tests and inspections are documented in a systematic 
way and used through a feedback process to further develop the programmes. The Operational Limits 
and Conditions are approved by STUK. In general, the role of STUK is to verify that the licensees follow 
the obligations imposed on them and carry out all activities scheduled in verification programmes.
Comprehensive evaluations related to the state and operation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
were carried out in the periodic safety reviews by Fortum in 2014–2016 and TVO in 2016–2018. These 
activities were controlled by STUK.
70 STUK-B 237 / JUly 2019
ARTICLE 14 – ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY
Inspection qualification
According to international experience and the Guide YVL E.5, STUK has recognised the qualification 
of non-destructive testing systems and procedures as an issue of high importance. This issue requires 
high priority at both present nuclear power plants. The implementation of qualified NDT systems has 
been started in 1990’s.
General requirements on inspection qualification are provided in the Guide YVL E.5. The docu-
ment “European methodology for qualification” drawn up by the European Network for Inspection and 
Qualification (ENIQ) shall be used as the minimum requirement level for qualification of inspection 
systems to be used in in-service inspection, and it shall be complemented by the ENIQ Recommended 
Practices. In the content of licensees’ guidelines published by the qualification body, the requirements 
presented in the Guide YVL E.5, in the European Methodology for Qualification (EUR 17299) and in its 
recommendations have been taken into account.
The licensee shall have available an FINAS accredited qualification body for inspection system 
qualification management, planning, implementation, control and assessment as well as the issuing of 
qualification certificates. Pursuant to Section 60 a of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the licensee 
shall have the accredited qualification body approved by STUK.
The qualification body and its activities shall meet the minimum requirements for a type 1 inde-
pendent third party organisation presented in ENIQ Recommended Practice 7. In this case it shall also 
meet, at a minimum, the general independency requirements for a type A inspection organisation pre-
sented in standard SFS-EN ISO/IEC 17020. Alternatively, it shall meet the requirements for a personnel 
certification body presented in standard SFS-EN ISO/IEC 17024.
In Finland, Inspecta Certification has been accredited according to standard SFS-EN ISO/IEC 17024 
and approved by STUK. Based on a contract with the licensees, Inspecta Certification is nominated as 
the qualification body for qualification management, implementation, control and assessment as well as 
the issuing of qualification certificates in Finland. When needed Inspecta Certification uses also experts 
outside of its own organisation for individual qualifications.
Most of the qualifications for Loviisa and Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPPs as well as Olkiluoto 3 preservice 
inspections have already been performed by the qualification body and approved by STUK. The qualifica-
tion work for Olkiluoto 3 inservice inspections and Posiva spent fuel canister NDT inspections has begun.
STUK ordered in 2009 an assessment of the current qualification activities in Finland from an 
independent expert organisation. The purpose was to assess whether Finnish inspection qualification 
practice leads to reliable and effective in-service inspection of safety critical components. Review was 
performed in two parts: 1) review of the inspection qualification system as specified in the Guide YVL 3.8 
(in force at the time) and the national qualification guideline documents issued by the qualification body 
and 2) review of the inspection qualification practices. As a conclusion of the assessment it was reported 
that the qualification system meets the Finnish requirements, is effective and provides confidence in 
the inspections of safety critical components.
In-service inspections
The condition of the pressure-retaining components of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs is ensured 
with regular in-service inspections. The components of the primary circuit are inspected by means of 
non-destructive examination methods. These regularly repeated examinations are carried out during 
outages according to the Guide YVL E.5. The results of the in-service inspections are compared with 
the results of the previous inspections and of the pre-service inspections which have been carried out 
before the commissioning.
The in-service inspection plans are submitted to STUK for approval before each individual in-service 
inspection. Programmes and related inspection procedures are changed when necessary, taking into 
account the development of requirements and standards in the field, the advancement of examination 
techniques and inspection experiences as well as operating experiences in Finland and abroad.
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Guide YVL E.5 and the latest revisions of the ASME Code, Section XI are applied as approval bases 
for the in-service inspection programmes and procedures. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix R and ENIQ 
European Framework Document for Risk-informed In-service Inspection are used as approval bases for 
the risk-informed in-service inspection programmes.
The reliability of the non-destructive examination methods for the primary circuit piping and 
components has been essentially improved after the commissioning of both the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs. Guide YVL E.5 calls for the qualification of the entire NDT-system; equipment, software, procedures 
and personnel. Most of the inspection systems are already qualified at both the plants. STUK follows 
the development and implementation of the plans.
A risk-informed inspection programme has been introduced and approved by STUK at the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 for the in-service inspections of safety-critical pipelines. The deployment of risk-informed 
inspection methods for targeting inspections has been developed in Finland by STUK, Fortum, TVO and 
VTT. The objective of risk-informed in-service inspection programmes is to allocate inspection resources 
to the targets that are most critical from the point of view of risk. Using this approach, it is possible to 
ensure that the current inspection objects are well-justified, identify new objects and omit certain less 
safety-critical objects from the existing inspection programme.
The length of the inspection period of the regular inspections (e.g. ASME Code, Section XI) is nor-
mally ten years. Inspection programmes have been complemented with additional inspections as regards 
the reactor pressure vessel and the primary circuit piping, and the length of the inspection period of 
the reactor pressure vessel has been reduced to eight years. The length of the inspection period of the 
objects susceptible to thermal fatigue is typically three years.
At the Olkiluoto plant, attempts have been made to focus the inspections on areas where faults 
are most likely to emerge. These include, for example, items susceptible to fatigue due to temperature 
variations or items susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. The selection of inspection items is under 
continuous development. For this purpose, a risk-informed in-service inspection programmes have been 
developed for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Risk informed programmes have been approved by STUK and 
inspection schedules are optimized. These programmes are under continues optimization and reviewed 
annually.
The frequency of the non-destructive examinations performed at regular intervals is usually ten 
years at the Olkiluoto NPP. The inspection frequency for items susceptible to thermal fatigue is three 
years, and the inspection frequency for items susceptible to stress corrosion cracking is two to five years.
In addition to the inspections mentioned above, physical inspections concerning the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are carried out as regular pressure equipment inspections according to 
the Finnish pressure equipment legislation. Such inspections are a full inspection, an internal inspec-
tion and an operational inspection. These inspections include non-destructive examinations as well as 
pressure and tightness tests. The inspections of piping have been defined in the system-specific moni-
toring programmes. These periodic inspections are dealt with in the Guides YVL E.3, YVL E.8, YVL E.9, 
YVL E.10 and YVL E.11. The periodic inspection programmes of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs fulfil the 
requirements of YVL Guides, as regards the number and techniques of inspections.
Ageing management
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), the design, construction, operation, condition 
monitoring and maintenance of a nuclear power plant shall provide for the ageing of systems, structures 
and components (SSCs) important to safety in order to ensure that they meet the design-basis require-
ments with necessary safety margins throughout the service life of the facility. Systematic procedures 
shall be in place for preventing such ageing of SSCs which may deteriorate their availability, and for 
the early detection of the need for their repair, modification and replacement. Safety requirements and 
applicability of new technology shall be periodically assessed in order to ensure that the technology 
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applied is up to date, and the availability of the spare parts and the system support shall be monitored. 
Furthermore, a dedicated regulatory guide, Guide YVL A.8, sets requirements for ageing management to 
license applicants and holders, and describes regulator’s control measures in this matter. The require-
ments covers all the phases from early conceptual design to operation of the facility.
Ageing management at the Loviisa NPP
Radiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the related surveillance and mitigation 
actions have dominated the ageing management in Loviisa NPP since the early years of operation. This 
was more relevant to Loviisa unit 1 whose girth weld at the level of the reactor core has a higher content 
of impurities. In 1996, the brittle weld joint of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel was heat-treated to 
improve the ductility properties of the welding material. In this connection the reactor pressure vessel 
was subject to thorough non-destructive tests. Embrittlement rate has been re-assessed based on the new 
surveillance programme representing the critical weld. Current operating licences of the Loviisa units 
1 and 2 are valid until end of 2027 and 2030, respectively. For both units, deterministic and probabilistic 
safety analyses will be evaluated in the PSRs (by end 2023) in order to justify continued service of the 
RPVs. In addition, new findings from domestic and international inspection and research programmes 
may require updating of the RPV analysis results.
In the mid-1990’s, Fortum implemented their systematic plant-wide ageing management programme. 
The SSCs are assigned to categories A through C based on their technical and economical replaceability. 
SSC failures in category A would limit plant lifetime and thus deserve a part-assembly-wise break-down 
of ageing related remedies. Category A comprises the main primary components. Data indicative of plant 
status and trends are collected with operation, maintenance and inspection IT systems, R&D activities 
and via experience exchange. The consequent ratings of operability, remaining service life and necessary 
actions for each SSC are stored on the plant database.
In 2006 the operating utility Fortum submitted to the Government an application to continue 
the operation of Loviisa units 1 and 2 until the end of 2027 and 2030, respectively, meaning a 20-year 
extension to the original design lifetime. Among the ageing-related justification were the main fatigue 
analyses, updated to cover the whole 50 years’ life span with consideration of the environmental effects. 
Documents on In-Service Inspection Summary Programme, Ageing Management Programme Principles 
and Implementation, and SSC Status and Service Life Extensibility were also submitted. For electrical 
and I&C components it was noted that massive projects are underway to replace cables in containment 
due to its detected considerable ambient temperature rise, and for plant-wide replacing of obsolete pro-
tection and plant I&C systems and components. In its review, STUK presented a general point that the 
state-of-the-art permitted a quantitative life-time evaluation only in case of ageing by fatigue. However, 
other potential mechanisms have been identified and resources are in place to monitor, inspect, mitigate 
and repair as needed. The operating organisation has also strong technical support which, in the past, 
has convincingly resolved forthcoming ageing issues, and the history records are well preserved. The 
Government granted the applied operating licences on condition that two periodic safety reviews (PSR) 
are undertaken during the licence period. The first PSR review was done in 2014-2016 and the ageing 
management was one of the key issues – especially the embrittlement margins of Loviisa unit 2 reactor 
pressure vessel before the expected end of life in 2030 (Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel core area was 
annealed in 1996). Related to PSR assessment Fortum sent at the end of 2016 to STUK for information 
the documents concerning the actions to increase the embrittlement margins of unit 2 reactor pressure 
vessel in the future. Then the documents provided confirmed necessary actions for safe operation of 
the unit 2 reactor pressure vessel.
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Ageing management at the Olkiluoto NPP
The ageing management activities at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 arose from wide-spread indications of 
inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in reactor auxiliary system piping. Early replacement 
of entire piping systems, achievable with modest doses to maintenance staff, considerably mitigated 
IGSCC and led the way to the utility’s strategy of seeing to the critical SSCs so that a remaining plant 
life-time of 40 years (design life-time) could be always demonstrated.
Since 1991, the licensee’s AGE Group, with assistance of several technical discipline related expert 
groups, has taken care of these activities by gathering information of possibly needed future actions 
from several sources and by preparing and updating a table of recommended major modifications, 
replacements, repairs and overhauls. The modernisation and power uprating of the Olkiluoto units 1 
and 2 by 16% in 1994–1996 evolved from these recommendations and was completely carried out by the 
utility’s technical support organisation residing on plant site. The associated significant renewal cam-
paigns of obsolete electrical and instrumentation systems and components largely, such as new reactor 
coolant pumps and emergency diesel generator sets, contributed to recent operating licence renewal up 
to 2038. Efforts to enhance the reliability and good performance of the plant components, and to ensure 
the spare part and support service availability have continued until recent years. The major foreseeable 
modifications until decommissioning have been identified.
Systematic maintenance planning is an integral part of ageing management at the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2. Nominated owners of equipment groups, characterised by a common type or location, analyse 
the entire maintenance programme and its experiences, and assist in selection of the most effective 
maintenance works. Annual findings from each equipment group are stored into a relational data base 
on the plant computer.
STUK reviewed TVO’s clarification on the actual condition and ageing implications of the main 
SSCs in connection to the licence renewal and periodic safety review (PSR) carried out in 2016–2018. 
Supporting assessment has been done in several periodical inspections on plant site. The main compo-
nents were generally found to be in good condition, however, reactor pressure vessel nozzles (safe-end) 
have been found susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. Two of total 20 nozzles were repaired 2017 by 
machining and making an overlay welding with a material more resistant to stress corrosion cracking. 
The licensee plans to apply the same procedure to the nozzles with no indications so far. The PSR also 
referred to a completed pilot project for updating fatigue analyses of selected systems to incorporate the 
environmental effect as required in Guide YVL E.4. Based on recommendations from expert consultancy 
of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, more refined modelling is employed now that the utility 
is renewing all fatigue analyses to justify a prospective re-licensing of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 for 
an operating life of 60 years. Integrity of reactor pressure vessel and internals were evaluated against 
possible degradation mechanisms such as irradiation/thermal embrittlement fatigue, stress corrosion 
cracking, general/erosion/flow assisted corrosion, mechanical wear
At the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units, the primary circuit’s periodic pressure test has not been performed 
after the commissioning of the units. So far periodic pressure tests, as stipulated in the Finnish pres-
sure equipment legislation, have been replaced with tightness tests (1.02 × operating pressure), which is 
guided by ASME XI for reactor plants planned and inspected in accordance with ASME requirements. 
At the time of commissioning it was not known that the service life of the units would be longer than 
the 40 years as presumed in the ASME version effective at that time. From now on, during the extended 
operation time, periodic pressure tests will be conducted every eight year at the maximum allowable 
operating pressure (design pressure). The purpose of the pressure test is to confirm that no ageing 
mechanism (expected or unexpected) has impaired the integrity of the primary circuit after 40 year of 
operation. The first pressure test is to performed at Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2019.
At the Olkiluoto unit 3, the ageing management is taken into account at the design and construc-
tion phase. The most severe operating conditions and long-term influences, under which an individual 
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component is expected to serve as a part of a process system, are used to determine the design basis 
requirements for that component. With known design basis requirements and defined life times of SSCs, 
their materials, fabrication and other ageing management related issues are specified accordingly. This 
includes precautions against foreseeable degradation mechanisms with state-of-the art technology, and 
provision for inspections, overhauls, testing and replacements as needed while respecting the ALARA 
principle. The anticipated life-span of the main technologies and independence from single technologies 
are particularly considered in I&C system and component design. The design and fabrication of SSCs 
are verified with qualified analyses, inspections and testing, overseen by STUK, in order to demonstrate 
fulfilment of quality and performance requirements set by the design specifications. During Olkiluoto 
unit 3 operation, the ageing of SSCs and retaining the design margins will be managed by dedicated 
programmes and monitoring tools, and by in-service inspections to who’s planning risk-informed meth-
ods are applied.
The regulatory oversight during operation
The regulatory oversight of ageing in operating plants focuses on operating licence renewals, periodic 
safety reviews (PSRs) and site inspections where the conformance to the relevant STUK Regulations 
and YVL Guides, including experiences with ageing and its management, is investigated. STUK’s find-
ings from other regulatory control practices, particularly the periodic inspection programme, are used 
as verification.
The periodic inspections are performed on plant site according to annual planning and tackle both 
the technical aspects of each discipline and the process of ageing management. Possible problems at 
the plants and in procedures of the operating organisations are to be recognised. The dedicated plant 
maintenance inspection is exclusively focused on the maintenance activities and ageing management. 
The aim of the inspection is to evaluate the procedures the licensee has for ensuring reliable operation 
and integrity of SSC. STUK will also assess the implementation of the ageing management programme 
based on the follow-up report prepared annually by the licensee.
In addition, an expert group dedicated to ageing management has been established within STUK 
to oversee how the licensees perform their duties in the ageing management of SSCs. The group, which 
consists of mechanical, electrical, I&C, civil and human resource experts and resident inspectors, plans 
and coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equip-
ment and structures. If shortcomings are found, for example in condition monitoring or maintenance, 
the group calls the licensee for further clarifications or corrective actions. The group also follows up 
findings from other countries and evaluates their possible applicability to the ageing management of 
the Finnish nuclear power plants.
A dedicated regulatory guide for ageing management, Guide YVL A.8, apply as such for new NPPs, but 
also the NPPs in operation have to meet the new requirements in the new guide to the extent practicable. 
Implementation of the updated ageing management requirements is underway for NPPs in operation 
and some specific challenges to fulfil the new ageing management requirements have been met. For 
instance the new guide has a requirement on the availability and operability as well as monitoring the 
condition of spare parts. Inspections have revealed that the amount of spare parts can be inadequate for 
keeping the plant in a safe state also during prolonged transients and accidents, and that some of the 
spare parts in the storage have either aged or obsoleted. However, significant progress has taken place 
in the spare part management. Organizational arrangements have been made and a special software 
(Proactive Obsolescence Management System) has been introduced. Dedicated groups consisting of 
necessary disciplines such as maintenance, quality control and procurement have taken charge of spare 
parts in terms of necessary availability and conditions. Another challenge has to do with knowledge 
and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs. Inspections 
have revealed that the licensees have challenges to implement knowledge management to ensure that 
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in the event of personnel changes information and knowledge necessary for discharging the duties 
involved is transferred to the successors. Additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both 
educate personnel and to identify new ageing mechanisms to develop new inspection or monitoring 
technologies to detect degradation early enough.
A generic lesson learned in Finland is that the closer nuclear power plants get to the end of their 
design lifetime, more difficult it is for the licensees to make decisions to modernise or modify the NPPs. 
Instead of renewing a system or a component, modernisation may be rejected or a partial modification 
is planned resulting in ageing issues in the remaining parts. A postponed decision to renew for instance 
an I&C system or an electrical system may result in that later on spare parts are no longer available for 
the remaining systems. Both of these cases may lead to situations where the licensee may not be able to 
demonstrate the continued safety of operations to the regulator, or at least the views on the demonstra-
tion results may differ between the licensee and the regulator. Finland has successfully applied periodic 
safety reviews for the operating NPPs. Practice has been that the licensee is obliged to demonstrate that 
the safety of the operations can be ensured and improved also during the next 10 years, and to do that 
the licensee has to commit to make safety improvements including major modernisations to address 
ageing of SSCs.
STUK participated in the Topical Peer Review under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURAT-
OM, carried out in 2017–2018. The topical peer reviews will be carried out every six years and the topic 
for the first peer review was ageing management.
Proactive ageing management, consolidation of ageing management data base and elaboration of 
Time Limited Ageing Analyses were recognised as areas for improvement. Furthermore, ageing man-
agement for long construction periods, and realising the importance of ageing management aspects in 
desing (e.g. inspectability and maintainability) in the new build projects were identified as challenges. 
A national action plan to address the above mentioned topics is under preparation. The peer review 
also noted some good practices, like interdisciplinary ageing management working groups established 
by the licensees, the concept of maintenance categories and STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 14.
Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the radiation exposure 
to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that 
no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose limits.
Regulatory requirements regarding radiation protection
The main regulations governing radiation protection of Nuclear Power Plant operation are the Radia-
tion Act (859/2018), Government Decree on Ionising Radiation 1034/2018), STUK Regulations and YVL 
Guides, Group C (7 guides). Government Decree stipulates that the effective dose caused to a worker 
shall not exceed 20 millisieverts (mSv) per year. The constraint for the annual dose of an individual in 
the population, arising from the normal operation of a nuclear power plant, is 0.1 mSv. Based on this, 
STUK shall upon application confirm the release limits for radioactive materials during the normal 
operation of a nuclear power plant. ALARA requirements are issued in the Radiation Act and more 
detailed implementation requirements are given in the YVL Guides both for NPP workers and release 
abatement. To meet the requirements stipulated e.g. in the BSS-directive (Basic Safety Standards Di-
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rective, 2013/59/Euratom), the radiation protection legislation went through an overall reform during 
the years 2014–2018. The STUK Regulations were restructured in 2018 to also include regulations given 
by virtue of the Radiation Act and the accordingly renewed guidance of STUK will be published in 2019. 
(see Article 7 for more details).
Radiation doses of the NPP workers and the public
The most important tools to reduce radiation doses of the NPP workers and the public shall be described 
in an ALARA programme of a NPP.
At the Loviisa NPP the ALARA programme was updated in 2018. One of the main objectives has 
been that there shall be a continuous improvement in the collective dose indicator trends. The four 
years average of the collective dose has decreased at the Loviisa NPP to 0.4 manSv/reactor unit/year. 
The ALARA programme includes also the goal that no employee at the plant should receive a radiation 
dose exceeding 13 mSv per year.
During the last ten years, the most important measure to lower the dose rates at the Loviisa NPP 
has been the minimisation of 122Sb and 124Sb on the primary circuit surfaces. It was discovered that the 
original seals of the main coolant pumps were the main reason for these activation products in the 
primary circuit. Since the seals were replaced with antimony-free materials during years 2012–2014, the 
dose rates near the primary circuit have fallen significantly. In 2019 the Loviisa NPP plans to modify 
the purification system of the primary circuit to allow primary water purification during outages in the 
future. This would allow an efficient purification of e.g. 110mAg, that is a significant contributor to the 
radiation dose arising from the primary water during outages. Another important measure has been 
the optimisation of the use of additional shielding in the primary coolant circuit area during outages. 
Also by extensive work planning and training and by optimising the timing of works between annual 
outages it has also been possible to reduce some of the radiation burden.
In the ALARA programme of the Loviisa NPP the company has committed, that in the effluent 
control mere compliance with the limits is not enough. Efforts shall be made to keep the radioactive 
releases to and radiation levels in the environment arising from the operation of the plant as low as 
reasonably achievable. The Loviisa NPP has not set numerical target values for the effluents, but a target 
value for the calculated annual effective dose to a representative person in the environment has been 
set to be less than 10% of the constraint of 0.1 mSv.
The ALARA programme of the Olkiluoto NPP contains also the major objectives and procedures 
regarding the reduction of the doses of the employees and the target values for the main radioactive 
effluents. The ALARA programme was last updated in 2016. The ALARA programme includes the goals 
for collective dose of the Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 units. For these two reactor units in a normal year 
the collective dose of 1 manSv should not be exceeded (1.5 manSv, when major additional maintenance 
is needed). Also no employee at the plant should receive a radiation dose exceeding 10 mSv per year. 
There is also a goal that the internal dose of any worker shall not exceed 0.5 mSv. For Olkiluoto unit 3 
the collective dose is targeted to be low. The collective dose in this new NPP is expected to be below 
0.05 manSv during the first year of operation.
In order to minimize the doses to the population, target values for the main radioactive effluents like 
noble gases, iodine isotopes, water-borne releases and tritium are included in the ALARA programme. A 
target value for the calculated annual effective dose to a representative person in the environment has 
been set to be less than 1% of the constraint of 0.1 mSv.
The Olkiluoto NPP has continued the replacement of cobalt-containing components (especially 
stellite alloys) in the primary circuit with new ones with low cobalt content. So far, the original amount 
of stellite in the primary circuit has been reduced by over 40% in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 units. The 
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reduction of moisture content in the primary steam with the equipment upgrades (new steam dryers) 
during 2005–2007 at the Olkiluoto NPP has resulted in a substantial reduction of radiation dose rates 
at the turbine plant. The risk-informed procedure was deployed to the in-service material inspections 
of piping and welding for the first time during the outages in 2012. This has resulted in reducing the 
amount of the work carried out in the most radioactive areas, thus reducing the radiation exposure of 
the employees.
Both the Loviisa NPP and the Olkiluoto NPP have a systematic way to address radiation protection 
issues in different working groups and pre-job meetings. At both NPPs ALARA-programmes are described 
in the radiation protection manuals, which are updated regularly.
The radiation dose statistics of the workers are presented for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 18 and 19. The individual radiation doses have remained well 
under the set annual dose limits. The maximum individual dose of a Finnish worker at the NPPs for a 
single year during 2016–2018 was 12.5 mSv.
TABLE 4. Annual radiation doses of workers at the loviisa NPP in 2016–2018.
Year Collective dose [manSv] Maximum personal dose [mSv] Average dose*) [mSv]
2016 0.84 9.8 1.61
2017 0.51 6.3 1.22
2018 1.24 12.5 2.04
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/month.
TABLE 5. Annual radiation doses of workers at the Olkiluoto NPP in 2016–2018.
Year Collective dose [manSv] Maximum personal dose [mSv] Average dose*) [mSv]
2016 0.88 8.1 0.89
2017 0.95 9.1 0.82
2018 1.1 9.5 0.95
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/month.
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FIGURE 18. Collective annual occupational doses at the loviisa nuclear power plant.
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FIGURE 19. Collective annual occupational doses at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
In international comparisons (e.g. the ISOE radiation dose database of the NEA, the Nuclear Ener-
gy Agency of the OECD countries), the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been among the best boiling water 
reactors when comparing both the individual and collective radiation doses. The long-term planning of 
annual maintenance operations has made it possible to keep the outage duration short, which usually 
reduces the amount of work carried out and hence also lower the radiation exposures. Also, in compari-
son with different types of PWRs, the units 1 and 2 of the Loviisa NPP have been on an approvable level.
Radioactive effluents
STUK confirms upon the licensee’s application the release limits for radioactive effluents during the 
normal operation of a nuclear power plant. The Operational Limits and Conditions of a NPP have more 
stringent requirements applicable for the radioactive substances of primary coolant (fuel integrity), thus 
practically preventing more significant releases. Fuel rods in the Loviisa NPP have had a very low failure 
rate. The fuel rod failure rate in the Olkiluoto NPP has increased over the last five years, still continuing 
to be relatively low. Both nuclear power plants have efficiently implemented measures to reduce the 
releases of the radioactive substances into the environment.
The radioactive effluents from the plants in 2016–2018 are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Radioactive 
releases into the environment from the Finnish nuclear power plants have been well below authorised 
limits, as stated in the Tables 6 and 7. The Olkiluoto NPP has had to remove leaking fuel assemblies in 
unscheduled outages in 2016 and 2017, which is not common in Finland. Due to these fuel failures the 
levels of iodine and noble gas discharges have risen from the Olkiluoto NPP. Also, the aerosol discharges 
from the Olkiluoto NPP have risen due to events in the turbine hall causing an undelayed discharge of 
short lived nuclides into the ventilation stack. Despite of these raised levels of discharges, the levels 
of the calculated effective doses to the representative person in the environment of the nuclear power 
plants have still been very small, as can be seen Figure 20.
Both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs have evaluated their implementation of BAT (Best Available 
Techniques) for further reduction of the radioactive discharges. The Loviisa NPP has developed and 
taken in operation caesium removal technology from liquid releases in the 90’s. The utility has reviewed 
VVER reactor R&D issues and evaluated their own developments underway. They have recognized some 
techniques worth further research and development.
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TABLE 6. Radioactive effluents from the loviisa NPP. The proportion of the releases as compared to the limit values is 
given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents
Year Noble gases Kr­87 ekv. [Bq] Iodine I­131 ekv. [Bq] Aerosols [Bq] Liquid effluents excluding tritium [Bq]
2016 5,62E+12 (0.04 %) 1,24E+06 (0.0006 %) 2,90E+07 1,41E+08 (0.02 %)
2017 4,84E+12 (0.03 %) 9,75E+05 (0.0004 %) 4,13E+07 1.64E+09 (0.2 %)
2018 4,66E+12 (0.03 %) 3,61E+06 (0.002 %) 5,38E+07 1.59E+08 (0.02 %)
TABLE 7. Radioactive effluents from the Olkiluoto NPP. The proportion of the releases as compared to the limit values is 
given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents
Year Noble gases Kr­87 ekv. [Bq] Iodine I­131 [Bq] Aerosols [Bq] Liquid effluents excluding tritium [Bq]
2016 9,69+12 (0.1 %) 1,56E+09 (1,51 %) 2,41E+11 1,54E+08 (0.05 %)
2017 3,43E+12 (0.04 %) 8,71E+08 (0.85 %) 2,55E+10 2,55E+08 (0.09 %)
2018 9,06E+11 (0.01 %) 4,94E+08 (0.48 %) 5,52E+08 1,28E+08 (0.04 %)
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FIGURE 20. Calculated annual effective doses to the representative person in the environment of the Finnish nuclear 
power plants. The doses have been clearly under the constraint of 0.1 mSv.
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The Olkiluoto NPP has previously carried out improvements on the water treatment and purification 
of discharge waters. An independent assessment has been made, comparing the emissions and operating 
experience in the Olkiluoto plant units to their sister units. The results indicated that the standard of 
radiation protection is at least on the same level as in the reference plant units surveyed.
STUK concluded that the both utilities apply the BAT principle to abatement of radioactive dis-
charges of their power plants.
Environmental radiation monitoring
The IRRS review team recommended in 2012 that STUK should withdraw from the practice of conducting 
the environmental monitoring programmes in the vicinity of the nuclear facilities based on commercial 
contracts with the licensees. Furthermore, STUK should implement an independent monitoring pro-
gramme for the environment, to verify the results of the off-site environmental monitoring programmes 
required from the licensees. Based on the IRRS recommendation, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act was 
amended in 2015 to give STUK legal authority to carry out environmental monitoring as a regulatory 
activity. Guide YVL C.7 “Radiological monitoring of the environment of a nuclear facility” was published 
in 2016. The operating programmes for environmental radiation monitoring in the surroundings of 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs for 2018–2022 were approved by STUK in 2018. The Environmental Ra-
diation Surveillance and Emergency Preparedness Department of STUK implements an independent 
monitoring programme for the environment to verify the results of the off-site environmental moni-
toring programmes required from the licensees. Even though the new programmes of the licensees are 
significantly reduced compared to the previous ones, the overall environmental surveillance will not 
be reduced. In total more than 300 samples are collected and analysed (air, fallout, sediment, indicator 
organisms, milk, etc.) per year from the environment of both the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. Very small 
quantities of radioactive substances of local origin were detected in 2016–2018 in some samples from 
the environment of both nuclear power plants. Concentrations of the radioactive substances were very 
low, and the effects on the public are insignificant.
Regulatory oversight
On the basis of documents submitted by the licensees, STUK approved in 2016 the use of the dosimetry 
service of the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs until 2021. The Loviisa NPP personnel carry out the do-
simetry service fully by themselves. In the Olkiluoto NPP the approval covers the agreement between 
the licensee and the outsourced services provided by the company Doseco Oy, that operates the routine 
dosimetry at the Olkiluoto NPP. STUK has inspected the dose monitoring service at Doseco Oy.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupational radiation doses of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants have underwent STUK’s tests with acceptable results. These tests comprise irradiating a random 
sample of dosimeters at STUK’s radiation standard laboratory and determination of the doses at the 
power plant (blind test).
STUK carries out annual radiation protection inspections on-site according to the periodic in-
spection programme, e.g. covering the resources, expertise and operation of the radiation protection 
organisation, dosimetry, radiation measurements in the plant, radioactivity measurements of effluents, 
and monitoring of radiation in the environment. STUK carries out on-site inspections related to radia-
tion protection also during annual maintenance outages. The inspections at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs have shown e.g. that the plants have introduced technical and IT administration improvements 
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in the field of radiation protection, which have made it possible to enhance the control of occupational 
radiation doses and contamination.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 15.
Article 16. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site emergency 
plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an 
emergency. For any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation 
above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they are likely to be affected 
by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competent authorities of the States in the vicinity of the 
nuclear installation are provided with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as they are likely to be 
affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate 
steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried out 
in the event of such an emergency.
Emergency preparedness on-site of NPPs
Regulations concerning emergency arrangements at the NPPs are given in the Nuclear Energy Act, the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, Radiation Act Act, Government Degree on Ionizing Radiation and STUK’s Reg-
ulation on Emergency Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants (STUK Y/2/2018). Detailed requirements 
and STUK’s oversight procedures are given in the Guide YVL C.5.
The renewed Government Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements at Nuclear Power plants 
became effective in 2013. Parallel to that the Guide YVL 7.4 was replaced by the Guide YVL C.5 taking 
also into account the lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The Government 
Decree was replaced by STUK’s Regulation (STUK Y/2/2016) at the beginning of 2016 and refreshed 
(STUK Y/2/2018) in the end of 2018 due to the changes in the Nuclear Energy Act and Radiation Act. In 
connection to this latter renewal some changes were implemented to the level of requirements. Major 
changes were related to changes in accepted doses during emergency work and establishing new emer-
gency roles in radiation emergencies.
In the current Regulation, design basis for emergency planning is a simultaneous accident at site’s 
all nuclear installations. In STUK’s decisions made on the basis of the national assessments and Euro-
pean Stress Tests for nuclear power plants, both TVO and Fortum were required to clarify and update 
their emergency plans and procedures with respect to issues like qualification of the staff in the emer-
gency organisation, management of access control and contamination control in the case when the 
normal arrangements are out of function and restoring the access routes and connections to the site 
in case of large-scale damage to the infrastructure. There were some further requirements for licensees 
regarding site autonomy in case of external hazards in autumn 2015 when Guide YVL C.5 was enforced 
at the operating NPPs. Since March 2019 Guide YVL C.5 was enforced also for OL3 NPP unit. The work 
for developing and improving the emergency preparedness arrangements continues.
Fortum and TVO have analysed accident and safety-impairing events at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs. These analyses are documented in the safety analysis reports of the plants and have been used as 
the basis for planning the Finnish nuclear power plant emergency response arrangements. Multiunit 
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accident as design basis for emergency planning has prompted licensees to analyse some new accident 
scenarios.
Emergencies are classified and described briefly in the plant’s emergency plan. The notifications 
and alarms to plant personnel and authorities required by different classes of emergencies, as well as 
the scope of operations of the emergency response organisation pertaining to the type of emergency, 
are described in the emergency procedures.
A person responsible for emergency response arrangements and his deputies have been appointed 
both for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due to the updated Nuclear Energy Act the 
nominated persons responsible for emergency response arrangements and their deputies are approved 
by STUK. The emergency response organisation has been described in the emergency plan and proce-
dures, updated with regard to personnel changes at least once a year. The more limited staffing of the 
emergency response organisation required for emergency standby state (alert) is defined in the shift 
supervisor guides for the emergency response.
The facilities of the emergency response organisation at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants include a system for displaying data directly from the process computer. Several hundred param-
eters are transmitted also to the STUK’s emergency response centre. The automatic data transfer and 
display system from the Olkiluoto NPP to STUK is going through renewal that according to the project 
schedule will be finished during spring 2019. The new unit Olkiluoto 3 and the unit’s training simulator 
were added to the data transfer and display system in autumn 2017 before OLKI17 emergency exercise.
Emergency training and exercises are arranged annually for the emergency response organisation 
of the nuclear power plants. The emergency training includes classroom and group-specific practical 
training as well as special training, such as first aid, fire and radiation protection training. In addition 
to severe accidents, emergencies covered by the emergency response exercises also includes conditions 
classified as alert. The content and scope of the training as well as feedback obtained from the training 
are assessed in the inspections of the STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
STUK verifies the preparedness of the organisations operating nuclear power plants in yearly on-site 
inspections as well as supervising the licensee’s emergency training and exercises. Emergency prepar-
edness at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants meet the regulatory requirements.
At the Loviisa NPP, the objects of the inspection included the emergency response organisation’s 
personnel resources, facilities and equipment, training and alert arrangements, revision of the structure 
and content of emergency instructions, radiation measurements in the surroundings and meteorological 
measurements on-site. Emergency exercises and mustering exercises have been conducted annually. In 
2014 Loviisa NPP exercised for the first time a two unit’s simultaneous accident scenario. Some of the 
emergency exercises are organized so that they start unannounced and/or outside the normal working 
hours. At the Olkiluoto NPP, the objects of the inspection included emergency organisation personnel 
resources, training, exercises, facilities and equipment, alarm arrangements, radiation measurements 
in the surroundings, meteorological measurements on-site, emergency preparedness of the Olkiluoto 
unit 3 construction site and the work for revising the emergency preparedness instructions. During the 
national full command post exercise OLKI-14 actions and decision making of the intermediate phase 
of the severe accident were exercised for the first time. In 2016 TVO exercised for the first time a multi 
unit’s simultaneous accident scenario pertaining both operating NPP units and used fuel facility. In 2018 
the annual emergency exercise OLKI18 was based on an unlawful action scenario that pertained all units 
including OL3. In OLKI18 exercise OL3 was considered to be operating unit. TVO has organized smaller 
scale exercises for OL3 organization to train and test the improvements in emergency plan.
Both the Loviisa and Olkiluoto have networks of monitoring stations providing real time environ-
mental dose rate. Stations are arranged in circles around plant area. Olkiluoto has inner circle close to 
plant area and outer circle at 5 km distance from the plant. Three additional measurement stations were 
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installed in the vicinity of Olkiluoto unit 3 in autumn 2017. TVO will renew the measurement network 
before Posiva’s disposal facility receives operating licence in early 2020’s. At the Loviisa NPP, a new 
monitoring network including 28 stations has been in operational use since summer 2015. The design 
basis of the new measuring stations is at least 3 months autonomic operation in emergency situations 
with long-term batteries. At the Loviisa NPP, the licensee has renewed the weather monitoring system. 
The new on-site weather mast and the additional measuring point in the marine environment are now 
in operation. The additional measuring point gives more precise data from the sea breeze and the land 
breeze phenomena which can strongly affect the dispersion of releases.
FIGURE 21. The measuring stations of the radiation 
monitoring network.
Off-site preparedness arrangements
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
required by the rescue legislation (379/2011) are 
prepared by regional authorities. The requirements 
for off-site plans and activities in a radiation emer-
gency are provided in the Decree of the Ministry 
of Interior (612/2015). STUK is an expert body who 
supports and provides recommendations to author-
ities responsible for making decisions and imple-
menting protective actions in case of nuclear or 
radiological emergency.
STUK publishes VAL Guides for emergency 
response. Guide VAL 1 (2012) “Protective Measures 
in Early Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological Emer-
gency” and VAL 2 (2012) “Protective Measures in 
Intermediate Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological 
Emergency” provide detailed guidance. In the case 
of an accident the local authorities are alerted by 
the operating organisation of the plant.
The Ministry of Interior has published a guide 
“Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies: Roles and 
Responsibilities of All Actors” (MI publication 
38/2012), which contains the detailed information 
of the arrangements in the Finnish society in the 
case of a nuclear or radiological emergency. 
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in the case of a nuclear or ra-
diological emergency. STUK has an expert on duty 
on 24/7 basis. The messages of an exceptional event 
(alarm) are received from the operating organisa-
tions of the facilities, from the automatic radiation 
monitoring network that covers the whole country 
(approx. 250 measuring stations, see Figure 21), and 
from foreign authorities.
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The off-site emergency plans include provisions to inform the population in the case of an accident. 
Written instructions on radiological emergencies, emergency planning and response arrangements have 
been provided to the population living within the 20 km Emergency Planning Zone. These instructions 
are regularly updated and distributed.
The regulations and guides are tested in off-site emergency exercises conducted every third year. 
Full scale off-site emergency and rescue exercise OLKI17 was carried out in 2017 based on the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant accident scenario. Approximately 50 different organisations participated in this 
exercise. Exercise scenario concentrated on OL3 NPP unit. According to STUK’s Regulation (STUK 
Y/2/2018) emergency arrangements shall comply with the emergency plan before fuel is loaded into the 
reactor and an emergency exercise shall take place before loading to demonstrate that the emergency 
arrangements function properly. OLKI17 scenario was sufficiently broad that all major functions in the 
emergency plan had to be activated and practiced. Based on OLKI17 exercise evaluation TVO started 
development project to improve some parts of their emergency plan. While OLKI17 is considered to be 
the exercise demanded by regulation some arrangements still need to be finished before fuel loading 
permit to OL3 can be granted by STUK.
In April 2016 a full scale off-site emergency and rescue exercise LOVIISA16 was held based on Loviisa 
nuclear power plant exercise. This exercise was an early-phase exercise with emphasis especially on the 
initial actions and starting operations outside office hours. The scenario continued for approximately 
eight hours after the initial event and included release that required protective actions for population to 
up to 50 km and protection of agricultural production to up to 250 km. Evacuation arrangements were 
also tested by moving pupils from three schools nearest the plant.
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no needs for major 
changes were identified in off-site emergency preparedness. However, some improvements were identi-
fied and implemented. They have improved accessibility to the site in case of extreme natural hazards, 
ensured that sufficient amount of radiation protection equipment and radiation monitoring capabilities 
for rescue services are available and the measures have improved the communication arrangements 
between emergency centres of NPPs, STUK, and Rescue Service.
The rescue planning is enhanced by the co-operation between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue services, regional police departments and STUK. Permanent coordination groups have been es-
tablished for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in order to ensure coordinated and consistent emergency 
plans, to improve and develop emergency planning and arrangements and to share lessons from the 
exercises, regulations and other information. Also extensive training is arranged by these groups. A Na-
tional Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Forum was proposed after the Fukushima accident 
for co-operation and combination between permanent groups with participation from Ministry of the 
Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the regional rescue service authorities, STUK and 
the NPP licensees. However, after the initial proposals, the group’s field of responsibility was found to 
be mostly overlapping with other existing co-operation and co-ordination bodies. Therefore, it has been 
decided that creation of new group is not the best way to address the issue. Instead, the membership 
and responsibilities of existing groups have been adjusted. For example, Ministry of the Interior, medical 
services and emergency response centre administration are now also members in both of the regional 
groups. Fennovoima and local authorities from northern Finland have been observing and participating 
in some of the groups emergency exercises and meetings.
STUK, The National Defense Training Association of Finland and National Emergency Supply Agency 
launched in 2017 a project to establish a radiation measurement team from volunteers. The purpose of 
the team is to support authorities during a large scale nuclear or radiological emergency. The persons 
are trained and equipped by the three above mentioned organizations. In an emergency, STUK’s duty is 
to give recommendations to the domestic authorities. The recommendations are based, among other 
things, on the performed radiation measurements. The first training course for the volunteers was ar-
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ranged in spring 2018, followed by a another course in autumn of the same year. The team is to consist 
of about 40 persons and it is assumed to start radiation measurements during the intermediate phase 
of radiation or nuclear emergency.
Information to the neighbouring countries
Finland is a party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Vienna 1986). Being a member 
of the European Union, the Council Decision (87/600/EURATOM) on Community arrangements for 
the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency applies in Finland, too. In 
addition, Finland has respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden 
and Ukraine. Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed to directly inform the competent authorities 
of these countries in the case of an accident.
Nordic countries have published two joint documents that detail the cooperation arrangements. 
Nordic Manual (updated 2015) describes practical arrangements regarding communication and infor-
mation exchange to fulfil the stated obligations in bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. 
The arrangements in this document include all phases of events, including intermediate and recovery 
phases. The second document, Nordic Flag Book (published 2014), describes joint guidelines, including 
operational intervention levels, for protective measures concerning population and functions of society 
in case of nuclear or radiological emergencies. These guidelines agreed by radiation and nuclear safety 
authorities in Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden form a unique document as it includes 
harmonised and practical criteria for early protective measures as well as recovery actions after contam-
ination. Nordic Manual and Nordic Flag Book ensure that the response to any nuclear or radiological 
emergency in Nordic countries is consistent between the countries.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant site, STUK has taken part in international emergency exercises. STUK has also participated as a 
co-player in emergency exercises arranged by the Swedish and Russian nuclear power plant operators 
and authorities. Neighbouring countries have been actively invited to take part in the Finnish exercises.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 16.
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Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are established and 
implemented:
i. for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its projected 
lifetime;
ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and the 
environment;
iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the 
continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation; for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a 
proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request provid-
ing the necessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own 
assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear installation.
Regulatory approach to siting
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power plant are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. The application for a Decision-in-Principle has to include e.g.:
• a description of settlement and other activities and town planning arrangements at the site and 
its vicinity
• a description of the suitability of the planned location for its purpose, taking account of the 
impact of local conditions on safety, security and emergency response arrangements, and the 
impacts of the nuclear facility on its immediate surroundings
• an assessment report in accordance with the Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (252/2017 replacing 468/1994) and the reasoned conclusion of the competent authority 
as well as a description of the design criteria which the applicant will observe in order to avoid 
environmental damage and to restrict the burden to the environment.
More detailed requirements on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) are provided in the Decree 
on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (277/2017 replacing 713/2006). The Finnish EIA legis-
lation complies with the EU Directives 2011/92/EU and 2014/52/EU on the EIA procedure.
In the design of a nuclear power plant, site-related external events have to be taken into account. 
According to Section 8 of the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) the impact of local conditions on safety 
and on the implementation of the security and emergency arrangements shall be considered when se-
lecting the site of a nuclear power plant. The site shall be such that the impediments and threats posed 
by the plant to its vicinity remain extremely small and heat removal from the plant to the environment 
can be reliably implemented.
The site-specific external hazards shall be taken into consideration in the design of a nuclear facility 
as stipulated in section 14 of the Regulation STUK Y/1/2018:
1. The design of a nuclear facility shall take account of external hazards that may endanger safety. Systems, struc-
tures, components and access shall be designed, located and protected so that the impacts of external hazards deemed 
possible on nuclear facility safety remain minor. The operability of systems, structures and components shall be 
demonstrated in their design basis external environmental conditions.
2. External hazards shall include exceptional weather conditions, seismic events, the effects of accidents that take 
place in the environment of the facility, and other factors resulting from the environment or human activity. The 
design shall also consider unlawful and other unauthorised activities compromising nuclear safety and a large 
commercial aircraft crash.
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Furthermore, the Guide YVL A.2 issued by STUK describes generally all requirements concerning 
the site and surroundings of a nuclear power plant, gives requirements on safety factors affecting site 
selection and covers regulatory control.
Requirements on design provisions for seismic events and other external events are set forth in 
the Guide YVL B.7. Deterministic analyses are made to assess the impact of earthquakes, and other nat-
ural and human induced external events. In addition, the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) provides 
information on the annual probability of core damage and release of radioactive substances caused by 
seismic events and other external events. According to the Guide YVL A.7 a preliminary PRA shall be 
submitted in connection with the Construction Licence application and PRA shall be updated during 
the life cycle of a nuclear installation, as explained in more detail under Article 14.
The limits for radiation doses of the public and for radioactive releases in normal operation, antic-
ipated operational occurrences and accidents (postulated accidents, design extension conditions and 
severe accidents) are given in the Nuclear Energy Decree. Design extension conditions include among 
other things rare external events .
The general principle in the siting of nuclear power plants is to locate the facilities in a sparsely pop-
ulated area and remote from large population centres. In the vicinity of the plant, no industrial or other 
activities are allowed that could pose an external threat to the plant. Site characterisation is performed 
based on geological, seismic, hydrological and meteorological factors as well as on transport routes and 
risks, industrial activities, agriculture, nature and population. Extreme meteorological conditions and 
consequences (e.g. external flooding, frazil ice formation) have to be taken into consideration in the 
site evaluation and plant design.
In connection with the decisions for construction of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in the 1970s, 
siting requirements related to population density and land use planning were quite easily and practically 
achievable in a sparsely populated country like Finland. The precautionary action zones, with radii of 
about 5 km, have only a few tens of permanent inhabitants. Similar attention was not given to the rec-
reational houses and the transient summertime population in the coastal area (mainland and islands) 
where the conditions might be demanding for efficient emergency preparedness and rescue action. The 
number of recreational houses on the seaside within 5 km radius of the existing plants is about 400–500. 
The precautionary action zone of the planned Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi NPP has a few hundreds of 
permanent inhabitants and the number of recreational houses within 20 km radius is a few hundreds.
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Con-
text, done in Espoo in 1991. The Convention is applied for Finnish nuclear facility projects by providing 
a full participation to all countries which announce the willingness to participate in the environmental 
impact assessment procedure in question. The EIA is conducted by the licence applicant or the licensee. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment is the competent authority of the EIA procedure for 
nuclear installations and arranges the public hearings. The Ministry of the Environment arranges the 
international hearing according to the Espoo Convention. STUK gives its statement on the parts of EIA 
relevant to nuclear and radiation safety, nuclear security and safeguards.
In Finland, the EIA is conducted at an early stage of a NPP project, prior to the selection of the plant 
design, based on the power range of the plant and on general information on the available designs. The 
EIA shall be carried out before the Decision-in-Principle application is submitted, and the EIA report 
and the reasoned conclusion by the competent authority on the EIA shall be attached to the application 
for the Decision-in-Principle. The EIA procedure of the new design option for the proposed Hanhikivi 
NPP was completed in 2014. Further information about the EIA process of Hanhikivi NPP is presented 
in Annex 5.
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The Guide YVL A.2 includes a description of all relevant legal processes, including those based on 
non-nuclear legislation. Efficient co-operation between the utility and responsible authorities is em-
phasised, e.g., for:
• maintaining the land use planning in the plant environment during the plant operational  
life time in line with the safety goal of avoiding dense population in the vicinity
• taking necessary actions to guarantee efficient road connections to the plant area  
also in case of a severe accident and extreme weather conditions.
Quality, competence and comprehensiveness of the site survey and site confirmation are required and 
the results shall be assessed by STUK in different licensing stages. The bilateral agreements mentioned 
under Article 16 include provisions to exchange information on the design and operation of nuclear 
facilities. In the European Union a specific statement is also prepared for each new nuclear power plant 
unit in a member state before authorisation of the operation (Euratom Treaty, Article 37). This is based 
on a General Data report submitted by the member state and on its examination in a plenary meeting 
of Group of Experts. For Olkiluoto unit 3 this process was conducted in 2010.
Based on the legislation on land use planning, statements from neighbouring countries must be 
requested for the land use plans of a nuclear power plant. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were informed of initiating the regional planning process for Fennovo-
ima’s two candidate sites (Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki and Karsikko in Simo) in Northern Finland and the 
opportunity to participate.
The requirements on the determination of site-specific design bases for external events are presented 
in more detail in the Guide YVL B.7.
Re-evaluation of site related factors
The operating licence for a nuclear facility is granted for a fixed term. Periodic safety review (PSR) shall 
be conducted either in connection with the licence renewal or as a separate review with intervals of 
about ten years at most. The site related factors are reviewed and, where necessary, updating is initiated 
in connection with the PSRs. Updating is also done between PSRs if it is called for by operating experi-
ence or research results. The studies on site-related factors are conducted by the licensee and reviewed 
by STUK in cooperation with relevant expert organizations. Plant modifications shall be implemented 
on the basis of the updated information on site-related factors if deemed appropriate according to the 
principle enacted in Article 7a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
The capacity of the NPP units to withstand external hazards is evaluated in deterministic safety 
analyses and in probabilistic risk assessments (PRA). The PRAs of the Finnish units cover natural and 
man-made external hazards such as high seawater level, high wind including tornadoes, lightning, high 
and low air temperature, high seawater temperature, frazil ice formation in cooling water intakes, algae 
and other organic material in seawater, and their combinations as well as oil spills from oil tanker ship 
accidents and earthquakes. During the past twenty-five years the results of external events PRAs have 
initiated several safety improvements in the plants.
Research on the site related natural hazards is conducted continuously in the Finnish National 
Nuclear Safety Research Program SAFIR (http://safir2022.vtt.fi). STUK has a major role in steering the 
research and the results support STUK in the review of the reports submitted by the licensees. The 
research covers seismic hazard and extreme meteorological phenomena and seawater level variations, 
including the effects of climate variability and change.
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The current operating licence of the Loviisa units was granted by the Government in 2007 for the 
unit Loviisa 1 until 2027 and for the unit Loviisa 2 until 2030. The licensee was required to conduct PSRs 
and submit the reports to STUK in 2015 and in 2023. The first of them was submitted in 2015 according 
to the schedule and STUK has issued its statement on the PSR.
For the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 a new operating licence was granted in 2018 until the end of 2038 
with a requirement of a PSR by the end of 2028.
For the periodic safety review of the Loviisa NPP in 2014–2016 and the renewal of the operating 
licence of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 2018, comprehensive re-assessments of safety, including the environ-
mental safety of the nuclear facility and the effects of external events on the safety of the facility, were 
conducted by the licensees and reviewed by STUK. The assessments covered meteorology, hydrology, 
geology, seismology, human-induced hazards, population and use of land and sea areas. Re-evaluation 
of the seismic hazard studies for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites have been recently updated and sub-
mitted to STUK for review.
During the operation of a nuclear facility, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), including its 
site-specific parts, has to be periodically reviewed and updated as needed. A detailed re-evaluation of the 
site related factors was also carried out in 2007–2009 for the Olkiluoto and Loviisa sites in connection 
with the Environmental Impact Assessment and Decision-in-Principle procedures for the proposed new 
NPP units Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3. Olkiluoto site related factors were reviewed also in connection with 
the operating licence procedure for the Olkiluoto unit 3.
In addition to the normal PSRs, an extraordinary review of site related issues was carried out after 
the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in connection with the so called European stress tests. National 
studies were initiated immediately after the accident and the EU stress tests were started in June 2011. 
The stress tests did not reveal any new site-related external hazards or vulnerabilities of the plants to 
external events. No need for immediate action was recognized, but some additional studies of external 
hazards and feasibility studies for plant modifications to improve robustness against external events 
were found justified.
The following examples of safety improvements and additional analyses of external events at the 
Loviisa NPP can be mentioned: enhanced protection against high seawater level, independent cooling 
units replacing the service water system in case of blockage of seawater intake have been installed, and 
detailed structural analysis of spent fuel pools to demonstrate integrity of the pools in the case of an 
earthquake with consequential boiling in the pools.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, system modifications to ensure the operation of the auxiliary feed water 
system in case of the loss of the ultimate heat sink (seawater systems) have been implemented at the 
operating unit 1 and will be implemented to unit 2 in 2018–2019. Structural analysis to demonstrate 
the integrity of the spent fuel pools in the case of an earthquake followed by pool boiling have been 
completed. Seismic walk-downs of the fire extinguishing water system have been carried out and some 
improvements have been implemented. The replacement of emergency diesel generators is ongoing. 
The new emergency diesel generators will be provided with alternative air and seawater cooling, while 
the existing diesels have only seawater cooling. In addition, steam turbine driven auxiliary feed water 
systems have been installed at the operating units 1 and 2 to ensure residual heat removal in the case 
of total loss of AC power and/or loss of the ultimate heat sink due to external or internal events. The 
effects of extreme seawater levels on the accessibility of the site has been studied as well.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 17.
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Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
i. the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels and methods of protection 
(defence in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents 
and to mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;
ii. the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation are proven by experience 
or qualified by testing or analysis;
iii. the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation, with specific 
consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.
Implementation of defence in depth
Regulatory requirements regarding nuclear power plant design and construction
According to STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), several levels of protection have to be provided in the 
design of a nuclear power plant. The design of the nuclear facility and the technology used is assessed by 
STUK when reviewing the applications for a Decision-in-Principle, Construction Licence and Operating 
Licence. Design is reassessed against the advancement of science and technology, when the Operating 
Licence is renewed and in the periodic safety reviews.
In the design, construction and operation, proven or otherwise carefully examined high quality 
technology shall be employed to reduce the probability of operational transients and accidents and to 
mitigate their consequences. A nuclear power plant shall encompass systems by means of which oper-
ational transients and accidents can be quickly and reliably detected and the aggravation of any event 
prevented. Effective technical and administrative measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. The design of a nuclear power plant shall be such that accidents leading 
to extensive releases of radioactive materials must be highly unlikely.
Dispersion of radioactive materials from the fuel of the nuclear reactor to the environment shall 
be prevented by means of successive physical barriers which are the fuel and its cladding, the primary 
circuit of the nuclear reactor and the containment building. Provisions for ensuring the integrity of the 
fuel, primary circuit and containment are included.
In ensuring safety functions, inherent safety features attainable by design shall be primarily utilised. 
If inherent safety features cannot be made use of, priority shall be given to systems and components 
which do not require an external power supply or which, as a consequence of a loss of power supply, will 
settle in a state preferable from the safety point of view (passive and fail-safe functions).
In order to minimize the frequency of accidents and mitigate the consequences thereof, a nuclear 
power plant shall be provided with systems for shutting down the reactor and maintaining it in a sub-
critical state, for removing decay heat generated in the reactor, and for retaining radioactive materials 
within the plant. Design of such systems shall apply redundancy, separation and diversity principles 
that ensure implementation of a safety function even in the event of malfunctions. The safety functions 
necessary for transferring the plant to, and maintaining a controlled state must be ensured, even if any 
individual system component needed to fulfil the safety function (including the necessary supporting or 
auxiliary functions) is inoperable and if any other component needed for the function is simultaneously 
inoperable due to the necessity for its repair or maintenance. Common-cause failures shall only have 
minor impacts on plant safety. A nuclear power plant shall have reliable off-site and on-site electrical 
power supply systems. The execution of safety functions shall be possible by using either of the two elec-
trical power supply systems. Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the Finnish requirements 
have been supplemented by requiring that the plants must have equipment and procedures to ensure 
that decay heat from nuclear fuel in the reactor and in spent fuel pools can be removed for a period of 
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three days independent of external electricity and external water supplies in situations which are caused 
by rare external events or by a malfunction in the plant’s internal electricity distribution system. In 
addition, there shall be fixed systems for residual heat removal with no material supplements (water, 
fuel, recharging batteries) for at least 8 hours.
The plant shall also be provided with systems, structures and components for controlling and 
monitoring severe accidents. These shall be independent of the systems designed for normal operational 
conditions anticipated operational occurrences and postulated accidents. Systems necessary for ensuring 
the integrity of the containment building in a severe accident shall be safety-classified, qualified for the 
environmental conditions and capable of performing their safety functions, even in the case of a single 
failure of an active component.
Special attention shall be paid to the avoidance, detection and correction of any human errors during 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. The possibility of human errors shall be taken into 
account in the design of the nuclear power plant and in the planning of its operation and maintenance, 
so that human errors and deviations from normal plant operations due to human errors do not endan-
ger plant safety. The impacts of human error shall be reduced by using various safety design methods, 
including defence-in-depth, redundancy, diversity and separation.
Limits of radiation exposure and releases of radioactive substances addressing also severe accidents 
are given in the Nuclear Energy Decree 1988/161, section 22b. The requirements for severe accidents are 
that the release of radioactive substances arising from a severe accident shall not necessitate large scale 
protective measures for the public nor any long-term restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land 
and water. In order to restrict long-term effects the limit for the atmospheric release of cesium-137 is 
100 terabecquerel (TBq). The possibility of exceeding the set limit shall be extremely small. The possi-
bility of a release requiring measures to protect the public in the early stages of the accident shall be 
extremely small.
The Finnish requirements for nuclear power plant design, siting and construction are inline with 
the goals 1 and 3 of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. Detailed requirements are given in Guides 
YVL B.1, YVL B.2, YVL B.3, YVL B.4, YVL B.5, YVL B.6 and YVL B.7. The wording in Nuclear Energy Decree 
Section 22b is very close to the Vienna Declaration. Finnish regulatory guide YVL C.3 explains in more 
detail what is meant by “large scale protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate 
that any release of radioactive substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the 
population beyond the protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency plan-
ning zone (appr. 20 km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit 
shall be designed in compliance with the Government Decree principlesin a way that:
• the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during an 
accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 5E-7/
year;
• the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase of a 
severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency.
Concerning goal 2 of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and the implementation of safety im-
provements (referred to in the second principle of the Vienna Declaration) at the operating NPP, Finnish 
Nuclear Energy Act states that a periodic safety review (PSR) shall be conducted at least every ten years. 
In addition, the Nuclear Energy Act states that the safety shall be maintained as high as practically pos-
sible. For further development of safety, measures shall be implemented that can be considered justified 
considering operating experience and safety research and advances in science and technology. Hence, 
the implementation of safety improvements has been a continuing process at both Finnish NPPs since 
their commissioning. Goals of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety are addressed in the regulations 
and also implemented in Finland.
92 STUK-B 237 / JUly 2019
ARTICLE 18 – DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
An assessment of the design of the facility and related technologies is made by STUK for the first 
time when assessing the application for a Decision-in-Principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued 
when the construction licence application is reviewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems, struc-
tures and components is carried out through their design approval process. The design of Loviisa plant 
units was reassessed by STUK in 2015–2016 and design of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been assessed 
for operation license renewal (2018). Design of the Olkiluoto unit 3 has been assessed for the operation 
licence (2019). Design of the Hanhikivi unit 1 will be assessed during ongoing construction licence phase.
Application of defence in depth concept at the Finnish NPPs
The condition of the multiple barriers containing releases of radioactive substances has remained good 
both at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs.
Severe accidents were not taken into account in the original design of the operating Finnish nu-
clear power plants. However, since the commissioning of the plants, major improvements have been 
implemented to prevent and mitigate the consequences of severe accidents. Mitigation systems of the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs are described in detail in Annexes 2 and 3.
Other safety improvements have also been implemented during the lifetime of the plants improving 
the safety functions of the plant and hence defence in depth. Some of the improvements are described 
below and in the appendixes. 
Defence in depth concept in Loviisa NPP
Several plant modifications improving safety have been carried out at the Loviisa NPP during its lifetime. 
During the last years the the most major modification has been the I&C renewal project, ELSA, which was 
finalised in 2018. In ELSA project reactor control and limitation system, reactor protection system and 
automatic reactor protection back up system was modernised using software based I&C platform. Hard 
wired manual back up system for reactor protection and engineered safety features actuation functions 
was also added in the project. In connection with the I&C renewal protection of the control rooms from 
any leaks at the feedwater tank level above control room level has been improved.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, improvements implemented and under imple-
mentation for the Loviisa plant include among other things:
• Installation of independent air-cooled cooling units for decay heat removal from the reactor core 
and from the spent fuel pools. The cooling units provide an alternative ultimate heat sink in case 
of loss of sea water cooling. The units have been taken into use in 2014–2015.
• The utility has estimated the effects of high sea level to the plant behavior based on which the 
flooding protection of the plant is being improved. The flood protection of the buildings most 
important to safety has been strengthend. In addition, means to cope with extensive loss of 
electrical systems are being implemented. The implementation of the new means and related 
instructions will be completed in 2019.
• Installation of diverse water supply to the spent fuel pools. The plant modifications will be 
completed by 2019. 
• Availability of emergency diesel and severe accident diesel fuel on-site was improved by adding 
filling lines from off-site diesel plant to on-site diesel tanks. 
Plant modifications, including Fukushima related modifications at the Loviisa NPP are described in 
more detail in Annex 2.
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Defence in depth concept in Olkiluoto NPP
Several plant modifications improving safety have also been carried out at the Olkiluoto NPP units 1 
and 2 during the lifetime of the plant improving the defence in depth.
TVO has made a decision to replace all current emergency diesel generators (EDGs) of the Olkiluo-
to units 1 and 2 with their auxiliary systems to correspond to the changed need for emergency power, 
taking also into account any increases in the need for power due to possible future plant modifications 
increasing diversity to the heatsink of EDG cooling (air and sea water). In addition of replacements there 
will be an extra EDG that can be connected to either unit.
Other safety improvements implemented or under implementation at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 
include among other things:
• Ensuring cooling of the reactor core in case of total loss of AC supplies and systems. The 
arrangement consists of high and low pressure systems. The high pressure system is based on a 
steam driven turbine pump. The low pressure system pumps coolant into the core from the fire 
fighting system. The systems have been implemented.
• Ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water system pumps independently of availability of the 
sea water cooling systems. The modification was implemented at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. Abnormal 
vibration and pressure oscillations were observed during the testing of one subsystem. The issue 
has been solved the modification will be implemented at Olkiluoto 2 in 2019.
• Diverse cooling water supply to the spent fuel pools have been completed in 2015. Additional 
instrumentation to improve monitoring of the water temperature and level in the spent fuel 
pools has also been implemented.
• The utility has acquired new mobile equipment (aggregates, pumps).
• The utility has evaluated the availability of makeup water and emergency diesel fuel in case of 
accidents at multiple reactor units and other nuclear facilities at the same site.
Fukushima related modifications, as well as other latest ongoing improvements at the Olkiluoto units 
1&2 are described in more detail in Annex 3.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3, application of the Defence-in-Depth principle was presented in the Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and again in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) when applying operating 
license. The design follows the principles laid down in the Finnish regulations. Common cause failure of 
a safety system in connection with an anticipated operational occurrence or class 1 postulated accident 
has been provided for. The mitigation of the consequences of the severe accidents was included in the 
plant already in the design phase. This was achieved by implementing features to ensure containment 
integrity. Design provisions included e.g. dedicated depressurisation of primary system to prevent high 
pressure core melt, core catcher for corium spreading and cooling, hydrogen recombination, and con-
tainment heat removal. In addition, aircraft crash protection design requirements for both a military 
aircraft and a large passenger aircraft have been taken into account.
Integrity of nuclear fuel
At Olkiluoto unit 1, altogether six fuel rods with cladding failure was detected in 2016, and an additional 
outage was needed to remove affected fuel. However, the reactor water fission product concentration 
limits set by the Technical Specifications were not exceeded. Pellet Cladding Interaction (PCI) was 
confirmed as the failure mechanism in Post-Irradiation Examinations (PIE) performed in 2018 with the 
fuel vendor. With stricter fuel operating rules similar large cladding failures have been avoided since. 
Three individual fuel rods with minor gas leakages have been detected at Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in later 
reactor operating cycles. These leaks were most probably caused by other mechanisms, such as foreign 
material fretting.
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Integrity of other barriers
The Loviisa unit 2 primary and secondary circuits were subjected to pressure tests in 2018. The pressure 
tests are performed every eight years. In the tests, the structural strength and leak tightness of the cir-
cuits are tested using a pressure 1.3 times the design pressure, i.e. 178 bar abs for the primary circuit and 
73 bar abs for the secondary circuit. Results of the tests were accepted by STUK.
STUK requested in 2018 in relation to opearing licence renewal that Olkiluoto 1 and 2 primary 
circuit will be subjected to periodical pressure tests at every eight years, first with OL2 in 2019 and next 
with OL1 in 2020. The pressure tests (with pressure of 1,02 times the operation pressure) will replace the 
periodical leak tightness tests conducted earlier based on ASME XI requirements.
The reactor containment at the Olkiluoto NPP is subjected to a leak tightness test three times 
during a 12-year period. In addition, leak tightness tests have been made systematically to containment 
isolation valves, personnel airlocks and containment penetrations during the annual outages. The 
results show that the leak tightness of the containment building has remained acceptable at the both 
Olkiluoto reactor units. The overall leak tightness of the Olkiluoto unit 2 reactor containment was test-
ed during the annual outage of 2017. Results of the test have fulfilled the acceptance criteria. Olkiluoto 
unit 3 containment leak tightness test was conducted in the beginning of 2019 with acceptable results.
During the period 2016–2018, no significant failures were observed at the Loviisa plant in the safety 
functions or in the systems, structures and components executing them. Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel 
primary nozzles were subjected in 2016 to periodic NDT-inspections with a new phased array NDT-in-
spection technique. In this inspection one indication was detected that required strength analysis to 
be approved before permission to continue plant operation. STUK required to repeat the inspection in 
2017 outage with qualified inspection procedure. Corresponding inspections were requested to carry out 
also at Loviisa 2. In addition STUK required Fortum to clarify the cracking mechanism to manage the 
situation. Also provisions to plan repair procedures were requested to clarify. In 2018 NDT-inspections 
there were no changes found concerning the year 2016 Loviisa 1 nozzle indication. 
Thermal fatigue cracks were found at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 on the inside surface of main feed-
water runpipe during the annual outage in 2014. All cracks were in the base material. The cracks located 
at a mixing point (T-joint) of pipelines between the feedwater system and the shutdown cooling system. 
These mixing points were replaced in outages 2015 at OL2 and 2016 at OL1. In addition, IRS report 8439 
”Thermal fatigue cracks in feed water piping Tee” was prepared.
In 2003 an indication in the reactor feedwater system at Olkiluoto 2 was detected and thus subject-
ed to more frequent in-service inspections, as reported earlier. The indication was located in the weld 
between the reactor pressure vessel nozzle and the safe end of the feedwater piping. Later on, a similar 
indication was detected in the reactor core spray system. Both indications have been surveyed by non 
destructive ultrasonic (UT) and eddy-current testing (ET). The indications may have initiated from 
welding defects with possible growth during operation. The size of the indications promoted STUK to 
require annual inspections and updated crack propagation calculations to verify safe operation for the 
following power cycles. In addition to these 2 major indications a additional non-recordable indications 
were detected in the periodical inspections, indicating ageing of the safe end welding material. This 
called the licensee TVO to start a major safe end repair campaign at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units.
The licensee submitted a repair plane for the safe-ends in 2016–2017, with the main objective to 
eliminate the indications and return back to the original in-service inspection interval. According to 
the plan, the indications will be removed by local machining and repair welding before final machining.
The repair campaign was launched for Olkiluoto 2 at the outage in 2017, with the aim to do similar 
repairs at Olkiluoto 1 in 2018. As a result of the tight schedule during the first quarter of 2017 a complete 
factory acceptance test (FAT) under remote control, including all the different working steps, could not 
be completely carried out. Partly due to this, the Olkiluoto 2 repair campaign encountered challenges 
that caused delays and modifications to the plan. There were challenges with the excavation and weld-
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ing processes, detecting indications during repair as well as with the final machining. This prompted 
TVO to modify the objective of the original repair plan. As a result, the larger indications in the main 
feedwater and reactor core spray systems at Olkiluoto 2 were repaired, and all other smaller indications 
were left out.
After the repair campaign of 2017 TVO concluded not to continue repairing of the smaller non-re-
cordable indications at Olkiluoto 1 in 2018. Obvious risks were foreseen related to the successful execution 
of such a repair campaign that could jeopardize the objective to return to the original inspection interval. 
TVO is required to monitor the two repaired safe-ends annually for three years , before returning to the 
inspection interval as used prior to the repair campaign. In relation to this, TVO has also made a new 
strategy in 2018 for a back-up repair campaign, which relies on complete replacement of the safe-end 
instead of repairing it.
The inspections carried out after the hydrogen flake findings at Doel unit 3 in 2012 have been assessed 
and realized in Finland. Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 units were regarded to be free of hydrogen flaking problem. 
To confirm this with Loviisa 1 and 2 additional UT-inspections for the RPV core areas were carried out 
in 2014 and 2016 without detection of such indications.
In Olkiluoto 3, pre-operational commissioning included pressure tests of the containment building 
and the primary circuit, as well as leak tightness test of the containment building. The containment 
pressure test and leaktightness tests were carried out successfully in January 2014. The leak tightness test 
was repeated in 2019 and it will be performed regularly during operation. The primary circuit pressure 
test was performed successfully in 2017.
Incorporation of proven technologies
According to STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), the nuclear plant shall be equipped with systems that 
function automatically and reliably to prevent severe fuel damage in postulated accidents and in design 
extension conditions; manually actuated systems can be used to manage accident situations if it can be 
justified from a safety perspective.
Practical implementation of safety requirements and procedures to ensure adequate reliability of 
software based instrumentation and control systems in the modernisation projects of the operating 
power plants and in the design of the new nuclear power plants is a big challenge. This includes also 
the issues related to the highly integrated control rooms.
At the Loviisa NPP, a big part of I&C systems are now renewed. The project began in 2002 with basic 
conceptual design; implementation begun in 2004 with construction of new buildings to accommodate 
the new systems. The first phase was implemented at the Loviisa unit 1 in 2008 and at the unit 2 in 2009, 
including the upgrade of I&C of reactor preventive and control rod position measurement and control 
functions, part of reactor in-core monitoring system and I&C of some non-safety auxiliary systems. A 
continuation project “ELSA” for the Loviisa NPP I&C renewal, was launched in June 2014. The ELSA project 
modernised a large part of the I&C system of the plant, switching it to a software based platform. The 
project were completed in the original timetable during the 2018 annual maintenance outages.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, changes in I&C systems are made gradually. Software based instru-
mentation and control technology has already been implemented in the modernised systems. The safety 
systems, with the exception of new protective relays of electrical systems and neutron flux measurement 
system, are still of conventional technology.
STUK has reviewed the licensing documents related to the I&C modernisation projects and the 
construction project of the Olkiluoto unit 3. The licensing path covers different layers of the design 
from architectural design of I&C (including Defence-in-Depth, separation and diversity assessments) to 
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system level design and down to I&C platform, application software and equipment suitability. During 
the licensing, STUK is reviewing that proven and qualified solutions are used.
The critical part of the licensing is how to demonstrate that the prevention of failure propagation 
and independency of different defence-in-depth levels are adequate. Proofing that platforms and equip-
ment fulfil requirements can also be laborious work and must be carefully planned if the equipment 
has not been originally designed for safety critical use. Cyber security threats must also be considered.
Design for reliable, stable and manageable operation
STUK Regulation Y/1/2018 section 16 requires that a nuclear facility shall contain equipment that 
provides information on the operational state of the facility and any deviations from normal opera-
tion. A nuclear power plant shall be equipped with automatic systems that actuate safety functions as 
required, and that control and supervise their functioning during operational occurrences to prevent 
accidents and during accidents to mitigate consequences. These automatic systems shall be capable of 
maintaining the nuclear power plant in a controlled state long enough to provide the operators with 
sufficient time to consider and implement the correct actions. In order to control the nuclear power plant 
and enable operator actions, the nuclear power plant shall have a control room, in which the majority 
of the user interfaces required for the monitoring and control of the nuclear power plant are located. 
STUK regulation Y/1/2018 also requires that human factors related safety must be taken into account 
in the design of the nuclear plant and in the design of its operation and maintenance. In particular in 
designing control rooms this means that a justified HFE program is required for new builds and control 
room modifications. For the purposes of the design process and the regulatory control exercised by 
STUK, the control room and emergency control room are be treated as a functional entity similar to a 
Safety Class 3 system.
STUK oversees new builds and modifications from the point of view of quality planning and from 
the point of view of human factors engineering process.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 18.
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Article 19. Operation
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
i. the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate safety analysis and a 
commissioning programme demonstrating that the installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety 
requirements;
ii. operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational experience are defined 
and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for operation;
iii. operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted in accordance with 
approved procedures;
iv. procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents;
v. necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available throughout the lifetime of 
a nuclear installation;
vi. incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant licence to the regu-
latory body;
vii. programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results obtained and the conclu-
sions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used to share important experience with international 
bodies and with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies;
viii. the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is kept to the minimum 
practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of 
spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take 
into consideration conditioning and disposal.
Initial authorisation
According to Section 19 of STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), in connection with the commissioning of 
a nuclear facility or its modifications, the licensee shall ensure that the systems, structures and compo-
nents and the nuclear facility as a whole operate as designed. At the commissioning stage, the licensee 
shall ensure that appropriate procedures are in place for the future operation of the nuclear facility.
Requirements for the commissioning programme are set forth in the Guide YVL A.5. According to 
the Guide YVL A.5, the purpose of the commissioning programme is to give evidence that the facility 
has been constructed and will function according to the design requirements. Through the programme 
possible deficiencies in design and construction can also be observed. The Guide YVL A.5 also requires 
that the licensee’s personnel shall participate in the commissioning testing to familiarize themselves 
with the facility and its systems. During commissioning, it shall also be ensured that the licensee’s 
organization is adequate to ensure the safe operation of the nuclear facility.
The Operating Licence is needed before fuel loading into the reactor. Authorisation for fuel loading 
is given by STUK after its specific inspection where readiness of the power plant and operating organisa-
tion is checked. Furthermore, according to the Nuclear Energy Decree, the various steps of the commis-
sioning, i.e., criticality, low power operation and power ascension, are subject to the approval of STUK.
The commissioning programme is described in the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. 
The commissioning programme is to be submitted to STUK for approval. The detailed commissioning 
test programmes and test reports of safety-classified systems are submitted separately to STUK for ap-
proval. STUK witnesses commissioning tests and assesses the test results before giving stepwise permits 
to proceed in the commissioning.
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Olkiluoto unit 3 commissioning
Commissioning of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is ongoing. Commissioning is divided into four actual commis-
sioning phases followed by a 30-day demonstration run before provisional take-over of the plant. The 
first commissioning phase consisted of component and system testing, which are still partly ongoing. 
These tests were followed by the plant level overall system tests or the so called cold and hot functional 
tests without the core which were completed in the years 2017 and 2018, respectively. In the late 2017 
and early 2018 the fresh nuclear fuel was also delivered to the site and is currently being stored in the 
spent fuel pools of the fuel building.
Currently, the preparation phase for the first fuel loading is ongoing at the site. This includes for 
example the finalization of the remaining system level tests and the necessary re-tests that are due to 
the modifications implemented at the unit and the other finalization works. Furthermore, the plant 
operating procedures are still partly under preparation and the validation of the procedures is still in-
complete. The preparation phase for the first fuel loading is followed by the fuel loading itself. For the 
fuel loading, the Operating licence and STUK´s authorisation are required. Hot functional tests with the 
core in sub-critical state and first criticality can then follow. After first criticality, the commissioning 
proceeds with power tests at various power levels up to rated power. During power tests, transient tests 
are performed. The transient tests will cover at least reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of off-site power, 
house load operation, trip of one main coolant pump or main feedwater pump, as well as other minor 
operational transients.
All commissioning documentation is part of Commissioning Manual which includes also organ-
isational procedures. The licensee has approved an Overall Commissioning Programme as well as sys-
tem level commissioning documentation prepared by the plant supplier and STUK has approved the 
documents that are safety relevant. Preparations for plant level commissioning are still underway, e.g. 
preparation of detailed commissioning programs for the later phases of commissioning such as the power 
tests. STUK oversees the commissioning of safety classified systems and related result documentation 
is provided for STUK’s review.
As the Guide YVL A.5 requires, one aim of the commissioning is to ensure that a sufficient organ-
isation is in place for the future operation. TVO’s personnel (e.g. future operators and maintenance 
personnel) have participated and are still participating in the commissioning activities in order to gain 
familiarity with the plant. The documentation for operation, like operating and testing procedures, is 
validated during the commissioning tests. TVO is also preparing itself for the future operation of the 
plant by planning refuelling outages, data systems, waste management, radiation protection and other 
issues related to the plant operation.
As part of the construction inspection programme inspections, STUK oversees TVO’s actions for 
ensuring that the plant is commissioned appropriately.
Operational Limits and Conditions
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that the applicant for an Operating Licence must provide STUK with the 
Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs). Furthermore, the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) Section 
22 states that the OLCs of a nuclear facility shall include the technical and administrative requirements 
for ensuring the nuclear facility’s operation in compliance with the design bases and the assumptions 
of safety analyses. The OLCs shall at least define limits for the process parameters that affect the safety 
of the facility in various operating states, provide regulations on operating restrictions that result from 
component failures, and set forth requirements for the testing of components important to safety. Guide 
YVL A.6 sets forth more specific requirements for the OLCs. It requires for example that the minimum 
99STUK-B 237 / JUly 2019
ARTICLE 19 – OPERATION
staff availability in all operational states and the limits for the releases of radioactive substances shall 
also be defined in the document.
The OLCs have been established for each nuclear power plant unit and are updated based on opera-
tional experiences, tests, analyses and plant modifications. The OLCs are subject to the approval of STUK 
prior to the commissioning of a facility. Strict observance of the OLCs is verified by STUK’s continuous 
oversight, reporting requirements and through a periodic inspection programme. The OLCs, operating 
procedures and other plant documentation need to be updated as part of plant modification process. 
Any amendments to or departures from the OLCs shall be submitted to STUK for approval prior their 
implementation as per the Guide YVL A.6.
Fortum has established the OLCs for the Loviisa units 1 and 2, and STUK has reviewed and accept-
ed them. The OLCs are continuously updated, and all the changes need to be approved by STUK. The 
limitations and conditions of the reactor and plant operation, the requirements for periodic tests and 
the essential administrative instructions are presented in the OLCs.
The OLCs for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 determine the limits of process parameters that affect the 
plant safety, for different operating modes, set the provisions for operating limits caused by component 
inoperability and set forth the requirements for the tests that are conducted regularly for components 
important to safety. Furthermore, the OLCs include the bases for the set provisions. TVO had a develop-
ment project to update the OLC for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. The goal of the development project was 
to clarify limits and conditions and expand bases and justifications. The project originally started in 2008 
and STUK received first updated OLC chapters in 2012. Project was completed in 2017. Furthermore, minor 
changes to the OLC has been made regularly based on plant modifications and organizational changes.
The OLCs for the Olkiluoto unit 3 was reviewed by STUK as a part of the operating licence docu-
mentation. STUK approved the OLCs for Olkiluoto 3 with requirements and the OLCs shall be updated 
according to the STUK requirements and approved by STUK before the first fuel loading.The OLCs for the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 define the safety limits for the plant, limiting conditions including the completion times 
and surveillance requirements for plant systems, structures and components, as well as administrative 
controls. The OLCs also include bases and justification for the conditions. Currently, there is a limited 
subset of OLCs in force in the fuel building of Olkiluoto 3 where the fresh nuclear fuel is being stored.
Figure 22 presents the number of exemptions and deviations from the Operational Limits and Condi-
tions. Based on the results of the last 10 years, the Loviisa NPP applied for STUK’s approval for exemptions 
from the OLCs on the average six times per year. Hence, the number of applications in 2016–2018 (total 
18) was same as the average. During the period 2016–2018, most of exemption applications concerned 
plant modifications and testing of equipment or overdue repairs of component failures. In 2016–2018, 
there were fifteen events at the Loviisa plant in which the Operational Limits and Conditions were de-
viated. The figure 22 is showing that the deviations are close to average. Deviations have occurred four 
times per year on average during past ten years (2009–2018).
Based on the results of the last 10 years, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applied for STUK’s ap-
proval for exemptions from the OLCs on the average seven times per year. Most of the applications were 
related to plant modifications In 2016–2018, there were ten events at the Olkiluoto plant in which the 
Operational Limits and Conditions were deviated. The number of events is close to the yearly average 
of the last 10 years (3 events per year). Many of these events were linked to human errors and improper 
procedures. In all of these events the safety meaning was considered low because there was enough 
defence-in-depth safety layers available to handle the event.
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FIGURE 22. Number of exemptions and deviations from the Operational limits and Conditions at the loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs.
Procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) Section 20, requires that the control and supervision of a nuclear 
power plant shall utilise written procedures that correspond to the current structure and state of the 
plant. Written orders and related procedures shall be provided for the maintenance, testing and repair 
of components. Section 23 requires that the plant shall have a condition monitoring and maintenance 
programme for ensuring the integrity and reliable operation of systems, structures and components. 
More detailed requirements are presented in the Guides YVL A.1, YVL A.4 and YVL A.6. The procedures 
for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing have been established for both Finnish operating 
nuclear power plants and for Olkiluoto 3 unit these procedures are still partly under preparation. The 
procedures shall be approved by the licensee itself, and most of them are required to be submitted to 
STUK for information. STUK verifies by means of inspections and continuous oversight performed by 
resident inspectors that approved procedures are followed in the operation of the facility.
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Loviisa NPP
A structured system of procedures exists at the Loviisa plant. The procedures cover work processes and 
functions important to safety and availability. The system of procedures is a part of the quality sys-
tem of the plant. Strict requirements have been set in the Quality Assurance Manual for the coverage, 
responsibilities, updating and observance of the procedures. According to the Manual the evaluation 
of the system of procedures is included in the annual review of the applicability and effectiveness of 
the management system. Procedures are maintained, evaluated and developed systematically and in a 
controlled way. The most important procedure types are:
• Administrative procedures including Organisational Manual and Administrative Rules,
• Operating procedures and testing procedures,
• Procedures for emergency and transient situations,
• Fuel handling procedures,
• Radiation protection procedures, and
• Maintenance procedures.
Loviisa plant has upgraded computer systems used in managing documentation and permit-to-work 
system. By means of a work order system it is ensured that the plant operators are aware of the state 
and configuration of the unit. Fortum has developed, and develops further, its work order system based 
on accumulated operating experiences. In addition to the work order system the operators in the main 
control room of the units follow failures, repairs and preventive maintenance of the components re-
ferred to in the Operating Limits and Conditions. A shift supervisor gives a permit to start a specific 
work when he has evaluated the work plans specified in the work order system, taking into account the 
operability requirements of the systems and components set in the Operational Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Loviisa units 1 and 2 cover preventive, predictive and repairing 
maintenance as well as implementation of modification works, spare part maintenance and activities 
during outages. The scheduling of the modification planning for the next maintenance outage is fixed 
in order to get enough time for preparations. Minor modifications are concentrated to every second 
annual maintenance outage and major works are carried out every fourth year. This is accomplished 
by starting from a long term investment planning which converts into a long term modification plan.
The functioning of the systems and components is ensured with regular tests. The systems and 
components to be tested and the time periods of the tests are presented in the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. At least the respective periodic tests are required after the modification and repairing works 
and maintenance activities requiring dismounting. The performance test programme to be carried out 
after an essential modification is required to be approved by STUK in advance. In addition, inspections 
regarding to the functioning and condition of components are carried out when necessary based on op-
erating experiences from other plants and on the advancement of technical knowledge. Other operating 
organisations of VVER-type reactors have been essential sources of operating experiences in this respect.
STUK oversees monitoring and maintenance activities as well as repair and modification works with 
regular inspections and continuous oversight performed by resident inspectors. Goal of the inspections 
is to ensure that the utility has adequate resources, such as a competent staff, instructions, a spare part 
and material storage as well as tools for the sufficiently effective implementation of the monitoring and 
maintenance activities. Special subjects are the condition monitoring programmes for the carbon steel 
piping and their results. Special attention has also been paid to the reliable activities of subcontractors 
as well as to the technical competence of external human resources. Both the utility and STUK oversee 
companies that perform inspection activities and the technical competence of organisations that carry 
out various duties.
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Olkiluoto NPP
The measures that are followed in the operation and maintenance of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are 
based on written procedures. The administrative and technical procedures needed in the operation of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been gathered into the Operating Manual. The Operating Manual contains 
also necessary transient and emergency procedures for unusual conditions. The most important proce-
dures have been reviewed by STUK. Updating and comprehensiveness of the procedures are among the 
inspection issues included in the STUK’s periodical inspection programme. TVO updates the procedures 
when necessary and checks systematically that the procedures are up-to-date in four-year-intervals.
For Olkiluoto 3 unit the written procedures for the operation and maintenance are partly still 
under preparation and will be finalized before the first fuel loading. The administrative procedures of 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are updated to take the unit 3 into account considering also the differences be-
tween the boiling and pressurized water reactors. Furthermore, new procedures for unit 3 are prepared 
where necessary.
The Work Request System ensures that the operators of the plant are aware of the plant state. 
TVO has developed its Work Request System and will continue to do so, on the basis of operational 
experience. In the main control room of the plant units, the operators follow, in addition to the Work 
Request System, the failures, repairs and preventive maintenance of the components specified in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions. The Shift Supervisor grants the permission to begin a single work 
after inspecting the work plans and taking into account the operability requirements for the systems 
and components set forth in the Operational Limits and Conditions.
At the Olkiluoto 3 unit the plant suppliers work management system is currently being used for 
reporting the component failures and managing the works at the plant. TVO’s own system which is in 
use at the units 1 and 2 will be commissioned before beginning of the commercial operation of the unit.
The maintenance activities of the Olkiluoto units 1 2 and 3 cover preventive and corrective main-
tenance as well as the design and execution of modifications, spare part service, outage actions and the 
related quality control. The Maintenance Department plans and implements the annual maintenance 
outages together with the Operation Department and Technical Support Department. Special atten-
tion has been paid to the reliable work of the subcontractors and to the technical competence of the 
external work force. The technical expertise of testing laboratories and contractors is controlled both 
by the power company and STUK.
The systems and the components that will be tested as well as the test dates are presented in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions. Periodical testing that corresponds at least to the aforementioned 
is required after maintenance measures that require modifications, repairing or disassembling. STUK’s 
approval is required in advance for a functional test programme that is conducted after a significant 
modification. Inspections that concern the operability and condition of components are also conducted, 
if necessary, on the basis of operational experience received from elsewhere and development of technical 
knowledge. The most significant sources of operational experience, in this sense, have been the Swedish 
BWR plants for Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 whereas the unit 3 will utilize the experiences especially from 
the other EPR units in Taishan and Flamanville.
STUK oversees the condition monitoring and maintenance as well as the modification and repair 
work by regularly repeated inspections. The inspections aim to ensure that the power company has ad-
equate resources such as a competent personnel, instructions, a spare part and material storage as well 
as the tools for adequately efficient implementation of condition monitoring and maintenance actions. 
Special items are the condition monitoring programmes of the carbon steel pipelines and their results.
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Procedures for responding to operational occurrences and accidents
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) Section 20 gives basic requirements for operating and emergency 
procedures. More specific requirements regarding the procedures including emergency operating pro-
cedures and severe accident management guidelines are set forth in the Guide YVL A.6.
At both Finnish operating nuclear power plants, procedures for anticipated operational occurrences 
and accidents are in use. To the extent found necessary, the procedures have been verified during opera-
tor training at the plant simulators. At both nuclear power plants there are also advanced safety panels 
for monitoring critical safety functions. STUK has independently evaluated the appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of the procedures for anticipated operational occurrences and accidents.
TVO had a development project to update event-oriented operating procedures for events within the 
scope of the design. These transient operating procedures will be updated by adding a symptom based 
chart in the beginning of each procedure. The chart guides operator to choose the right procedure for 
the ongoing situation. The development work started in 2012 and was completed in 2017. To cope with 
emergency conditions beyond design, including severe accidents, a set of symptom-based emergency 
operating procedures (EOPs) is available. The focus of the severe accident EOPs is on ensuring the con-
tainment integrity. The symptom oriented accident management procedures (included in EOPs) apply 
to shutdown states, as well, although prevention of core damage is essential especially in situations with 
open containment. As a lesson learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the licensee has 
improved EOPs to support heat removal from spent fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying make-up 
water to the pools. Also possibility to shutdown the plant from an emergency control room is added to 
EOPs. EOP to manage accident conditions affecting multiple units (OL1/OL2/OL3) and spent fuel pools 
is under preparation.
At the Loviisa NPP, immediate Severe Accident Management (SAM) measures are carried out within 
the EOPs. After carrying out immediate actions successfully, the operators concentrate on monitoring 
the SAM safety functions with SAM procedures. The SAM procedures focus on monitoring the leak 
tightness of the containment barrier, and on the long-term issues. As a lesson learnt from the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the licensee will improve EOPs and SAM procedures to support heat removal 
from spent fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying additional water to the pools, connection of the 
additional water supply to the spent fuel pools will be carried out in 2019 outage. EOPs were developed 
in 2012 for shutdown states covering the immediate recovery of SAM systems.
At the Olkiluoto 3 unit the procedures for abnormal and emergency operation including severe 
accident management guidelines are under preparation. All these procedures will be verified and val-
idated in the training simulator before the first fuel loading. The purpose of the emergency operating 
procedures is to prevent the core melt. The emergency operating procedures of Olkiluoto 3 unit consist 
of the event-based procedures and of the symptom-based procedures. In addition, necessary event di-
agnosis procedures for abnormal and emergency operation are included as well as the safety function 
monitoring procedures for the safety engineer. The plant level procedures are in the form of the flow 
charts and in electronic format. In case of losing the electronic procedures, the paper-based procedures 
also exist in the main control room. STUK has supervised the validation activities of the procedures at 
the simulator. Based on the validation results, several modifications have to be made to the procedures.
As mentioned above, the severe accident management guidelines or the operating strategies for se-
vere accidents (OSSA) are also being prepared and validated for Olkiluoto 3 unit. The purpose of the OSSA 
is to ensure the integrity of the containment and to mitigate the consequences of the severe accident.
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The assessment conducted for Olkiluoto 3 unit due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
showed that the external hazards had been taken into accuountin the design sufficiently and there was 
noneed for immediate actions. However, the following safety improvements among others have been 
implemented: the possibility to feed the spent fuel storage pool by movable hoses and pumps and the 
possibility to transfer the fuel from the emergency diesel generator storage tank to the station blackout 
diesel generator.
Engineering and technical support
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) Section 25 requires that the organisation shall have access to profes-
sional expertise and technical knowledge required for the safe operation of the plant, the maintenance 
of equipment important to safety, and the management of accidents. The requirements in the Guide 
YVL A.4 also cover technical support. Competence of the engineering and technical support is supervised 
by the licensee. In addition, STUK carries out inspections and audits by which also the competence of 
the support staff is evaluated.
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj has longstanding expertise in nuclear operations. TVO uses external ex-
pertise regularly in various design and modification activities when needed.
Fortum has under corporate structure own unit for technical support that provides support to the 
Loviisa NPP among other projects. There are also on-site experts at the Loviisa NPP for various engi-
neering and technical support functions.
Reporting of incidents significant to safety
Guide YVL A.10 provides in detail the reporting requirements on incidents. The Guide provides a number 
of examples of operational disturbances and events, which have to be reported to STUK. It also defines 
requirements for the contents of the reports and the administrative procedures for reporting, includ-
ing time limits for submitting of various reports. STUK publishes information concerning significant 
events (INES ≥ 1) as press releases. Information from some events is published on STUK´s website. STUK 
describes the events also in yearly reports on nuclear safety that are also available to the general public 
through internet.
Loviisa NPP submitted to STUK on an average 21 operational event reports per year (in 2016–2018) 
and Olkiluoto NPP on an average 17 operational event reports per year (in 2016–2018). Average level is 
similar to previous period 2013–2015 (Loviisa NPP 19, Olkiluoto NPP 18).
Figures 23 and 24 present the total number of safety-significant events (criteria: Guide YVL A.10 
requirements A01–A07) and INES classified (≥ 1) events at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
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FIGURE 23. Annual total number of safety-significant event reports (criteria: Guide yVl A.10 requirements A01–A07) 
submitted by the loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
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FIGURE 24. Annual total number of events at INES level 1 at the Finnish  
nuclear power plants. All events were ≤ INES level 1 in 2014–2018.
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INES-classified events
At the Loviisa NPP, six events in 2016, eight events in 2017 and seven events in 2018 were classified on the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). One of these events were rated at level 1, others being of level 0:
• A fresh nuclear fuel assembly fell from the fuel transfer machine into the fuel transfer basket, 
28.2.2017, INES 1 (IRS 8474)
This incident is described in more detail in Annex 2.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, two events in 2016, six events in 2017 and seven events in 2018 were classified on 
the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). One of these events were rated at level 
1, others being of level 0:
• Reactor scram on high reactor power in natural circulation conditions (SS15), 8.5.2018, INES 1.
These incidents are described in more detail in Annex 3.
Operational experience feedback
According to the Section 21 of the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), nuclear power plant operational 
experience feedback (OEF) shall be collected and safety research results monitored, and both assessed 
for the purpose of enhancing safety. Safety-significant operational events shall be investigated for the 
purpose of identifying the root causes as well as defining and implementing the corrective measures. 
Improvements in technical safety, resulting from safety research, shall be taken into account to the 
extent justified on the basis of the principles laid down in Section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
STUK requires that incidents at nuclear facilities and activities are analysed. Based on the analysis, 
corrective actions are planned and implemented by the operators. Regulatory requirements are given 
in STUK’s Regulatory Guide YVL A.10. The guide provides detailed requirements and administrative 
procedures for the systematic evaluation of operating experiences, and for the planning and implemen-
tation of corrective actions. Operational events at other nuclear power plants and foreign operational 
occurrences have to be systematically screened and assessed as well, from their applicability and their 
significance for the nuclear facilities in Finland.
The licensees have developed the required procedures for analysing operating experiences and 
root causes for events. The licensees are using WANO and IRS reports as basic material to be screened 
for external OEF and they have OEF groups for screening, analysing of OE entry into processing and 
following the corrective actions. The licensees have also their internal audit programme and OEF is one 
topic in these programmes.
STUK verifies by means of inspections and by reviewing licensee’s event reports that the activities 
of the licensees as regards incident evaluation are effective. In STUK’s periodic inspection programme 
there is inspection focusing to OEF, namely “Operational experience feedback” When necessary, a spe-
cial investigation team is appointed by STUK to evaluate a certain incident or group of incidents. The 
evaluation of foreign operational occurrences and incidents is based on the reports of the IRS Reporting 
System (IAEA/NEA) and on the reports of other national regulatory bodies.
Following targets for development have been recognised during 2016–2018: interface between OEF 
organization and line organization (roles and responsibilities) and results of the OEF function (learning 
from experiences).
For review and assessment of OE information abroad STUK has an internal OEF Group for inter-
national events with a coordinator and technical experts (18) covering all expertise areas of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation departments. The group meets monthly 
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and based on the expert assessment in STUK’s own IRS database the group members make together an 
judgement whether there is a need for regulatory or licensee measures on the basis of lessons learned as-
signing the IRS report into categories with respect to actions to be taken (categories 1 to 3), or not needed 
(category 0). In the case that an expert to whom the report is assigned for review cannot immediately 
say if an event requires actions at Finnish plants the report is classified into category 1 (particular issues 
need clarification) and clarifications of the applicability are initiated with the plant contact persons. 
After clarifications the event is reclassified. Classification into category 2 (Lessons learned need to be 
taken into account in certain activities) means that concrete actions are not required but the report 
contains information which should be considered in inspections by STUK. If actions are required at the 
Finnish nuclear power plants in operation or under construction the report is classified into category 3 
(Actions required). Examples of such events are unexpected failures of components being installed also 
into the systems or equipment of Finnish plants, or events revealing deficiencies in procedures of the 
plants. Category 4 (Good practise in Finland) means that actions to prevent an event have already taken 
or an occurrence of such an event has taken into account in the original design of the plant, or there 
are special procedures and regulatory requirements in place (YVL guides) preventing a similar event.
Figure 25 shows the distribution of IRS reports into different categories in STUK’s review and as-
sessment from 2016 to 2018. Altogether 499 IRS-reports were assessed during that period and most of 
them (75%), 373 reports, fell into category 0 requiring no further actions. 16% (81 IRS reports) of reviewed 
reports were classified into category 2 and applicability of lessons learned were checked in the inspec-
tions of STUK’s periodic inspection programme or evaluated in some other inspections. In the case of 
4 reported events review resulted specific actions at the Finnish nuclear power plants:
• IRS 8505 “Unit removed from service for maintenance due to a through-wall crack formation in 
the base metal of control rod drive tube in cell 05-38”, Russia
• IRS 8315 “EDG failed to start after undetected loss of two phases on 400 kV incoming offsite 
supply”, Sweden
• IRS 8435 “Outbreak of fire in a reactor coolant pump”, France
• IRS 8493 “Generic deviations in the 1450 MWe units involving primary reactor coolant pump 
suction adapter screws”, France.
In the 13 events it was realised that similar kind of events were already well prevented by technical or 
administrative arrangements, and thus we have good practices in use.
 1.0% No operational experience value (2)
 72.0% No further actions (224)
 19.0% Lessons learned need to be taken into account in certain activities (58)
 3.0% Actions required (9)
 2.0% Good practise in Finland (5)
 5.0% Particular issues need clarification (15)
Distribution of IRS-reports into dierent categories in STUK‘s review and assessment in 2016–2018
FIGURE 25. Distribution of IRS reports into different categories in STUK’s review and assessment in 2016–2018.
108 STUK-B 237 / JUly 2019
ARTICLE 19 – OPERATION
Reports for the IRS System on safety-significant occurrences at the Finnish nuclear power plants 
are written by STUK. STUK has delivered four (4) new IRS-reports during 2016–2018.
• IRS 8756 “Programmable technology in qualified relays results in expiration of qualification”, 
Generic report, reported 4.7.2016. Several occurrences of relays found with programmable 
technology have been found out, Four separate events that took place in Finland in 2012, 2014 and 
2015
• IRS 8677 “Prolonged opening time of main steam safety relief valve at repeated actuation”, 
Loviisa-1, reported 10.10.2017.
• IRS 8747 “Challenges with operation of fuel transfer machine” , Loviisa-2, reported 22.11.2018.
• IRS 8761 “Common cause failure in control rod drives” , Olkiluoto-1, reported 13.12.2018.
STUK oversees the utilisation of international OE by licensees.
STUK has also participated in co-operation between international organisations such as the IAEA, 
the OECD/NEA and the EU (Clearinghouse), which exchange information on safety issues and operating 
events. In the OECD/NEA/CNRA working groups for e.g. WGOE (Operating Experience) and WGRNR 
(Regulation of New Reactors) improves nuclear safety by sharing experience and lessons learnt from 
nuclear installations. Other forums that STUK uses to obtain information are WENRA, MDEP work-
groups, the VVER Forum as well as some bilateral agreements. A special exchange of information be-
tween Rostechnadzor and STUK on the operation of the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants and 
of Finnish nuclear power plants is also ongoing activity. The similar information exchange is arranged 
also to Sweden (SSM) and France (ASN).
At the Loviisa NPP, VVER reactor operating experience is collected, screened and evaluated by a 
dedicated operating experience feedback group composed of engineers from the plant operation organ-
isation and from Technical Support. The main information to be handled comes from WANO (Moscow 
Centre) which links all the VVER reactor operators. Additional information and reports are received 
from the IAEA, OECD/NEA, NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and FROG (Framatome owners 
group). The activities of the operating experience feedback group are not limited only to VVER reac-
tors. The plant managers of VVER-440 reactors have periodic meetings. The plant operation problems, 
modernisation, back-fitting, plant life management and safety questions are handled and experiences 
are exchanged in these meetings and in further individual contacts.
TVO has also an operating experience feedback group. This onsite group gives recommendations 
to the line organisation that makes decisions on eventual corrective actions. The industry operating 
experience from similar reactor types is followed by several means. The main sources of information are 
NordERF (cooperation between Nordic NPPs) with connection to KSU (Swedish nuclear training centre) 
and WANO. Information is also coming directly from several sources (IAEA and OECD/NEA, IRS), Loviisa 
power plant (e.g. operating experience meetings and reports), vendors (Westinghouse Atom, Alstom 
Power Sweden AB), component manufacturers, BWROG (BWR Owners Group) and BWR Forum (FANP).
IRS reports are also received directly by the licensees via WBIRS and evaluated by them. Almost 
all plant modifications, as improvements in systems, structures, and components, which have emerged 
from foreign experience originate from plants that are of the same type as the Finnish plants.
Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste on the site
Management of the operational low and intermediate level nuclear wastes and the disposal of these 
wastes takes place at the NPP sites. Disposal facilities for low and intermediate level waste are in oper-
ation at Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites and there are plans to construct a disposal facility also for the new 
built NPP site Hankikivi in Pyhäjoki. Since the disposal facilities are operated by the nuclear power plant 
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operators, the technical feasibility and economic motivation to minimize the generation of radioactive 
waste are evident.
The requirement for radioactive waste minimization is included in the Guide YVL D.4. It calls for a 
limitation of waste volumes in particular from repair and maintenance works, and segregation of waste 
on the basis of activity. Clearance of waste from regulatory control, prescribed in the Radiation Act, STUK 
regulation on exemption levels and clearance levels, Nuclear Energy Decree and in the Guide YVL D.4, 
aims at limiting the volumes of waste to be stored and disposed of. The Guides YVL D.3 and D.4 includes 
also more specific requirements for the conditioning and interim storage of waste and spent nuclear fuel 
and it requires that besides the short-term radiation protection objectives, also the long-term properties 
of waste packages with respect to disposal shall be taken into account in the conditioning and storage of 
waste. The Guide YVL B.4 provides requirements for prevention of fuel failures, which also contributes 
to the limitation of activity accumulation in waste from reactor water cleanup systems.
The Guide YVL D.5 calls for a waste type description, to be approved by STUK, for each category of 
waste to be disposed of. In the description of waste type, the most important characteristics of waste with 
respect to the safety of disposal are defined. The Guide includes also specific requirements for planning, 
design and operation of the disposal facility and demonstration of compliance with safety requirements.
Low and intermediate level waste (LILW)
The policy to minimize the waste production at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs has included the high 
quality requirements for the fuel, careful planning of the maintenance work and decontamination. The 
segregation and monitoring of the operational waste have been effective, enabling the clearance from 
the regulatory control of waste below the clearance levels. Some large metal components from both 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs have been transported for treatment to Cyclife Sweden facility in Studsvik. 
The purified metal has been recycled in Sweden. Parts of components containing activation products 
or external contamination have been separated and transported back to Finland for disposal.
The predisposal management of LILW was developed in Loviisa NPP during the reporting period 
as the solidification plant was authorized for full operation in 2016. Loviisa NPP has now been able 
to start the solidification of historical liquid wastes, which had been stored in tanks from the start of 
NPP’s operation in the late 1970s. The aim is to solidify and dispose of all existing liquid waste in the 
forthcoming years.
At the Loviisa NPP site, the disposal facility for the low and intermediate level waste is located at 
the depth of 110 meters in granite bedrock. It consists of three tunnels for solid low level waste and a hall 
for solidified intermediate level waste. Two tunnels for low level waste disposal have been in use from 
the very beginning of the facility. The third tunnel, built during 2010–2013, was licensed for storage of 
low level solid waste. In 2016 it was licensed to include also interim storage of the solidified intermediate 
level packages until end of 2018. Since the disposal hall for intermediate level is not commissioned yet, 
the license of the third tunnel was extended until end of 2021. In the end of 2018 Loviisa NPP delivered 
STUK the updated post closure safety case of the disposal facility. The updated safety case covers both 
operational waste and decommissioning waste. STUK will review the safety case during 2019.
The renewal of the operating license for Olkiluoto 1&2 in 2018 included the possibility to use the 
waste handling equipment and storage rooms for wastes originating from Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 site area 
and other radioactive waste with same activity level originated from other licenses or State. The simi-
lar principle was introduced in the operating license application for Olkiluoto 3 for the waste from the 
Olkiluoto NPP site area. All together the interim storage capacity for low and intermediate level wastes 
in Olkiluoto NPP site area will be 30000 m³.
The disposal facility for the low and intermediate level waste at the Olkiluoto NPP site consists 
of two silos at the depth of 60 to 95 meters in tonalite bedrock, one for solid low level waste and the 
other for bituminized intermediate level waste. The license conditions of the low and intermediate level 
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waste disposal facility were updated in 2012 and the disposal of low and intermediate level wastes from 
Olkiluoto 3 in the facility was allowed as well as disposal of non-nuclear radioactive wastes originating, 
e.g. from research, industry and hospitals. Non-nuclear waste has been stored in a cavern in the LILW 
disposal facility at Olkiluoto. The disposal of waste started in 2016 and currently the most of the waste 
accumulated over the years have been disposed of.
At the end of 2018, 6420 cubic meters of low and intermediate level operating waste has accumulated 
at the Olkiluoto NPP and 3571 cubic meters at the Loviisa NPP. About 95% of Olkiluoto waste and 55% 
of Loviisa solid waste has been disposed of in the on-site repositories. Rest of the low and intermediate 
level disposal waste is stored at the NPP site area.
Decommissioning
Revised Nuclear Energy Act and Nuclear Energy Decree were issued in January 2018. In this revision 
a decommissioning license was added into the Finnish licensing system. The licensee shall apply for 
the decommissioning license, while the operating license is still valid. The license application for de-
commissioning shall be submitted to the authorities in time to ensure that they are able to review the 
application while the operating license is still valid. The requirements for the licensing documentation 
are presented in the Nuclear Energy Decree (paragraphs 33 a, 34 a and 36 a).
The Nuclear Energy Act sets the basic principles and requirements for the decommissioning. Dis-
mantling of a nuclear facility and other measures taken for the decommissioning of the facility may 
not be postponed without a due cause. Decommissioning costs shall be included into the total cost 
estimates of the nuclear waste management of Licensee and will be taken into account in the liability 
and fund target estimations for the Nuclear Waste Management Fund. More detailed requirements for 
the decommissioning are presented in the Guide YVL D.4. Decommissioning of the nuclear facility shall 
be taken into account already in the design phase of a nuclear facility. According to the Nuclear Energy 
Decree decommissioning plan has to be included in the construction license application documentation. 
Since the operating license the utilities are obliged to keep the decommissioning plans up-to-date and 
submit them to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment every six years for review. The final 
decommissioning plan is required for the decommissioning license application. The decommissioning 
of a nuclear facility shall be performed in accordance with the safety requirements and with a decom-
missioning plan approved by STUK. The last review for Olkiluoto NPP decommissioning plan was made 
in 2014. Loviisa NPP submitted the updated decommissioning plan for review in the end of 2018.
The strategy for the decommissioning in the Loviisa NPP is that both units will be shut down af-
ter 50 years operation in 2027 and 2030 and the dismantling of the NPPs starts immediately and lasts 
approximately 11 years. In Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are planned to be shut down after 60 years operation 
in 2038. The decommissioning strategy for units 1 and 2 is deferred and dismantling starts after 30 
years of safe storage period. The main reason for delayed dismantling is the radiation protection of 
the personnel. Unit 3 is planned to shut down after 60 years operation in 2070’s. The decommissioning 
strategy for the unit 3 is immediate dismantling and it is planned to be dismantled after dismantling 
the units 1 and 2 has been completed.
In 2012 VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd) decided to shut down Finland’s only re-
search reactor FiR 1 (TRIGA Mark II, 250 kW). By this decision, the research reactor will be the first nu-
clear reactor to be decommissioned in Finland. The Environmental Impact Assessment procedure for 
the decommissioning was conducted in 2013–2015. VTT submitted an application to the Government 
for a decommissioning on June 20, 2017. Formally it was an application for a new operating license as 
the Finnish legislation didn’t define a decommissioning license at that time. In the license application 
VTT presents two alternative time schedules for the decommissioning. The first option is based on the 
assumption that the spent fuel can be repatriated into the USA according original returning agreement 
in 2019. In this case the actual dismantling of radioactive parts of the facility would be ready in 2020 and 
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the site would be released from the regulatory control in 2023. The other schedule is based on assumption 
that spent fuel needs to be interim stored in Finland before transportation to USA. In this option, the 
dismantling could not be started until the interim storage concept is licensed separately according the 
Nuclear Energy Act. In this case the dismantling would be ready at the end of 2025. STUK submitted 
its statement and safety evaluation report of the application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment in March 2019.
Spent fuel
Spent fuel from the Loviisa NPP was transported back to Russia until 1996. Amendment of the Nuclear 
Energy Act issued in 1994 requires that spent fuel generated in Finland has to be treated, stored and 
disposed of in Finland. Accordingly, spent fuel shipments to Russia were terminated, and the necessary 
extension of the wet type spent fuel storage facility was commissioned in 2001. The installation of the 
dense racks into the storage facility started in 2007 to increase the capacity and it will be continued 
until Posiva starts transferring spent fuel to Olkiluoto for disposal. The capacity of the interim storage 
will be adequate for the total amount of the spent fuel 1100 tU allowed in the operating license issued 
in 2007. This amount covers all spent nuclear fuel that is estimated to be produced in Loviisa NPP until 
the decommissioning of the reactors.
The Loviisa spent fuel storages have been improved since the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The 
main changes were aimed at reducing the dependency on the plant’s normal electricity supply and dis-
tribution system, as well as on the seawater cooled systems for residual heat removal from the reactor, 
containment and spent fuel pools. Two air-cooled cooling units were constructed and commissioned in 
2014–2015 to ensure long-term decay heat removal in case of the loss of seawater. In order to improve 
safety in all conditions, the installations of a diverse water supply from external sources to the spent 
fuel pools and instrumentation of the water level and temperature monitoring of the fuel pools are 
planned to be carried out during 2019.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, the wet type spent fuel interim storage was commissioned in 1987. In 2009 
TVO submitted documentation for STUKs approval on extension of the capacity of the facility. The spent 
fuel interim storage underwent numerous safety improvements during its capacity extension, which 
became operational in summer 2015. These included, e.g. protection against large airplane crashes and 
enabling a cooling water feed from outside the storage facility. After the extension the interim storage 
serves all three units at Olkiluoto NPP. The original capacity of 1200 tU was extended to 1800 tU. Based 
on the evaluation in relation to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, water level and temperature moni-
toring functions have been improved for earthquake resistance and for the potential loss of the facility 
power supply. Instrumentation of the water level and temperature monitors were installed to the spent 
fuel pools at the beginning of 2019.
At the end of 2018, the spent fuel accumulation at the Olkiluoto NPP was 1864 tons of uranium and 
at the Loviisa NPP 734 tons of uranium.
Fennovoima submitted the construction licence application in 2015 for the NPP. Fennovoima plans 
to store spent fuel in an interim storage which will be a pool type wet storage. The amount of spent fuel 
to be stored is estimated to be around 1400 tU.
In the construction license application documents Fennovoima provided STUK the licensing plan 
of the spent fuel interim storage. The detailed documentation of the license application was submitted 
to STUK in two batches in 2017 and 2018.
The power companies Fortum and TVO established in 1995 the joint company Posiva to take care 
of the spent nuclear fuel disposal. Research, development and planning work for the spent fuel disposal 
is in progress and the disposal facility is envisaged to be operational in 2024. The Decision-in-Principle 
on the spent fuel disposal facility in deep crystalline bedrock was made by the Government in 2000 and 
ratified by the Parliament in 2001. It covers the disposal of the spent fuel from the Olkiluoto units 1 and 
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2 and Loviisa units 1 and 2. A separate Decision-in-Principles for the disposal of the spent fuel from the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 was made in 2002. The spent fuel disposal facility will be constructed in the vicinity 
of Olkiluoto NPP site.
Posiva submitted the construction licence application for an encapsulation plant and a disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in the end of 2012. 
The construction licence was granted for Posiva by the Government in November 2015. The capacity of 
the disposal facility is restricted in the construction license to 6500 tU which covers the spent nuclear 
fuel from the NPP units in operation (Olkiluoto 1 & 2, Loviisa 1 & 2) and in commissioning (Olkiluoto 3). 
The Decision in Principle for Posiva disposal facility allowed Posiva to construct an underground 
rock characterization laboratory ONKALO® to confirm the suitability of the site. It was built during 
2004–2016 and it was also planned to be a part of the disposal facility. After the construction license was 
granted to Posiva, the underground construction activities outside the scope of ONKALO® were started 
in the end of 2016. In the beginning of 2019 Posiva has proceeded to excavate the beginning part of the 
central tunnel of the first disposal panel.
The encapsulation facility will be built on the ground level and above the disposal facility. The 
base for the encapsulation facility is already excavated and the construction work is about to begin in 
summer 2019. According to Posiva, the operation license application will be provided for the authorities 
in the end of 2021.
In 2016 Fennovoima submitted Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) program for disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. According to the program 
Fennovoima will start assessment for spent nuclear fuel encapsulation and disposal facility in two al-
ternative municipalities Eurajoki and Pyhäjoki. Fennovoima has proposed that EIA process is finalized in 
year 2040 and after that they will apply for Decision-in-Principle. Fennovoima has planned to start spent 
fuel disposal at earliest in 2090’s. At the same time, a co-operation agreement with Posiva Solutions Oy 
(Posiva’s subsidiary that focuses on supplying services) was signed to ensure that the expertise of Posiva 
is available for Fennovoima’s spent nuclear fuel management activities. Co-operation started in 2016.
The safety regulation for spent fuel handling, storage and disposal is included in the STUK Reg-
ulation on the safety of disposal of nuclear waste (STUK Y/4/2018), STUK Regulation on the Safety of 
a Nuclear Power Plant (STUK Y/1/2018) and in the Guides YVL D.3 and D.5. STUK published also a new 
Guide YVL D.7, Release barriers of spent nuclear fuel disposal facility.
A detailed description of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and related regulation is 
included in the 6th Finnish National Report as referred to in Article 32 of the Joint Convention on the 
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (STUK-B 218, 
October 2017).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices are in compliance with Article 19.
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List of main regulations
Legislation (as of 31 December 2018)
1. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
2. Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988)
3. Act on Third Party Liability (484/1972)
4. Decree on Third Party Liability (486/1972)
5. Radiation Act (859/2018)
6. Government Decree on Ionizing Radiation (1034/2018)
7. Decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on Ionizing Radiation (1044/2018)
8. Act on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (1069/1983)
9. Decree on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (618/1997)
10. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (105/2016)
STUK Regulations by virtue of Nuclear Energy Act
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (STUK Y/1/2018)
• STUK Regulation on Emergency Arrangements of a Nuclear Power Plant (STUK Y/2/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy (STUK Y/3/2016)
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2018)
• TUK Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling Operations aimed at Producing Uranium or 
Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016)
STUK Regulations by virtue of Radiation Act and Nuclear Energy Act
• STUK Regulation on Exemption and Clearance Levels (STUK SY/1/2018)
• STUK Regulations by virtue of Radiation Act (applied to the use of nuclear energy)
• STUK Regulation on the Investigation, Assessment and Monitoring of Occupational Exposure 
(STUK S/1/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Radiation Measurements (STUK S/6/2018)
The Regulations are available on the Internet at https://www.stuklex.fi/en/maarays (In English)
Regulatory Guides on nuclear safety (YVL Guides)
Group A: Safety management of a nuclear facility
Guide YVL A.1 Regulatory oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy, 22.11.2013
Guide YVL A.2 Site for a nuclear facility, 15.2.2019
Guide YVL A.3 Management system for a nuclear facility, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL A.4 Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility, 2.6.2014
Guide YVL A.5 Construction and commissioning of a nuclear facility, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL A.6 Conduct of operations at a nuclear power plant, 15.6.2019
Guide YVL A.7 Probabilistic risk assessment and risk management of a nuclear power plant, 15.2.2019
Guide YVL A.8 Ageing management of a nuclear facility, 15.2.2019
Guide YVL A.9 Regular reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility, 15.2.2019
Guide YVL A.10 Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility, 15.2.2019
Guide YVL A.11 Security of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL A.12 Information security management of a nuclear facility, 22.11.2013
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Group B: Plant and system design
Guide YVL B.1 Safety design of a nuclear power plant, 15.16.2019
Guide YVL B.2 Classification of systems, structures and components of a nuclear facility, 15.16.2019
Guide YVL B.3 Deterministic safety analyses for a nuclear power plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.4 Nuclear fuel and reactor, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL B.5 Reactor coolant circuit of a nuclear power plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.6 Containment of a nuclear power plant, 15.6.2019
Guide YVL B.7 Provisions for internal and external hazards at a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.8 Fire protection at a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Group C: Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment
Guide YVL C.1 Structural radiation safety at a nuclear facility, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL C.2 Radiation protection and exposure monitoring of nuclear facility workers, 20.5.2014
Guide YVL C.3 Limitation and monitoring of radioactive releases from a nuclear facility, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL C.4 Assessment of radiation doses to the public in the vicinity of a nuclear facility, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL C.5 Emergency arrangements of a nuclear power plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL C.6 Radiation monitoring at a nuclear facility, 15.13.2019
Guide YVL C.7 Radiological monitoring of the environment of a nuclear facility, 19.12.2016
Group D: Nuclear materials and waste
Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory control of nuclear safeguards, 24.5.2019
Guide YVL D.2 Transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste, 15.15.2019
Guide YVL D.3 Handling and storage of nuclear fuel, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.4 Predisposal management of low and intermediate level nuclear waste  
and decommissioning of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.5 Disposal of nuclear waste, 13.12.2018
Guide YVL D.6 Production of uranium and thorium, under drafting
Guide YVL D.7 Barriers and rock engineering of nuclear waste disposal facility, 13.2.2018
Group E: Structures and equipment of a nuclear facility
Guide YVL E.1 Authorised inspection body and the licensees in-house inspection organisation, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL E.2 Procurement and operation of nuclear fuel, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.3 Pressure vessels and piping of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.4 Strength analyses of nuclear power plant pressure equipment, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.5 In-service inspection of nuclear facility pressure equipment with  
non-destructive testing methods, 15.2.2019
Guide YVL E.6 Buildings and structures of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.7 Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility, 15.13.2019
Guide YVL E.8 Valves of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.9 Pumps of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.10 Emergency power supplies of a nuclear facility, 15.8.2014
Guide YVL E.11 Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.12 Testing organisations for mechanical components and structures  
of a nuclear facility, 15.3.2019
Guide YVL E.13 Ventilation and air conditioning equipment of a nuclear facility, under drafting
The guides are available on the Internet at https://www.stuklex.fi/en/yvl-ohje (in English)
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Loviisa NPP units 1 and 2 in operation
The Loviisa NPP comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors, of VVER type), operated by 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum). The plant units were connected to the electrical grid in February 8, 
1977 (Loviisa 1) and November 4, 1980 (Loviisa 2). The nominal thermal power of both units is 1500 MW 
(109% as compared to the original 1375 MW). The increase of the power level was licensed in 1998. The 
Operating Licences of the units are valid until the end of 2027 and 2030 for Loviisa 1 and 2, respectively. 
According to the conditions of the licences, two periodic safety reviews were required to be carried out 
by the licensee (by the end of the years 2015 and 2023). STUK’s assessment of the first periodic safety 
review was completed in February 2017. Based on the assessment, STUK considered that the Loviisa NPP 
meets the set safety requirements for operational nuclear power plants. The second periodic safety re-
view process has started in the end of 2018 and will be finalised before 2023. The licencee’s project also 
includes the evaluation of the possibility to continue operation beyond the current operating licence, 
but no decision on the lifetime extension has been made yet.
Most significant plant modifications at the Loviisa NPP during the plant 
lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out during Loviisa NPP plant lifetime. The most important 
projects since the plant commissioning have been modifications made for protection against fires, 
modifications based on the development of the PRA models, severe accident management programme, 
reactor power uprating, and construction of training simulator, interim storage for spent fuel and dis-
posal facility for operational radioactive waste.
Among the earliest modifications in 1982, a hydrogen removal system was installed in the contain-
ment building in order to eliminate the risk of explosion during an accident when hydrogen is released 
from the core. The system consisted of 60 glow plugs that can ignite a controlled hydrogen burn.
In 1993, strainer area in the floor sumps of the emergency cooling system and the containment spray 
system was significantly enlarged by new design, and the sump systems were improved so as to provide 
more reliable pumping of the water accumulated in the two sumps during a loss of coolant accident 
(when the emergency make-up water tank is empty) back into the reactor and to the spray nozzles. The 
sumps were equipped with several hundreds of strainer units, a nitrogen flush system to blow any insu-
lation debris off the strainers, and control instrumentation. The amount of debris the strainer system 
can cope with increased ten-fold.
In connection with the PRISE project in 1994–1995 (protection from primary to secondary leaks), the 
plant protection system was modified to provide automatic isolation of the damaged steam generator 
at high water level (the steam and feed water lines are closed), and to stop the reactor coolant pump in 
the corresponding loop. The aim was to protect the steam line from water hammer. Also new measuring 
equipment, based on the detection of nitrogen-16 isotope, was installed in the steam lines in order to 
ensure the detection of any leaks from the primary circuit.
Protection against fires at the Loviisa NPP
The possibility of fires and nuclear accident risks caused by them were not adequately taken into account 
initially in the functional design and the lay-out design of the Loviisa plant. Therefore, fire compartments 
were not implemented so that the plant safety functions could be maintained during all fire situations 
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considered possible. For this reason the significance of an active fire fighting (fire alarm and extinguishing 
systems as well as operative fire fighting) is important along with structural fire protection arrangements.
Fire safety has been improved with several measures at the Loviisa plant after its commissioning. 
These measures have been implemented in various fields of fire protection. As a result, the plant safety 
against the effects of fires has been essentially improved.
For a provision against oil fires in the turbine hall several measures have been taken. Fire insulators 
of the load-bearing steel structures of the turbine building have been installed. The turbine hall has 
been equipped with an automatic sprinkler system and the significant parts of the turbines have been 
protected. Later on, the fire wall of the turbine hall has been built up to protect components important 
to reactor decay heat removal. Furthermore, an auxiliary emergency feedwater system has been built for 
the case that both the feedwater and the emergency feedwater systems would be lost in a turbine hall fire. 
At the Loviisa NPP the decay heat removal systems are in the turbine hall. Thus, a separate building for 
additional decay heat removal system outside turbine hall was built in 2005. The new system is needed 
for cooling the plant to cold shutdown, if the normal systems are not operable.
The main transformers have been protected with a sprinkler system, which essentially reduces the 
risk of fire spreading into the surrounding buildings, especially into the turbine hall. The risk to lose the 
AC-power (station black-out) during transformer fires has been reduced by protecting the diesel genera-
tors against fires. The 110 kV net connection has been physically separated from the 400 kV connection 
so that the loss of both connections as a result of a transformer fire is improbable. Several improvements 
against fires have been done in off-site power supply arrangements and in diesel generators. The origi-
nal fire water pumps are supplied only from the off-site electrical network. Therefore, an additional fire 
water pump station has been constructed at the plant and equipped with diesel-driven fire water pumps 
and with a separate fire water tank. The fire water piping and fire extinguishing systems, as well as their 
coverage have been improved. A new addressed fire alarm system was completed in 1999 at Loviisa 1 and 
in 2001 at Loviisa 2. Several structural improvements for fire safety have also been done.
The level of the operative fire protection has been improved by establishing a plant fire fighting 
crew which is permanent, constantly ready to depart and has the proper equipment. As regards fire 
protection and fire risks also plant instructions have been complemented.
Severe Accident Management implementation at Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident management (SAM) programme was initiated in the end on 1980’s in order 
to meet the requirements of STUK. For Loviisa NPP, the SAM strategy was developed and the approach 
chosen focuses on ensuring the following top level safety functions in case of a severe accident:
• depressurisation of the reactor coolant system (RCS)
• absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen burns and steam explosions
• coolability and retention of molten core in the reactor vessel
• long term containment cooling
• ensuring subcriticality
• ensuring containment isolation.
Introducing the SAM strategy lead to a number of hardware changes at the plant as well as to new se-
vere accident guidelines and procedures.The RCS depressurisation is an action in the interface between 
the preventive and mitigation measures of the SAM strategy in the Loviisa NPP. If the emergency core 
coolant injection function is operable, the depressurisation may prevent the core melt (RCS cooling by 
feed and bleed). At the same time the mitigation actions and measures to protect the containment in-
tegrity and mitigate large releases are initiated, in case the core cooling cannot be restored. The manual 
depressurisation capability has been designed and implemented through motor-operated high capacity 
relief valves. The depressurisation capacity will be sufficient for feed & bleed operation with high-pres-
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sure pumps, and for reducing the primary pressure before the molten corium degrades the reactor vessel 
strength. Depressurisation is to be initiated from indications of superheated temperatures at the core 
exit detected by dedicated thermocouples. The depressurisation valves were installed at the same time 
with the renewal of the pressuriser safety valves in 1996.
The cornerstone of the SAM strategy for Loviisa is the coolability of corium inside the reactor pres-
sure vessel (RPV) through external cooling of the vessel. Due to in-vessel retention of molten corium all 
the ex-vessel corium phenomena such as ex-vessel steam explosions, direct containment heating and 
core-concrete interactions can be excluded. Some of the design features of the Loviisa plant make it most 
amenable for using the concept of in-vessel retention of corium by external cooling of the RPV as the 
principle means of arresting the progress of a core melt accident. Such features include the low power 
density of the core, large water volumes both in the primary and in the secondary side, no penetrations 
in the lower head of the RPV, and ice condensers which ensure a passively flooded cavity in most severe 
accident scenarios. On the other hand, if in-vessel retention was not attempted, showing resistance to 
energetic steam generation and coolability of corium in the reactor cavity could be laborious for Lovi-
isa NPP, because of the narrow, water filled cavity with small floor area and tight venting paths for the 
steam out of the cavity.
An extensive research programme regarding the thermal aspects was carried out by the licensee. 
The work included both experimental and analytical studies on heat transfer in a molten pool with 
volumetric heat generation and on heat transfer and flow behaviour at the RPV outer surface. Based on 
experiments, the in-vessel retention concept for Loviisa was finalised. STUK approved the conceptual 
design in December 1995. The modifications were completed in 2002. The most laborious one of them 
was the modification of the RPV lower head thermal shield such that it can be lowered down in case of 
an accident to allow a free passage of water in contact with the RPV bottom. Also a strainer structure 
was constructed in the reactor cavity in order to screen possible impurities from the coolant flow and 
thereby prevent clogging of the narrow flow paths around the RPV.
Due to in-vessel retention of molten corium, the only real concern regarding potential energetic 
phenomena is due to hydrogen combustion events. The Loviisa NPP reactors are equipped with ice-con-
denser containments, which are relatively large in size (comparable to the volume of typical large dry 
containments) but have a low design pressure of 0.17 MPa. The ultimate failure pressure has been esti-
mated to be well above 0.3 MPa. An intermediate deck divides the containment in the upper (UC) and 
lower compartments (LC). All the nuclear steam supply system components are located in the lower 
compartment and, therefore, any release of hydrogen would be directed into the lower compartment. In 
order to reach the upper compartment, which is significantly larger in volume, the hydrogen and steam 
have to pass through the ice-condensers.
In the 1990’s an extensive research programme was carried out by the licensee to assess the reliability 
and adequacy of the existing igniters system. The experiments and the related numerical calculations 
demonstrated that the global convective loop around the containment for ensuring well mixed condi-
tions will be created and maintained reliably provided that the ice-condenser doors will stay open. A 
new hydrogen management strategy for Loviisa was formulated which concentrates on two functions: 
ensuring air recirculation flow paths to establish a well-mixed atmosphere (opening of ice condenser 
doors) and effective recombination and/or controlled ignition of hydrogen. Plant modifications includ-
ed installation of autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners, modifications in the igniters system (igniters 
were removed from the upper compartment and the system in the lower compartment was modified 
and rearranged) and a dedicated system for opening the ice-condenser doors. The modifications were 
completed in 2003.
The studies on prevention of long term overpressurisation of the containment showed that the 
concept of filtered venting was not possible at the Loviisa NPP because the capability of the steel liner 
containment to resist subatmospheric pressures is poor. Therefore, an external spray system was designed 
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to remove the heat from the containment in a severe accident when other means of decay heat removal 
from the containment are not operable. Due to the ice condenser containment, the time delay from the 
onset of the accident to the start of the external spray system is long (18–36 hours). Thus the required 
heat removal capacity is also low, only 3 MW (a fraction of decay power is still absorbed by thick concrete 
walls). The system is started manually when the containment pressure reaches the design pressure of 
0.17 MPa. Autonomous operation of the system independently from plant emergency diesels is ensured 
with dedicated local diesel generators. The active parts of the system are independent from all other 
containment decay heat removal systems. The containment external spray system was implemented 
in 1990 and 1991.
Maintaining the containment integrity ensures that the environemental releases through possible 
small leakages remain low. To support the containment leaktightness the seals of the large hatches were 
replaced with the material capable of withstanding the conditions during severe accidents. Furthermore, 
production of gaseous iodine compounds is evaluated to remain low due to high pH of the sump water. 
As the ice in the ice-condensers contain large amount of borax, the sump water pH remains well above 
7 during severe accident despite of possible cable fires and radiolysis procuding hydrochloric acid and 
nitric acid, respectively.
The SAM strategy implementation included also a new, dedicated, limited scope instrumentation 
and control system for the SAM systems, a dedicated AC-power system and a separate SAM control room 
which is common to both units and to be used in case the main control room has to be abandoned during 
a severe accident. These were implemented mainly in year 2000 for Loviisa 1 and in 2002 for Loviisa 2.
In addition to the hardware modifications, severe accidents guidance for the operating personnel 
has been implemented. It consists of SAM procedures for the operators and of a so-called Severe Accident 
Handbook for the Technical Support Team. The SAM procedures are started after a prolonged uncover 
of the reactor core indicated by highly superheated core exit temperatures. The procedures are symptom 
oriented and their main objective is the protection of containment integrity through ensuring the top 
level severe accident safety functions.
Modernisation and power uprating of Loviisa NPP in 1994–1997
The key aspects in the project for the modernisation and power uprating of the reactor units of the Lovi-
isa NPP were to verify the plant safety, to improve production capacity and to give a good basis for the 
extension of the plant’s lifetime to 50 years, which corresponds to the additional 20 years of operation 
applied for both units of the Loviisa NPP in 2006.
The reactor thermal power uprating from 1375 MW to 1500 MW was planned on the basis of opti-
mising the need for major plant modifications. In the primary side and the sea water cooling system, 
the mass flow rates were not affected, but the temperature difference has been increased in proportion 
to the power upgrading. In the turbine side, the live steam and the feedwater flow rate were increased 
by about 10%; the live steam pressure was not changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the basis of the previous limits set for the maximum fuel 
linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase in the reactor thermal output was carried out by optimising 
the power distribution in the core and the power of any single fuel bundle was not increased above the 
maximum level before power upgrading. In parallel with this work, more advanced options related to 
the mixing rate of the cooling water in the fuel subchannels and the increasing of fuel enrichment were 
investigated. The dummy elements installed on the periphery of the core at the Loviisa units 1 and 2 
were preserved to minimise irradiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the primary side are rather large and the hardware modifications 
needed there were quite limited. Replacement of the pressuriser safety valves was indicated already 
during the feasibility study as a necessary measure because of the power upgrading. Most of the other 
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substantial measures in the primary side were carried out on the basis of the continuing effort to main-
tain and raise the safety level of the plant, and they were not directly included in the power upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive measures in the turbine plant and to the electrical 
components. Steam turbines were modified to a higher steam flow rate. Because of these measures, also 
the efficiency and operation reliability have improved. Certain modifications were carried out in the 
electrical generators and the main transformers to ensure reliability in continuous operation with the 
upgraded power output.
The implementation of the modernisation project was carried out in co-operation between Loviisa 
NPP and the Fortum Group's own nuclear engineering company. Due to the small number of plant mod-
ifications required for the power increase of the Loviisa plant, a simple trial test programme supported 
by the simulator studies was considered as appropriate and acceptable.
Transient tests defined in the test programme were performed with a reactor thermal power of 105% 
and 109%. The last transient test at final reactor power 109% was completed successfully in December 
1997. The test results corresponded very well with all analyses and calculations. All the acceptance cri-
teria for the tests were fulfilled. Measures to improve the efficiency of the steam turbines continued in 
the annual maintenance outages until the year 2002.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of the project, from the early planning of the concept to 
the evaluation of the results from the test runs. STUK examined all the modification plans that might 
be expected to have an impact on plant safety. Individual permits were granted stage by stage, based on 
the successful implementation of previous work.
The renewal of the operating licence for the increased reactor power was carried out according to 
the nuclear safety legislation. First the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (former Ministry 
of Trade and Industry) gave a permission to make plant modifications and test runs with upgraded re-
actor power under the existing operating licence and under the control of STUK. Then the assessment 
of the environmental impact (EIA-procedure) of the project was carried out. STUK approved the Final 
Safety Analyses Report (FSAR), the safety-related plant modifications, and the test programmes and the 
results. Finally the Government granted the renewed operating licence in April 1998. The licence was 
awarded to 1500 MW nominal reactor thermal power until the end of the year 2007.
The revision of emergency operating procedures (2000–2005)
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa nuclear power plant were revised in the so called HOKE 
project, launched in 2000. The project encompassed the drawing up of diagnosis procedures for tran-
sients and emergencies arising from primary and secondary leaks, procedures for operators and the 
safety engineer as well as action sheets for onsite measures.
In accordance with the new procedures, nuclear power plant operators follow their own separate 
procedures and initiate the necessary actions in their fields of responsibility in the event of an emer-
gency or a transient. The shift manager co-ordinates these actions and reviews the main actions and 
parameters using his own procedures. The safety engineer in parallel with the operators independently 
oversees safety functions using separate procedures to ensure that plant behaviour is as planned.
The revised procedures consist of guidelines and instructions presented as flow charts. The guide-
lines define strategy and give grounds for operator actions during emergencies and transients. It serves 
as a basis for actual control room procedures containing operator procedures. The guidelines are used 
for training purposes as well.
The validation and verification of the procedures and their background material ascertains authentic-
ity of the procedures i.a. by comparison with the plant and by simulator tests. Verification authenticates 
i.a. correlation and functioning of the new procedures with other plant procedures. The project included 
training given to the control room personnel of the Loviisa plant in the use of the new procedures. Due 
to the revision’s significance STUK required that shift supervisors and operators working in the control 
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room have given shift-specific proof of workmanship prior to the introduction into use of the revised 
procedures.
In December 2005, STUK authorised the introduction into service of the revised emergency oper-
ating procedures.
Examples of latest plant modifications at the Loviisa NPP (2016–2018)
I&C renewal project at Loviisa NPP
A project for the Loviisa NPP I&C renewal, ELSA, was launched in June 2014. The ELSA project modernise 
a large part of the I&C system of the plant, switching it to a digital equipment platform. The delivery 
contract had been made with the Rolls-Royce. The installation of the the first stage of the renewal was 
in 2016. In its first phase, the control and indication system of preventive safety functions and the I&C 
status monitoring system were renewed for both plant units. The second phase covering manual back-up 
and the extension of monitoring system was installed in both units during the 2017 annual outage. The 
preliminary installations for the third phase were also done at that time. The safety I&C, the element 
which is most important for the safety of the I&C reform, was installed during the 2018 annual outages 
in Loviisa unit 1 and 2.
Preliminary planning of the renewal project started several years ago and in the beginning of 2005 
the licensee signed the delivery contract with the consortium of Framatome and Siemens. New buildings 
at the plant site were constructed to accommodate the main equipment of the safety and operational 
I&C. The first phase of this LARA project included e.g. the renewal of the reactor preventive protection 
I&C and was implemented in the outage 2008 at Loviisa unit 1 and at Loviisa unit 2 in the outage 2009. 
The change of the supplier was made before the second phase of the LARA project including the renewal 
of the reactor protection system.
The scope of the ELSA renewal was not as extensive as it was at the LARA project. The assessment 
concerning the scope change impacts for safety relevant functions and other modernisation projects was 
made as a part of the periodic safety review in 2015. And after starting ELSA project installations Fortum 
has launched many smaller automation projects to cover the final scope of the needed renewal as a part 
of aging management. One example is the modernization of the automation of the four emergency die-
selgenerators (preliminary plan is to renew all Loviisa unit 1 EDG’s automation, but not Loviisa unit 2). 
The modernisation of secondary circuit safety functions
In connection with the I&C renewal protection of the control rooms from any leaks at the feedwater 
tank level above control room level were completed at the outages in 2018. It has been long term project 
where the safety functions are based on the mechanical protections and functional and physical sepa-
ration of the redundancies.
Installations in previous years/ unit:
• additional emergency supports and jet shields for steam pipelines were installed for main steam 
lines in 2008
• additional emergency feedwater supply lines were installed for two remaining steam generators 
(now every steam generator has the suply instead of 4/6) in 2010
• installation of minimum flow lines for residual heat remowal pumps in 2008
• modification of the one main feedwater pump (minimum flow, cooling of pump and motor) in 
2009 to be available as reserve pump similarly as emergency feedwater pump during plant start-
up and shutdown 
• fast acting isolation valve of the main steam collector installation (to form two separate groups 
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when steam collector pressure < 35 bar, three steam generators in each) in 2008. Also the main 
feed water collector was equipped with two isolation valves using same protection signal to 
enable the main feed water suply to the three intact steam generators, if the others are lost due 
to a leak.
• installation of the water-steam qualified main steam safety valves (1/each steam generators) in 
2014 and 2016
• wide range water level measurement of the steam generator.
In 2018 the finalization of the project covered:
• renewal of the protective signals (main steam & feedwater separation/isolation and stop of the 
primary circulation pumps)
• installation of new minimum flow lines for the emergency feedwater pumps and change of the 
emergency feedwater supply (supply only from the emergency feed water tank)
• better separation of the feed water collector lines
• new bypass pipe lines for the main feed water to be used in the start-up and shutdown.
Examples of latest incidents at the Loviisa NPP (2016–2018)
Fall of a fresh fuel assembly in the fuel transfer pool of Loviisa 2 on 28 February 2017  
(IRS-report 8747)
On February 28, 2017, fresh nuclear fuel assembly was accidentally dropped ca. three meters from the 
fuel transfer machine into the fuel transfer basket in a pit of the Loviisa 2 reactor hall. The incident 
occurred while fresh fuel assemblies were being transferred under water from the storage pool to the 
refueling pool. When the fuel transfer machine operators were trying to lay down one of the fresh fuel 
assemblies on the refueling pool, the assembly inadvertently got stuck on the gripper. The operators 
noted an indication lighting signaling “no gripping”, but they failed to check the reading of the fuel 
transfer machine scale, which was still indicating attachment of the assembly. When they were picking 
up the next fuel assembly, they observed that the previous assembly was still stuck on the gripper. The 
operators decided to transfer the fuel assembly to its original position but when they lowered the as-
sembly towards the fuel transfer basket, it fell off from the gripper.
The incident was reported to the supervisor of the fuel transfer work who contacted a reactor 
engineer who further contacted the responsible manager who convened a operative decision-making 
meeting to decide on the procedures. The main control room was also informed about the incident and 
the operating shift went through specifications for the fuel handling incident. Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) and the head of the division were also informed about the incident. The fuel 
transfer operation was stopped to determine the corrective procedures and the reasons for the incident. 
Fortum carried out extensive inspections of the fuel, transfer basket and refueling machine.
A camera inspection showed that the lower end of the fallen fuel assembly was deformed and there 
were deflections at the supporting structure of the fuel transfer basket’s floor structure. There were 
scratches and burrs on the point of attachment at the upper end of the fuel assembly but according the 
safety assessment it was still safe to handle.
A burr on the gripper of the fuel transfer machine was evaluated as the direct cause for the incident. 
Because of the burr the fuel assembly got stuck in the gripper although a main mast was rotated to the 
release angle and the gripper was open.
The event was rated as an INES category 1 event. The event did not compromise nuclear or radiation 
safety, but it did reveal obvious deficiencies in the power company’s activities and in the condition of 
the refueling machine.
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As this was fresh fuel, there was no radiation hazard, but as similar transfers are also carried out 
for spent fuel, the event was significant. Similar mistakes had been made in fuel handling at the Loviisa 
NPP in recent years. Due to the situation, STUK sent a request to Fortum, stating that Fortum can only 
continue fuel transfers after STUK has assessed the rectifying actions proposed by Fortum as sufficient 
for preventing similar events.
The inspections and necessary immediate rectifying actions specified by Fortum were acceptably 
completed, and the personnel were provided with additional training before the operations could con-
tinue with STUK’s permission on 18 April 2017. In addition, STUK carried out an operational control 
inspection regarding refuelling activities in the summer for ensuring that the long-term development 
actions promised by Fortum have progressed and monitored the activities during annual outage.
On the basis of processing and investigating the matter, it is obvious that Fortum has significantly 
reformed its refuelling methods. The refuelling machine modernisation project has been progressed. 
The organisational change related to reforming the refuelling activities entered into force from the be-
ginning of 2018. STUK was monitoring the effects of Fortum’s organisational change in its inspection in 
2018 ensuring through its other oversight activities that the refuelling machine modernisation project 
advances and the lessons of the event were taken into account in the activities.
Furthermore, STUK carried out its own internal investigation regarding its activities concerning the 
event in order to develop its activities during the next strategy period. The investigation was complet-
ed at the end of 2017 and resulted in recommendations regarding the oversight of transfer and lifting 
equipment as well as regarding the oversight processes of STUK in general.
Physical and electrical separation of the non-safety classified automation system in March 2018
Loviisa has planned to renew the process computer system in the 2019 outages. In March 2018, STUK was 
at the site walkdown related to the non-classified process computer renewal and detected that the sepa-
ration of this automation system was not adequate: the process computer automation cabins included 
some safety classified and non-classified signals wired from both redundancies without the electrical 
separation. In case of fire, this could cause malfunctioning of the both non-safety and safety systems.
The principles of signal routing to the process computer is originally 70’s design. Physical separation 
rules were not followed in original installation and the supplier of the process computer system was 
probably not aware about the physical separation need of incoming signals; electrical isolation were 
installed in computer cabinets in some cases.
STUK immediately required licensee to analyze and report the possible signal error types and effects 
of the possible fire to the plant. This analysis covered the design and the separation of the 6300 signals, 
effects of the possible malfunctions to the safe shutdown of the plant in case of fire event and the PRA.
Conclusion of the analysis was that there are no effects to the reactor protection system, plant 
protection system or severe accident management system and no effects to reach the controlled state, 
but safe shutdown state might need local and manual operations (at the switch gears). One example of 
the results of the assessment was that fire and errorneous control signals can result in a limited small 
LOCA (via pressurizer relief valve, when pressure > 6 bar) but plant can handle the situation by using 
local and switching station controls. A very conservative calculation of the increase of the risk gave the 
result of 710–8/a (= 0,6 % of Loviisa 1 annual core damage frequency).
Improvements for the fire protection arrangements concerning the case were done immediately 
and the operation procedures for safe shutdown were updated during 2018.
Based on the analyses and actions taken STUK approved that there is no need for modifying the 
signals before 2019 outages. The safety significant modifications can be made in the 2019 outages in 
connection with the modernization project of the process computer system. Rest of the signals will be 
repaired separately during 2020 and 2021.
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Periodic safety reviews at the Loviisa NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out by the licensee 
and independently by STUK in connection to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear power plant 
units. The safety documentation, including safety assessments done by the licensee, was submitted 
to STUK at the end of 1996. In addition to the review of the licensing documents such as Final Safety 
Analysis Report, STUK also made an independent safety assessment. The statement of STUK was given 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (former Ministry of Trade and Industry) in March 
1998. As regards radiation and nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the statement were that the con-
ditions of the Finnish nuclear energy legislation are complied with.
The relicensing of the operation of the plant took place in 2005–2007. The operating licence ap-
plication was addressed to the Government and was handled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment. Fortum filed the application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in 
November 2006. Legislative and regulative requirements for the application of the operating licence are 
described in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) Sections 33, 34, 36 and in the Guide YVL 1.1 (currently 
in YVL A.1).
The Loviisa plant was reaching its original design age in 2007–2010, but the technical and econom-
ical lifetime of the plant is estimated to be at least 50 years according to the current knowledge of the 
plant ageing. Due to consistent plant improvements, the safety level of the plant has been increased as 
shown by the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
Based on the application, STUK carried out a comprehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 when STUK provided the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment with its statement on the safety of the plant. The Finnish Government granted in July 2007 
to Fortum new licences for unit 1 until the end of 2027 and for unit 2 until the end of 2030. The length 
of the operating licences corresponds to the current goal for the plant’s lifetime, which is 50 years. Two 
periodic safety reviews (by the end of the year 2015 and 2023) carried out by the licensee was set as a 
licence condition according the Nuclear Energy Act (11.12.1987/990) Section 24.
The first periodic safety review in the current licence period was carried out 2013-2016, where the 
evaluation of the documents was performed by STUK 2015–2016. Fortum sent to STUK for approval 
the periodic safety review related documents 2014–2015. These documents include e.g. summary of the 
most significant changes to the licensing documents, report on fulfilment of the requirements given 
in Government Decrees and Nuclear Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides), summary of the renewed safety 
analyses and conclusions drawn from these results, descriptions of safety and management culture 
and how operating experience feedback and R&D results are utilized to improve safety. Based on the 
assessment, STUK considered that the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant meets the set safety requirements 
for operational nuclear power plants. Key issues in assessment were ageing management, organisational 
issues and deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses and the status of safety improvements. The 
implementation of the revised regulatory YVL Guide requirements was carried out during 2015 as a sep-
arate project. Hence, there was no need in PSR to go through all the modified regulatory requirements 
in detail as the decisions of implementation were just referenced in the PSR.
The design basis of the Loviisa NPP has been laid down during the 1970s. However, substantial 
modernisations have been carried out at the Loviisa NPP since its commissioning to improve safety. 
Risk factors have been systematically identified and eliminated using operating experience, research 
and development and probabilistic risk analysis. Fortum has also many ongoing projects for enhancing 
safety and reducing the accident risk. This is in line with the principle of continuous improvement of 
safety provided in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act. The recent risk reducing modifications are con-
nected to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident: including improvements to the plant residual heat removal, 
protections against the flooding and 72 hours operability for safety systems.
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Others are for example the improvements aiming at reducing the risk arising from heavy load lift-
ing with the structural reliability of the polar crane and developing the procedures relating to lifting. 
The polar crane project was established already after the operating licence renewal in 2007, but it was 
delayed. The installation and commission of the new polar crane has been done for Loviisa unit 2 in 
2018 before the outages and will be carried out before outages 2019 for Loviisa unit 1. At shutdown the 
most significant initiating events are drop of heavy loads.
As a part of the ageing management, the safety of the reactor pressure vessel was assessed in the 
periodic safety review. Fortum stated during the last operating licence renewal process that the brittle 
fracture risk can be managed until the end of the 50 years plant lifetime. The primary circuits of both 
Loviisa plant units are still in good condition. STUK has had some concerns about the embrittlement 
margins of LO2 reactor pressure vessel before the expected end of life in 2030. Related to PSR 2015 as-
sessment Fortum sent at the end 2016 to STUK for information the documents concerning the actions 
to increase the embrittlement margins of Loviisa unit 2 reactor pressure vessel in the future. The most 
limiting case concerning the embrittlement margins is an inadvertent start of containment spraying 
(cooled water) so the main action by Fortum will be to change the water temperature at the start of 
spraying. The modification of the cooling water temperature has planned to be implemented in 2019 
outages for both Loviisa units.
As a summary of the review of the issues and documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK noted that the prerequisites for safe operation of 
Loviisa NPP have been met.
The second periodic safety review process has already started by Fortum in the end of 2018 and will 
be finalysed before 2023. The licencee’s project includes also the possibility to apply for a new operating 
licence with life time extension but no decisions has been made yet.
Planned and ongoing activities to improve safety at the Loviisa NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and enhancement approach is presented in the nuclear 
legislation. Actions for safety enhancement are to be taken whenever they can be regarded as justified, 
considering operating experience, the results of safety research and the advancement of science and 
technology. The implementation of safety improvements has been a continuing process at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plants since its commissioning and there exists no urgent need to upgrade the safety of 
this plant in the context of the Convention.
The nuclear safety at the Loviisa NPP is maintained and further improved by necessary renewal 
activities and backfitting measures. The largest ongoing investment is the complete renewal of the plant 
I&C system. Also some improvement measures based on the lessons learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident will be finalised in 2019.
Safety assessments and improvements based on the lessons learnt  
from TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Based on the results of assessments conducted after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident on 11 March 
2011, it is concluded that no such hazards or deficiencies have been found as would require immediate 
actions at the Loviisa NPP. However, the areas where safety can be further enhanced have been identified 
and plans were made on how to address these areas. Main changes aimed at decreasing the dependency 
on plant’s normal electricity supply and distribution systems as well as on the sea water cooled systems 
for residual heat removal from the reactor, containment and spent fuel pools. There have also been 
measures to improve protection against external flooding.
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Natural hazards
The renewed regulations and YVL Guides published in 2013 include updated requirements on provisions 
for external hazards, including, e.g., earthquakes, high sea water level, harsh weather conditions and 
hazards related to transport and industrial activities. For the operating units the fulfilment of the new 
requirements was evaluated separately and new Guides were implemented in 2015.
According to the PRA results, the risk caused to the operating units by external events is a relatively 
small fraction of the total risk. However, there are areas where possibilities for further risk reduction 
exist, for example improving the protection against high seawater level.
Safety margins were assessed by the licensee and reviewed by STUK. Based on the results, STUK 
required further clarifications on the following main points:
• seismic resistance of spent fuel pools including situations with water temperature exceeding the 
design bases;
• seismic resistance of fire fighting systems; and
• plans for improving flooding margin for the Loviisa plant by end of 2013.
Seawater level variations in the Baltic Sea are moderate. Due to geological conditions and the shallow 
water strong tsunami type phenomena are not considered possible in the Baltic Sea. At the Loviisa 
NPP, the observed maximum seawater level is +1.77 m above the mean sea level (N60 reference system). 
The design basis of the Loviisa NPP is about +3.0 m during power operation and about +2.1 m during 
refuelling shutdown. Based of extreme value distribution fitting, the annual probability of exceeding 
the level +3 m is about 4∙10-7. The refuelling shutdowns are scheduled for summer and early autumn 
when the seawater level is relatively low and variations are small. The design basis of the Loviisa NPP 
was considered sufficient in the short term. Although the estimated annual probability of exceeding 
the design value is very small, the consequences of flooding of the basement of the Loviisa NPP would 
be severe, as all cooling systems might be lost. Therefore, to ensure safe operation in the long term, the 
possibilities for decreasing the risk of seawater flooding had to be examined.
Loviisa NPP improved in 2012 flood protection during certain annual shutdown states with open 
hatches in the condenser cooling seawater system; the design water level was increased in stages first 
from +2.1 m to +2.45 m and further to +2.95 m. The last modications of the hatches were implemented 
in 2018 outages.
The licensee was required to submit plans to improve protection against external flooding by the 
end of 2013. The licensee examined site area protection with leeves and protected volume approach and 
also their combination to improve of the flooding resistance of the Loviisa plant. The work turned out to 
be more challenging than originally estimated. The utility estimated the effects of high sea level to the 
plant behaviour. The decisions made were based on updated flooding hazard estimates contracted from 
the Finnish Meteorological Institute. The utility submitted a detailed plan of improved flood protection 
in 2015. The plan was based on strengthening of flood protection of the buildings most important to 
safety (the auxiliary emergency feedwater and auxiliary residual heat removal buildings. Due the plan, 
the flood protection of the buildings most important to safety has been strengthend (the auxiliary 
emergency feedwater and auxiliary residual heat removal buildings). In addition, means to cope with 
extensive loss of electrical systems are being implemented. The implementation of the new means and 
related instructions will be completed in 2019.
Design issues
At the Loviisa NPP, the systems needed for residual heat removal from the reactor, containment and 
fuel pools require external power and the ultimate heat sink is the sea. A reliable supply of electrical 
power to the systems providing for basic safety functions at the Loviisa NPP is ensured by the Defence-
in-Depth concept. As a result of multiple and diversified electrical power sources at different levels, 
126 STUK-B 237 / JUly 2019
LOVIISA NPP UNITS 1 AND 2 UNDER OPERATION ANNEX 2
the probability of loss of all electrical supply systems is considered very low. However, as a result of the 
studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, further changes were implemented. Main 
changes implemented are decreasing the dependency on plant’s normal electricity supply and distri-
bution systems as well as on the sea water cooled systems for residual heat removal from the reactor, 
containment and spent fuel pools.
At the Loviisa NPP, the availability of an alternate heat sink depends on the plant state and feed 
water availability. If primary circuit can be pressurised (i.e. reactor vessel head is in place), atmosphere 
can be used as an alternate heat sink as long as there is enough water available for dumping steam into 
atmosphere from the secondary circuit. There is a separated diesel driven auxiliary emergency feed water 
system with two pumps which feed water to the steam generators in case of loss of AC power. It is also 
possible to transfer heat to spent fuel cooling system and hence to intermediate cooling system, giving 
time for restoring ultimate heat sink.
In addition, the licensee has evaluated measures needed to secure the availability of the auxiliary 
emergency feedwater system in the case of loss of electrical power, water supply for the diesel driven 
auxiliary emergency feed water pumps, and electricity supply for instrumentation needed in accidents. 
The modifications were realised during 2012 and 2013, with the exception of improving the instrumen-
tation by 2016.
The licensee at the Loviisa NPP has completed also the modification to ensure the long-term decay 
heat removal in case of loss of seawater by implementing an alternative ultimate heat sink. The modifi-
cation consists of two air-cooled cooling units per plant unit powered by an air-cooled diesel-generator. 
The other cooling unit would remove decay heat from the reactor and the other one ensures the decay 
heat removal from the spent fuel pool inside the containment and from the separate spent fuel interim 
storage pools. The cooling unit is connected to the intermediate cooling circuit, and it backs up the sea-
water cooled heat exchangers. The cooling units for the reactors are dimensioned to be able to remove 
the decay heat after 72 h, and until then the heat removal can be carried out by steam dumping into the 
atmosphere from the steam generator secondary side. The modifications create a possibility to closed-
loop operation also in case of loss of ultimate heat sink. The cooling units were installed in 2014–2015. 
The commissioning of the system was performed during the outages in 2015.
At the Loviisa NPP, the current AC power supply systems include connections to 400 kV and 110 
kV power grids, main generator (house load operation), four emergency diesel generators per unit, a 
diverse diesel power plant and a dedicated connection to a nearby hydropower plant, two SAM diesel 
generators, and the possibility to supply electricity from the neighbouring NPP unit. No modifications 
are planned to the current design concerning AC power supply.
At the Loviisa NPP, there is enough diesel fuel in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) tanks for 
at least 72 h of operation, and with realistic loads in case of an accident, the duration is evaluated to be 
twice as long. Currently the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) at the Loviisa NPPs use conventional 
diesel fuel, which is available only in limited scope. An investigation of replacing conventional diesel 
with widely available biodiesel was performed by the licensee and the diesel engine manufacturer. Based 
on the investigations biodiesel is allowed to use in exceptional circumstances. In 2012, the licensee of the 
Loviisa NPP purchased a container to transfer diesel fuel at the site. The purpose of this container was 
to make fuel transfer between the tanks on-site easier and faster. In addition, to improve the delivery of 
the fuel and to ensure the 72 h operation, the licensee has built during 2015–2016 a new fuel line from 
the new air-cooled diesel power plant fuel storage tank to the emergency diesel customers (emergency 
diesel fuel storage tank, diesel driven auxiliary emergency feed water pumps daily tank) and made a new 
extra storage tank for SAM diesels.
At the Loviisa NPP, the depletion times of some DC batteries are considered to be rather short. 
The duration of DC power supply has been considered to be enhanced. Especially the reactor coolant 
pump seal water system functionality must be ensured. The licensee submitted a plan regarding these 
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improvements to STUK at the end of 2012. The depletion time of the batteries was 15…30 minutes. In 
the implementation of the new YVL guidelines the requirement of the two-hour discharge time for all 
battery sets supplying loads important to safety and the 24-hour discharge time for the battery sets 
supplying severe accident management systems was set. The batteries important to safety depletion 
time was lengthened by the licencee in 2014–2018 and the renewal of the SAM batteries is planned to 
be implemented by the end of 2019.
It is possible to charge the batteries using the AC power sources. The licensee installed two new 
separate underground cables from the new diesel power plant to the 6.3 kV diesel busbar in 2012–2013, 
which will furthermore ensure and enhance battery charging possibilities.
Regarding spent fuel pools, the approach in Finland is to “practically eliminate” the possibility of 
fuel damage. The licensee have evaluated alternative means of decay heat removal from fuel pools in 
case of loss of existing systems, and to supply coolant to fuel pools (including potential need for new 
instrumentation). There has been done further analysis before starting the detailed design work. The 
more detailed analysis was performed in 2013. STUK has approved in 2015 the design plans concerning 
the installation of diverse water supply to the spent fuel pools. The plant modifications will be complet-
ed by 2019. Furthermore, the licensee will improve Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and SAM 
Guidelines to support heat removal from spent fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying additional water 
to the pools. Licensee has also studied the seismic resistance of the spent fuel storage pools as well as 
the influence of pool water boiling to the pool structures.
Severe accident management
A comprehensive severe accident management (SAM) strategy has been developed and implemented 
at Loviisa 1&2 plant units during 1990’s after the accidents in TMI and Chernobyl (see above). These 
strategies are based on ensuring the containment integrity which is required in the existing national 
regulations. STUK has reviewed these strategies and has made inspections in all stages of implementation.
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major changes 
at the plants are considered necessary. However, the licensee is required to consider spent fuel pools in 
the SAM procedures as well as any implications on them possibly arising from simultaneous multi unit 
accidents. In addition, there are many actions related to the update of the emergency plans. The update 
of the emergency plans and SAM procedures will be completed in 2019.
At the Loviisa NPP, the design basis for all SAM safety functions is that the actions can be done, 
when the other supplies have been lost, with dedicated independent SAM electrical systems and dedicat-
ed independent SAM I&C from SAM control room or main control room. The SAM strategies and their 
implementation at the Loviisa NPP follow the requirements set in the Government Decree 733/2008 (in 
force at the time) and the YVL Guides. The approach and the plant modifications have been approved by 
STUK. Since the systems for management and mitigation of severe accidents have already been imple-
mented at Loviisa operating units and the corresponding procedures are in place, no further measures 
for this purpose are foreseen at the moment. However, the soundness and adequacy of the accident 
management schemes is being constantly assessed against the latest knowledge and experience obtained 
from different international sources.
At the Loviisa NPP, immediate SAM actions are carried out within the Emergency Operation Pro-
cedures (EOPs). After carrying out immediate actions successfully, the operators concentrate on mon-
itoring the SAM safety functions with the SAM procedures. The SAM procedures focus on monitoring 
the leaktightness of the containment barrier, and on the long-term issues. At the Loviisa NPP, licensee 
will improve EOPs and SAM procedures to support heat removal from spent fuel pools by pool boiling 
and supplying additional water to the pools. New EOPs for shutdown states, which cover the immediate 
recovery of SAM systems, have been developed in 2012.
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Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 
in operation
The Olkiluoto plant comprises of two BWR units that are operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). 
The plant units were connected to the electrical network in September 2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) and February 
18, 1980 (Olkiluoto 2). The present nominal thermal power of both Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW, which 
was licensed in 1998. The new power level is 115.7% as compared to the earlier nominal power 2160 MW 
licensed in 1983. The original power level of both units was 2000 MW. The Operating Licences of the 
units are valid until the end of 2038. According to the conditions of the licences, the licensee carried 
out a periodic safety review and submitted it to the regulator at the end of 2028.
Most significant plant modifications at the Olkiluoto NPP  
during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out during Olkiluoto NPP plant lifetime. The most important 
projects since the plant commissioning have been two reactor upratings, severe accident management 
programme, modifications based on the development of the PRA models, construction of training 
simulator, interim storage for spent fuel and disposal facility for operational waste, and investigation 
programme for disposal of spent fuel. The first power uprating project was carried out in 1983–1984. 
Thermal power was uprated from 2000 MW to 2160 MW (8%). The plant modifications included for 
example a new relief valve that was installed in the reactor primary system, changes in the reactor pro-
tection system, and increase of cooling capacity of some heat exchangers.
Severe Accident Management implementation at the Olkiluoto NPP
Several new research programmes were launched in the beginning of 1980’s, whose objective was both 
to clarify the character and magnitude of loads arising from a severe accident and to find means for 
controlling the loads on the containment. The main provisions for severe accident management were 
installed at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 during the SAM project which was completed in 1989. The meas-
ures implemented were
• containment overpressure protection
• containment filtered venting
• lower drywell flooding from wetwell
• containment penetration shielding in lower drywell
• containment water filling from external source
• containment instrumentation for severe accident control
• Emergency Operating Procedures for severe accidents.
The means for managing severe accidents had to be adjusted to the existing design, and so an optimal 
implementation of all chosen solutions was not possible. Subsequent development of the accident 
management procedures and additional minor plant modifications at Olkiluoto plant have taken place 
during the years after that when new aspects on the issue have emerged. Hydrogen burns are prevented 
by inerting the containment atmosphere by nitrogen, which is an original design feature of Olkiluoto 
1 and 2.
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To secure depressurisation of the reactor primary system in severe accident situations and to prevent 
a new pressurisation of the reactor, two valves of the relief system were modified. It is now possible to 
keep the valves open with the help of nitrogen supply or water supply from outside the containment.
One of the most significant deficiencies at the Olkiluoto plant containments, from the standpoint of 
controlling severe accidents, has been the small size of the containment, which may cause the contain-
ment to pressurise due to the hydrogen and steam generation during an accident (common feature for 
BWRs). Another deficiency is the location of the reactor pressure vessel inside the containment, which 
is such that the core melt erupting from the pressure vessel may expose the structures and penetrations 
which ensure the tightness of the containment, to pressure loads and thermal stresses. To eliminate these 
deficiencies, the containment was e.g. provided with a filtered venting system. Gases that pressurise the 
containment can be removed through a filter designed for the purpose, if the pressure inside the con-
tainment threatens to increase too much. The part of the containment underneath the reactor pressure 
vessel can be flooded with water in order to protect the containment bottom and penetrations from the 
thermal effect of core melt. Some penetrations of the containment have been protected from the direct 
effect of core melt also by structural means. To ensure the cooling of reactor debris, the plant units are 
also provided with a water filling system, by the means of which the water level inside the containment 
can be raised all the way to the same level with the upper edge of the reactor core.
The cooling of reactor core melt and the protection of containment penetrations requires that the 
lower dry well of the containment is flooded at such an early stage of the accident that if the pressure 
vessel melts through, the erupting core melt falls into a deep water pool. When the core melt falls into 
the water a so-called steam explosion, which causes a strong and quickly propagating pressure wave in 
the water pool, may occur. A lot of research has been done on steam explosions. The results show that 
the core melt discharged through the pressure vessel cools down as it travels through the water pool 
and cannot create a steam explosion. However, the structures of the lower equipment hatch have been 
enforced to decrease the risk for loss of containment integrity due to loads caused by limited steam 
explosions.
Research results have demonstrated that in unfavourable conditions iodine may form organic 
compounds that are not easily absorbed in the containment or in the filter. Such conditions may occur 
at the Olkiluoto plant, if the water inside the containment is acidified due to chemicals released during 
the accident. Organic iodine may also be generated in the primary circuit, if iodine reacts with the hy-
drocarbons that are released, when the boron carbide contained in the control rods becomes oxidised 
during the core damage. To improve the possibilities for retaining organic iodine in the filtered venting 
system, chemicals have been added to the water in the scrubber tank of the system. To minimise the 
formation of organic iodine, it is also possible to control the pH of the containment water volume by 
a specific system. The function of the system is based on addition of NaOH to the fire fighting water 
reservoir which is used for filling of the containment in post-accident conditions. The lower drywell 
will be flooded from the wetwell prior to the NaOH supply and the lower drywell water pool pH will be 
kept above 7.
Protection against fires at the Olkiluoto NPP
The possibility of fires and the risks of nuclear power plant accidents arising from fires have been taken into 
account in the functional and layout design of the existing Olkiluoto plant. Fire safety has been improved 
in different areas of the fire protection at the existing Olkiluoto plant after commissioning. Although the 
loss of external electrical supply has been taken into account in the plant design, both units were provided 
with e.g. second start-up transformer, based on the experience gained from the fire of the electric supply 
unit in 1991, to improve the independency of plant’s external grid connections. Furthermore, the main 
transformers, in-house transformers and start-up transformers are protected with a sprinkler extinguishing 
system, which reduces essentially the risks arising from transformer fires. The use of halon is forbidden in 
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Finland since the year 1999 with the exception of some special items. Due to this the halon extinguishing 
systems at the existing Olkiluoto plant were replaced with other extinguishing systems by the year 2000. 
Fire risks have been assessed in a probabilistic risk assessment that concentrates on fire issues. Based on 
this the fire protection of cables, that are crucial to safety, have been improved by renewing fire detectors 
and improving fire extinguishing systems in cable tunnels. On the basis of the probabilistic risk assessment 
these improvements reduce the risks arising from fires considerably.
Modernisation and power uprating of Olkiluoto NPP in 1994–1998
The main goals of the modernisation project at the Olkiluoto NPP were the reviewing of safety features 
and enhancing safety, when feasible, improving the production related performance, identifying factors 
limiting the plant lifetime and eliminating them, when feasible, and enhancing the expertise of the 
own staff and improving productivity. In order to achieve the safety goal, the existing plant design was 
reviewed and compared by the TVO to the present and foreseeable safety requirements. Compliance 
with the European Utility Requirements (EUR) was also reviewed. The feasibility of fulfilling new re-
quirements set for the new nuclear power plants was considered case by case. The living PRA model of 
the plant was utilised in this context.
The most important safety related modifications included in the modernisation programme are 
listed below:
• Reactor pressure relief system was diversified by installing two additional relief valves.
• ATWS behaviour was improved by modifying some trip signals and making boron injection 
automatic and more effective.
• Additional severe accident mitigation measures were implemented.
• Earthquake resistance of the plant was checked and related modifications were made.
• Partial scram function was strengthened.
• Generator breaker was replaced with a new one, which is able to break also short circuit current.
• Protection against frazil ice at the seawater intake was improved.
• Protection against snowstorms at the air intake of the emergency diesels was improved.
Modification of the safety features in connection with the modernisation programme as a whole reduced 
the severe core damage frequency estimate by a factor of three.
The radiation exposure of the population was reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
Liquid releases were reduced by a factor of ten by improving the liquid waste handling systems. Also 
occupational doses were reduced. In practice, this meant minimising the cobalt content in the primary 
circuit. Renewal of steam dryers reduced the occupational doses remarkably, because the moisture of 
the steam was reduced.
The development of the BWR technology, margins revealed by operational experience, and plant 
modifications due to other reasons made also power uprating possible. Thermal power was uprated from 
2160 MW to 2500 MW (15.7%). The most important changes were made in fuel technology. The operation 
was changed from with 8×8 bundles to 10×10 bundles. The new bundles have 40 percent lower average 
linear heat rating than the old ones. Some additional design changes implemented due to the uprating 
were the increasing of inertia of the main circulation pumps electrically, steam separators replacement, 
high-pressure turbine and feed water system modifications, decay heat removal system capacity increase-
ment, and generator and main transformers replacements. The low pressure turbines were also replaced 
and in that way about 30 MW additional production capacity in each unit was achieved.
The modernisation programme of the Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2 was started in 1994 and com-
pleted in 1998. The installations were performed during the refuelling outages of the years 1996–1998. 
Some later installations were realised during outages in 1999. In spite of large modifications the refu-
elling outage times were reasonable, between 15 and 20 days. The test programme was quite the same 
as in the case of a new plant.
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Test operations were conducted in stages at different power levels under STUK’s supervision and 
within the frames permitted by STUK. Before uprating the reactor power to a higher power level STUK 
conducted a safety review concerning the test operation for the power level in question and asked the 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee for a statement concerning the review before granting the test 
operating licence.
Test operation programmes that included the entire plant units and were drawn up by TVO, were 
based on the original commissioning programmes that were run through during the start-up phase and 
that were modified taking into account the test requirements caused by the modernised systems. For 
the long-term test operation of the plant units the thermal power of both reactor units was uprated 
step by step from the nominal power of 2160 MW to 2500 MW.
The most significant plant transient tests of the test operation were the load rejection test, turbine 
trip test and the by-pass test of the high-pressure preheaters. STUK considered it necessary to continue 
the test operation at the 2500 MW power level for about two months before issuing a statement in favour 
of continuing the operation of the plant units at the 2500 MW power level.
Licensing steps related to the modernisation programme included an uprated Safety Analysis Report 
(PSAR, for example) and an uprated Probabilistic Safety Assessment (level 1 PRA), which were reviewed 
and approved by STUK. Design modifications and test runs were accepted by STUK before implementa-
tion. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the related Topical Reports were rewritten. It meant 
also that almost all transient and accident analyses were redone taking into account the uprated power 
level and modified plant design. The FSAR and Topical Reports were submitted to STUK at the end of 
1996. An operating licence renewal application, covering design modifications and the power uprating, 
was submitted to the Government at the end of 1996. The licence was granted in 1998. The power up-
rating was reviewed also according to the Environmental Impact Legislation.
Modernisation and power uprating project contained several safety, ageing and efficiency remedies. 
Influences of modifications have been positive in most cases. A negative finding has been a slight increase 
of steam moisture. To improve this the steam dryers in both units were replaced in outages 2005–2007. 
Another slightly negative finding was increase of condensate clean up temperature, which decreased 
the life cycle of clean up resins. To avoid this problem the location of condensate clean up system was 
changed in the process. In this context the first LP-preheaters were replaced and modernised as well.
The modernisation of turbine plant was continued with replacement of steam reheater moisture 
separators (MSR). They were replaced with modern two stage MSR’s. This replacement required modern-
isation of HP-turbine as well. These replacements were performed in annual outages 2005 and 2006. In 
the same outages the I&C system of the turbine plant process was be replaced with a modern digital one.
Turbine plant process automation system renewal (2004–2006)
A new computerised turbine plant automation system was installed in the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2005 
annual maintenance outage (equivalent modification was performed at Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2006). One 
reason to switch from analogue to programmable technology was the obsolescence the old system. In 
addition, the modifications made in the turbine plant process in 2005, and in 2006, required some ad-
ditional modifications to the automation system. The new system improves information management 
and control of the turbine plant as well as facilitates component maintenance. Another system renewal 
objective has been to increase reliability and reduce by adding redundancy susceptibility to malfunctions.
The new automation system has been implemented by programmable technology. This allows an 
increased number of process status measurements and versatile information handling possibilities. As 
regards turbine automation, it facilitates for turbine operators improved information management, 
process control at operating work stations, trend monitoring and setting of safety limits. Safety limit 
settings enable turbine operator reaction to even minor process changes. The control desk for the tur-
bine side in the control room was replaced with a safety function control desk and a turbine systems 
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control and monitoring board with operator’s work stations. The control room was also fitted with a 
screen display. In addition, the process computer system capacity had to be upgraded in connection 
with the control system renewal to handle the large volume of data yielded by the turbine automation. 
The automation interface was introduced at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 training simulator in September 
2004, which made possible the training of operating personnel in its use.
Examples of latest plant modifications at the Olkiluoto NPP (2016–2018)
Renewal of main recirculation pumps and their frequency conventers
TVO has implemented a project for replacing the main circulation pumps and their frequency conven-
ters at the Olkiluoto unit 1 and 2. According to TVO the decision on the replacement was made, because 
the pumps were more than 35 years old and the availability of product support and spare parts from the 
original equipment manufacturer was significantly reduced.
The new pumps are in the main parts similar to the old pumps. The most important difference is 
the flywheel mounted on the pump shaft to ensure the safe shutdown of the recirculation pumps in 
case power supply is lost. This ensures that the pump speed is reduced passively in the event of scram 
or power loss and the previous electrically connected and separate flywheels will no longer be required 
to ensure fuel integrity in the context of these transients. The main circulation pumps of the Olkiluoto 
unit 2 were modernised in 2017. At the Olkiluoto unit 1 one new pump was installed in 2016, and the 
rest of the pumps in 2018.
High and low pressure auxiliary feed water system
TVO has finalized a project for an independent way of pumping water into the reactor pressure vessel in 
case of loss of AC power. The arrangement consists of high and low pressure systems. The low pressure 
system pumps coolant into the core from the fire fighting system. The high pressure system consists 
of a steam driven turbine pump for which the steam is drawn from the main steam line and supplied 
through a dedicated line to the pump turbine. The water is supplied to the reactor by the system via one 
auxiliary feedwater line. The exhaust from the turbine is routed to the wet-well suppression pool. Such 
a high pressure system is necessary because, based on studies conducted by TVO, it is apparent that the 
a low pressure system with supply via the fire water system alone would not be enough to guarantee 
integrity of the reactor core in case of a total loss of power. The high pressure system will offer more 
time to guarantee adequate pressure decrease for starting the low pressure system. STUK approved 
the conceptual design plan of the new system in 2015. The project was finalized in 2018 when the high 
pressure system was installed to both plant units. The plant modification was one of the actions based 
on the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiici accident.
Examples of latest incidents at the Olkiluoto NPP (2016–2018)
Olkiluoto 2 reactor scram in May 2018
On 8 May 2018, Olkiluoto 2 was undergoing power raise after the 2018 annual outage. At power level 
98%, a reactor scram occurred due to condition SS15 (high power relative to the main coolant flow) when 
five of the six main coolant pumps stopped simultaneously. The reason for the main coolant pumps 
stopping was a transient in the off-site grid. Due to the transient, the protections of the main coolant 
pump frequency converters stopped the frequency converters (the contactors opened), which caused the 
main coolant pumps to stop. The grid transient was caused by a deviation in the changeover switching 
of the Fenno-Skan connection managed by Fingrid.
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As a consequence of the tripping of the scram, all control rods went into the reactor in scram mode and 
the cooling of the condensation pool started. All of the safety functions for scrams functioned as planned.
For the frequency converters, it was a common cause failure in regard to the protection parameter 
settings. A protection function based on a parameter value that was too low caused five frequency con-
verters to stop during a transient where the protection function in question was not necessary. In the 
situation, the impact mainly focused on the Olkiluoto 2 unit, where the replacement of main coolant 
pump frequency converters had been fully completed. As a result of the event, the protection settings 
where changed, due to which the immunity to interference of the frequency converters of both plant 
units is better in regard to similar transients.
The event did not affect the plant’s nuclear or radiation safety, but due to the common cause failure 
of the frequency converters, the event has been rated at level 1 of the International Nuclear and Radio-
logical Event Scale (INES).
Periodic safety reviews at the Olkiluoto NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety review of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out by the licensee 
and independently by STUK in connection to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear power plant 
units. The safety documentation, including safety assessments done by the licensee, was submitted to 
STUK at the end of 1996. In addition to the review of the licensing documents such as Final Safety Anal-
ysis Report, STUK also made an independent safety assessment. The statement of STUK was given to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry in June 1998. As regards radiation and nuclear safety, the main conclusions 
in the statement were that the conditions of the Finnish nuclear energy legislation are complied with.
The next overall safety review of the Olkiluoto plant took place in 2007–2009 in connection of the 
periodic safety review. Regulatory guide YVL 1.1 (currently YVL A.1) specifies the contents of the PSR. 
For a separate periodic safety review, STUK shall be provided with similar safety-related reports as in 
applying for the operating licence.
The PSR documentation was submitted to STUK for approval in the end of 2008. STUK made a 
decision concerning the PSR in October 2009. In the STUK’s decision the licensee’s PSR was approved 
as a comprehensive periodic safety review according to the licence condition. Based on the assessment, 
STUK considered that the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 meet the set safety requirements 
for operational nuclear power plants, the emergency preparedness arrangements are sufficient and the 
necessary control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been appropriately arranged. The 
physical protection of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was not yet completely in compliance with 
the requirements of Government Decree 734/2008, which came into force in December 2008. Further 
requirements concerning this issue based also on the principle of continuous improvement were included 
in the decision relating to the periodic safety review.
The safety of the plant was to be further improved during the operating licence period. Based on 
the periodic safety review, TVO submitted to STUK action plans for the observed points requiring im-
provement. STUK included also some additional requirements in the decision relating to the periodic 
safety review. Systematic assessment and development of the diversity principle was required, including 
investigation of possibilities for residual heat removal to be independent of seawater. TVO submitted 
a report regarding the adequacy of the diversification at the plants and an action plan for developing 
the plants at the end of 2010. STUK approved the report in 2012. Another requirement considered plant 
modifications to improve safety in situations involving spurious opening of the turbine bypass valves. 
TVO has submitted required report and STUK has approved TVO’s disquisition and action plans to 
improve the situation.
The latest periodic safety review was carried out during 2016–2018 in connection of the relicensing 
of the operation of the plant units.
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Operating licence renewal for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units
STUK delivered its statement on the operating licence application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment on 31 May 2018. In its statement, STUK supported the application to continue the operation 
of the operating plant units in Olkiluoto. According to STUK’s assessment, the continued operation of 
the plant units is safe and meets the statutory requirements. STUK also assessed that the nuclear waste 
management arrangements used by TVO are adequate and appropriate. Therefore, STUK saw no reason 
not to issue an operating licence for the plant units for 20 years in accordance with TVO’s application.
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was assessed in compliance with the STUK regula-
tions brought into force in 2016, in addition to the Nuclear Energy Act. These include STUK’s regulations 
on the safety of a nuclear power plant, the emergency arrangements of a nuclear power plant, security 
in the use of nuclear energy, and the safety of disposal of nuclear waste. The safety regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016) takes into account that operating plants must meet certain requirements set for new plants 
to the extent that their application is justified with due consideration to the technical solutions of the 
nuclear power plant unit in question and the principle laid down in Section 7(a) of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (STUK Y/1/2016, Section 27, Transitional provision). In accordance with the principles set forth in 
Section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act, the safety of nuclear energy use must be maintained at as high a 
level as practically possible. For the further development of safety, measures shall be implemented that 
can be considered justified considering operating experience, safety research and advances in science 
and technology.
Review started at STUK in early 2017, once TVO had submitted to STUK the documents connected 
to the periodic safety review in accordance with Guide YVL A.1. Key areas of STUK’s review included 
ageing management, revised safety analyses, the organisation and personnel as well as matters related 
to operation of the plant and its safety culture.
The design basis concerning the structures, systems and components of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nu-
clear power plant units was primarily issued in the 1970s. The goal for the operating period of the plant 
has been to ensure the continuous improvement of plant safety. TVO has updated the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 plant units to a significant degree and, during the facility’s operating history, carried out extensive 
modifications on the plants’ systems, structures and components in order to improve safety. In its state-
ment, STUK emphasised that, in the coming operating licence period, it is important to continue the 
implementation of the safety-improving measures. Based on the documentation submitted to STUK, 
TVO is committed to continuing the efforts to improve plant safety also during the coming operating 
licence period. This is in line with the principle of continuous improvement of safety provided in section 
7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
Over the course of the current operating licence period, TVO has significantly reduced the risk of 
core damage and large release at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units. However, among the risk reduction op-
portunities, the share of a common cause failure in the protection I&C system’s output relays, which 
is currently about 8% of the total core damage frequency, remains to be examined. Based on its own 
periodic safety review, STUK required TVO to investigate in more detail how this risk could be reduced. 
TVO must analyse the significance of common cause failures in the protection I&C system’s output 
relays from the perspective of the reliability of the safety functions and the core damage frequency and 
use these analyses to determine the necessary measures to reduce the core damage risk caused by the 
aforementioned common cause failures.
TVO’s application for the continuation of the operating licence in such a way that the original de-
sign-basis service life of 40 years will be exceeded by 20 years is largely based on ageing management. 
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TVO’s goal is to keep the systems, structures and components (SSCs) of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units continuously up-to-date and in good condition in terms safety and production capac-
ity. TVO has an ageing management programme which entails the functions, tasks and responsibilities 
to ensure the operability of the SSCs related to safety for the entire duration of their service life. Early 
identification of the relevant SSCs and the related ageing phenomena makes possible far-reaching 
predictions and plans on the requisite fundamental improvements and maintenance tasks. According 
to STUK’s assessment, ageing management at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units has been organised in an ap-
propriate manner.
TVO has updated the strength analyses of the primary circuit to correspond to a service life of 60 
years. The analyses cover the Safety Class 1 pipes, the reactor pressure vessel and the reactor pressure 
vessel internals. The strength analyses cover dimensioning against pressure and other mechanical design 
loads as well as tension and fatigue analyses for critical points. The design loads account for the vari-
ous operating and accident situations of the primary circuit as well as the effects of the environmental 
conditions. Based on the analyses, the safety margins remain sufficient for the entire planned 60-year 
service life of the plant unit.
At the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units, the primary circuit’s periodic pressure test has not been performed 
since the commissioning of the plant units. By STUK decisions, periodic pressure tests have been replaced 
with tightness tests (1.02 × operating pressure) conducted at 8-year intervals, which is permitted by the 
ASME XI standard for reactor plants planned and inspected in accordance with ASME requirements. 
When the pressure test was originally replaced with a tightness test compliant with ASME XI, it was not 
known that the service life of the plant units would be longer than the 40 years presumed in the ASME 
version effective at the time. For this reason, STUK required, based on its own periodic safety review, 
that the periodic primary circuit tightness test prescribed by the current procedure must be replaced 
with a periodic pressure test conducted every eight years at the maximum allowable operating pressure. 
The purpose of the pressure test is to demonstrate through tests that the known or any possible latent 
ageing mechanisms have not weakened the integrity of the primary circuit once the plant units have 
reached their original design life span. The first pressure tests on Olkiluoto 2 must be conducted in 2019 
and the first tests on Olkiluoto 1 in 2020.
The Finnish Government issued a new operating licence for the plant units on 20 September 2018. 
TVO has now licence to operate the units until the end of 2038. TVO must carry out a periodic safety 
review of the plant units and submit it to STUK for approval by the end of 2028.
Planned and ongoing activities to improve safety at the Olkiluoto NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and enhancement approach is presented in the nuclear 
legislation. Actions for safety enhancement are to be taken whenever they can be regarded as justified, 
considering operating experience, the results of safety research and the advancement of science and 
technology. The implementation of safety improvements has been a continuing process at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 since their commissioning and there exists no urgent need to upgrade 
the safety of these plant units in the context of the Convention.
There are several ongoing and planned safety upgrading measures at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant. For example renewal of the diesel generators and diversification of reactor water level 
measurements.
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Safety assessments and improvements based on the lessons learnt  
from TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Natural hazards
Safety margins were assessed by the licensee and reviewed by STUK. Based on the results, STUK required 
further clarifications on the following main points:
• seismic resistance of spent fuel pools including situations with water temperature exceeding the 
design bases; and
• seismic resistance of fire fighting systems.
The licensee of the Olkiluoto NPP was also requested to carry out a more detailed assessment on the 
effects of exceptionally high seawater level on the cooling systems of the spent fuel interim storage and 
their electric power supply. Cooling system pumps are situated at the +0.5 m level. The spent fuel interim 
storage is designed as watertight up to the seawater level +1.2 m. At higher seawater levels some seepage 
of water through the soil to the drainage system is anticipated. According to the licensee, the seepage 
would be stable and slow and the water could be removed with submersible pumps. Fast flooding of the 
interim storage would be possible through the doors if the seawater level exceeds +3.5 m and through the 
seam between the seawater pumping station and seawater pipe culvert at the level +2.5 m. The licensee 
submitted the plans for tightening the aforementioned seam and carried out the modifications after 
STUK's approval. The licensee submitted at the end of 2012 plans for further improving the protection 
of the interim storage against flooding, including increase of the capacity of the submersible pumps.
TVO has carried out seismic walkdowns for the fire extinguishing water systems of Olkiluoto. In 
2014, TVO improved seismic resistance of the fire water systems by reinforcing pipe supports and the 
supports of electrical cubicles and relay cabinets in the relay rooms.
Design issues
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, sea water is the primary ultimate heat sink and an alternative heat sink 
exists only partially. Both units can evaporate residual heat from the reactor core to atmosphere by con-
ducting the steam produced inside the reactor pressure vessel to the condensation pool through the safety 
relief valves, by letting the condensation pool to boil, and by venting the steam from the containment 
to atmosphere through the filtered venting system. However, the systems required to pump water into 
the reactor pressure vessel are either dependent on the sea water based component cooling systems or 
on the condensation pool water, which means that the complete loss of sea water as the ultimate heat 
sink will eventually prevent the supply of water to the reactor pressure vessel.
Licensee is finalaising plant modifications on the current residual heat removal chain to decrease 
the dependence on the sea water cooling. A modification in the auxiliary feed water system is enabling 
cooling of the components by demineralised water in addition to sea water based cooling chain. By this 
modification system can remain operational for a significant period of time even during the loss of the 
primary ultimate heat sink (sea water). The new recirculation line modification was implemented at 
Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. Abnormal vibration and pressure oscillations have been observed during the testing 
of one subsystem. This did not influence operation of the pump, however, and the fault would not have 
prevented the supply of water to the reactor in case of need. TVO has studied the issue and solved the 
problems at Olkiluoto 1 by for example improving recirculation pipeline support. The modification is 
planned to be implemented at Olkiluoto 2 in 2019.
In addition, an independent way of pumping water to the reactor pressure vessel in case of loss of 
AC power has been implemented to the plant units. The arrangement consists of high and low pressure 
systems. The low pressure system pumps coolant into the core from the fire fighting system. The high 
pressure system consists of a steam driven turbine pump: the steam is drawn from the main steam line 
and supplied through a dedicated line to the pump turbine. The water is supplied to the reactor by the 
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system via one auxiliary feedwater line. The exhaust from the turbine is routed to the wet-well suppres-
sion pool. Such a high pressure system is necessary because, based on studies conducted by TVO, it is 
apparent that the a low pressure system with supply via the fire water system alone would not be enough 
to guarantee integrity of the reactor core in case of a total loss of power. The high pressure system will 
offer more time to guarantee adequate pressure decrease for starting the low pressure system. STUK 
approved a conceptual design plan of the new system in 2015. The project was finalized in 2018 when 
the high pressure system was installed to both plant units.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the current AC power supply systems include connections to 400 kV 
and 110 kV power grids, main generator (house load operation), four emergency diesel generators per 
unit, a gas turbine, a dedicated connection to a nearby hydropower plant, and the possibility to supply 
electricity from the neighbouring NPP unit. The licensee has decided to renew all the eight emergency 
diesel generators. Renewal of the diesel generators is descripted in more detail below.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the depletion times of DC batteries are well above 10 h, in some cases 
tens of hours. It is possible to charge the batteries using the AC power sources. DC batteries supplying 
the severe accident monitoring systems can also be recharged by mobile generators for instance, during 
long-lasting accidents.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the licensee has evaluated that water injection into the pool and 
boiling of the pool water could be used as an alternative means to remove decay heat from the pools 
inside the reactor building. To support monitoring of the water level in the reactor building spent fuel 
pools, there was a plan to equip the fuel pools with a level measurement system. The implementation 
has been made in 2016. The fixed pipelines from the fire water system dry risers to the fuel pools at both 
units has been installed in 2014–2015.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the licensee started the investigation of needs and targets for mo-
bile power supply in autumn 2011. Investigation includes also renewal of the present mobile SAM diesel 
generators. Today there are four new mobile aggregates and two old mobile aggregates. Enhancing 
charging of batteries has also been found feasible to improve the availability of DC power. The licensee 
has investigated the possibilities for fixed connection points for recharging of all safety important bat-
teries and other important consumers (e.g. weather tower) using transportable power generators, and 
the decision to install fixed connection points has been made.
Severe accident management
A comprehensive severe accident management (SAM) strategy has been developed and implemented 
at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 during 1980’s and 1990’s after the accidents in TMI and Chernobyl (see 
above). These strategies are based on ensuring the containment integrity which is required in the ex-
isting national regulations. STUK has reviewed these strategies and has made inspections in all stages 
of implementation.
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major changes 
at the plants are considered necessary. The licensee has improved procedures to support heat removal 
from spent fuel pools by pool boiling and supplying make-up water to the pools. Also possibility to 
shutdown the plant from an emergency control room is added to the emergency operating procedures. 
Procedrues to manage accident conditions affecting multiple units (OL1/OL2/OL3) and spent fuel pools 
is under preparation.
Hydrogen leakages out of the containment during severe accidents has been analysed for all Olk-
iluoto NPP units, and the results show that design leakages do not cause a threat to the containment 
integrity. For spent fuel pools, the approach in Finland is to “practically eliminate” the possibility of fuel 
damage. The possibility of top venting of reactor hall has been studied at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 for 
the steam release in case of spent fuel pool boiling. Hydrogen possibly formed in the spent fuel pools or 
leaked from the containment could be exhausted through this route as well. Minor plant modifications 
are required, which will be implemented in 2019.
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Diversification of reactor water level measurements
The reactor water level measurement system consists of four parallel subsystems, two of which are suffi-
cient for implementing the protection function (from high and low level). The subsystems are based on 
differential pressure measurement. TVO has studied possibilities to supplement the currently used low 
level measurement system with another system based on a different measuring principle. TVO’s plans 
to implement the modification have been delayed. Design work is progressing and the current schedule 
is to install the new devices for test use in annual outages of 2020 and 2021. However, at the same time 
TVO also studies whether similar safety benefits could be achieved by other methods and will send an 
application to STUK during 2019.
Renewal of the diesel generators
TVO has initiated a project for replacing all current emergency diesel generators and their auxiliary 
systems at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. There are four emergency diesel generators in use at both oper-
ating reactor units in Olkiluoto. The replacement project is implemented taking also into account any 
increases in the need for power due to possible future plant modifications as well as the lessons learnt 
from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in relation to securing the power supply. The nuclear safety 
requirements dictate that a power margin of at least 10% is available in all load conditions. Furthermore, 
both main components of the EDGs (the diesel engine and the generator) are old models, whose devel-
opment and manufacture has been discontinued, and the availability of spare parts and the supplier’s 
technical support are declining. STUK approved the conceptual design plan on the replacement of the 
diesel generators in early 2013.
The purpose of the emergency diesel generators and their associated auxiliary systems is to supply 
electrical power to the 660 V emergency power system in case of loss of supply from the 6.6 kV main bar. 
Both plants have four subsystems, and each subsystem has its own standby diesel generator. Replacement 
of the diesel generators will also mean that the main switchgear in the 660 V emergency power network 
has to be replaced; this has already been done as part of the replacement of low-voltage switchgear as a 
modification project separate from the replacement of the EDGs.
The intention is to implement the EDG replacement project during the normal operation of the 
plant units as far as possible. According to the plan, the new EDGs will be installed and commissioned 
during power operation so that one new EDG is installed to both plant units during one power operation 
cycle. For this purpose, a ninth EDG unit has to be constructed to replace the power supply from any of 
the current EDGs of the Olkiluoto units 1 or 2 during the installation. In the future, the ninth EDG can 
be connected to replace an EDG undergoing periodic maintenance at the Olkiluoto units 1 or 2, or it can 
replace a failed EDG. A new building will be constructed for the ninth EDG, while the replacement EDGs 
will be installed at the same premises where the current units are located.
The renewal plan includes several safety improvements. First of all, the new EDGs would be equipped 
with two diverse component cooling systems. The primary EDG cooling would be provided by the sea 
water based cooling system, similar to present EDGs units. An alternative, automatically activated air 
based cooling system would be added to cope with situations involving the loss of availability of sea 
water. This would provide extra protection against external hazards, internal hazards such as fires, as 
well as component failures.
During last years TVO has continued the preparation of the replacement of the emergency diesel 
generators at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. At present, TVO has started construction of the building for 
the ninth emergency diesel generator that will be shared by the units. According to the current estimated 
schedule, this emergency diesel generator, which will be used during the replacement project instead 
of the diesel generator that is currently being replaced at the units, will be installed and commissioned 
in the autumn 2019. The plan is to have the entire diesel generator replacement project completed by 
the spring 2023.
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Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 under construction
Licensing steps
Decision-in-Principle procedure was carried out during the period November 2000 – May 2002 when 
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) applied a Decision-in-Principle for the fifth NPP unit in Finland and the 
Government approved it and the Parliament confirmed the approval. Construction licence application 
for the Olkiluoto unit 3 was submitted by TVO to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (predecessor of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment) in January 2004. The new unit, Olkiluoto 3 is a 
1600 MWe European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), the design of which is based on the French N4 
and German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn key delivery is provided by the Consortium Areva NP and Sie-
mens. The technical requirements for Olkiluoto unit 3 were specified by using the European Utility Re-
quirements (EUR) document as a reference. TVO’s 
specifications complemented the EUR mainly in 
those points where Finnish requirements are more 
stringent. STUK gave its statement and safety as-
sessment in January 2005 based on the review of 
the licensing documentation and the Government 
issued the Construction Licence in February 2005.
Pre-operational testing of the Olkiluoto unit 3 
is on-going. Plant level commissioning tests were 
completed in May 2018, but finalization of remain-
ing system level tests, retests after modifications 
and preparation for fuel loading are still on-going. 
Next step will be fuel loading and nuclear com-
missioning. TVO submitted operating licence ap-
plication to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment in April 2016. Operating Licence is 
needed prior to loading nuclear fuel into the re-
actor core. STUK gave its statement and safety 
assessment in February 2019 and the Council of 
State issued the Operating Licence in March 2019. 
STUK will ascertain that the prescribed safety re-
quirements are met following the issuance of the 
operating licence for the nuclear facility and before 
fuel is loaded into the reactor.
FIGURE 26. Commissioning tests of main steam relief 
trains at Olkiluoto 3. Source: STUK.
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Challenges
Olkiluoto 3 was supposed to start commercial operation in 2009. According to present schedule, commer-
cial operation will start in January 2020, ten years after the original target. At the moment, the licensee 
and the vendor have agreed on the time schedule, and detailed time schedules for the remaining work 
have been drafted.
There are certain factors that have affected greatly the project progress. Olkiluoto unit 3 was the 
first European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) where construction started. Construction of the unit started 
after a long break in nuclear power plant construction in Europe, which had resulted in loss of experi-
enced and qualified engineering and manufacturing resources. Lack of knowledge on Finnish regulatory 
framework and safety requirements, insufficient completion of the design prior to construction, some 
difficulties with advanced manufacturing and construction technologies and lacks in safety culture in 
the earlier phase of construction works at site have been challenging aspects in the project and caused 
delays. On the other hand parties have succeeded to find deviations induced during the project and the 
end products have finally fulfilled quality, performance and safety requirements.
During the earlier phase of the project, I&C design lagged behind process system design and for a 
long time it set the timeline of the project. Using of integrated, software based I&C platforms sets new 
requirements for designing, safety analyses as well as for implementation and testing of the systems. 
The main issues where STUK asked more clarification concern defining and management of interfaces 
of different I&C systems so that failure of one system can’t disturb other systems. STUK also asked more 
clarification how possible spurious actuations are taken into account in the design and corresponding 
safety analyses. STUK received answers to the aforementioned concerns as well as the related analyses 
and approved the I&C design.
During the pre-operational testing of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit, it emerged that the 
vibration of the surge line of a pressuriser that is a part of the primary circuit exceeds the set criteria. 
TVO and the plant supplier have investigated solutions to dampen the vibrations. Alternative solutions 
exist, and the studies to find out the optimal solution considering safety are ongoing. STUK will review 
the detailed plans of the solution chosen by TVO, oversee the progress of the work and verify before 
fuel loading that modifications necessary for safe operation have been implemented and the necessary 
tests have been performed.
Regulatory oversight
During the construction, STUK oversees the project comprehensively. The licensee’s performance is 
evaluated via Construction Inspection Program. The purpose of the program is to verify that the per-
formance and organisation of the licensee ensure high quality construction and implementation in 
accordance with the approved designs while complying with the regulations and STUK’s decisions. 
Under Construction Inspection Program STUK has performed around 15 inspections every year. Some 
of the inspections have been unannounced inspections.
In addition to Construction Inspection Programme, STUK has strong on-site presence by the res-
ident inspectors at the construction site. There are four resident inspectors dedicated for Olkiluoto 
unit 3 project. This provides STUK constant flow of information and oversight capabilities and gives 
additional information on licensee’s activities. STUK has therefore also very quick ability to response 
with short notice to any immediate safety concern or incident. Findings made by resident inspectors 
are also important inputs for the construction inspection programme inspections.
The construction of a nuclear facility shall not begin before the Government has granted the Con-
struction Licence. After that, prior to start manufacturing, installation or commissioning of the system, 
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structure or component, STUK’s approvals for the detailed design or plans are needed. STUK also ap-
proves manufacturers of nuclear pressure equipment for their duties and inspection organisations and 
testing organisations for duties pertaining to the control of pressure equipment at nuclear facilities. 
During the Olkiluoto unit 3 project, STUK has reviewed more than 19900 applications – about 11800 of 
them are submitted to STUK for approval. 
STUK also inspects the compliance of the design and manufacturing of mechanical components and 
structures. Inspections are performed during and after the manufacturing in manufacturers’ premises 
and at the site after installation and during commissioning. In lower safety classes these inspections 
are conducted by Inspection Organisations.
Based on the findings made during the technical inspections, inspections under construction in-
spection programme, document reviews and other visits during construction, STUK prepares annually 
a comprehensive safety evaluation how safety aspects are fulfilled and taken into account during the 
construction. The experience has shown that STUK’s practice to oversee the project in all level of ac-
tivities has been effective way to find possible weak points and deviations in early phase of the project. 
Translations of annual report can be found from the STUK’s website.
FIGURE 27. STUK’s resident inspector on her way to perform  
inspection for primary circuit. Source: STUK.
Safety assessments based on the lessons learnt  
from TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
Following the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of March in 2011, 
safety assessment of Olkiluoto unit 3 was initiated. The topics included the preparedness against loss of 
electric power supply, loss of ultimate heat sink and extreme natural phenomena. As being a unit under 
construction, any immediate actions were not necessary, but STUK required the licensee to carry out 
additional assessment and present an action plan for safety improvements. Assessment was conducted 
and reported by the licensee to STUK on 15 December 2011. STUK reviewed the assessment and made 
decision on 19 July 2012 on the suggested safety improvements and additional analyses.
External conditions in Finland are moderate. No destructive earthquakes or tsunami waves have 
been observed. Storms are not comparable to tropical cyclones and strong tornadoes are quite rare. Olk-
iluoto unit 3 fulfils the current regulatory requirements concerning external events. The design basis 
of Olkiluoto unit 3 for external events has been selected conservatively in the design phase. The design 
basis covers earthquakes, internal and external flooding, extreme weather and other natural hazards (like 
snowstorms, frazil ice formation and impurities in the seawater) as well as human induced hazards. The 
design values correspond to return periods of up to 100 000 years and much longer for events with “cliff 
edge” type consequences. As the estimated conditions corresponding to such long return periods involve 
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large uncertainties, considerable physical margins to the largest values observed in the neighbourhood 
of the site have also been ensured.
The ultimate heat sink of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is the sea. In case of the total loss of the availability 
of sea water for cooling, the residual heat from the reactor core would be released to the atmosphere via 
the steam generators. The water inventory of the emergency feed water tanks is sufficient for 24 hours 
and with the line-up of the demineralized water distribution system to the emergency feed water tanks, 
the water inventory is sufficient for 72 hours. After 72 hours, make-up water will be added from the fire 
water distribution system with diesel powered pumps. Also the nearby Korvensuo reservoir can be used 
as water source.
During refuelling outage the containment filtered venting could be used to release the steam out 
from the containment in case of loss of sea water cooling. Filtered venting system is not an original 
safety feature of EPR concept but it was required by STUK in an early phase of the conceptual design 
of Olkiluoto unit 3 to ensure the pressure management of the containment during severe accidents.
In the fuel building, the spent fuel pools can be cooled by evaporation. Make-up water is added from 
the fire water distribution system. In order to ensure water supply to the spent fuel pools independent 
of the fixed OL3 systems, mobile pump with hoses can also be used to add water to the pools. In the fuel 
building there are pipe fittings where the hoses can be connected or water can be injected directly to 
fuel pools with hoses. Water source is either demineralized water tanks or Korvensuo reservoir.
The current AC power supply systems of the Olkiluoto unit 3 include connections to 400 kV and 
110 kV power grids, main generator (house load operation), four emergency diesel generators (EDGs), 
two station black out (SBO) diesel generators, a gas turbine and the possibility to supply electricity from 
the neighbouring NPP units via 400 kV switchyard. To ensure long autonomy of SBO diesels possibility 
to move fuel from EDG storage tanks to SBO diesels has been added. In addition, the licensee further 
evaluated the robustness of EDG building doors against flooding and the results indicate that there is 
no threat to loss of EDGs due to flooding (doors leak tight up to over 10 m of water).
For uninterrupted power supplies, there are separate and diversified 2 h and 12 h battery backed power 
supply systems. The first set of batteries supplies all electrical equipment which require uninterruptible 
power in the nuclear island and the second set of batteries supplies loads which are important in case 
of a severe accident. The licensee evaluates that there is no need for upgrading the battery capacity.
Severe accidents have been considered in the original design of the Olkiluoto unit 3. STUK has re-
viewed the overall SAM strategy and the approach has been accepted. No changes to this approach are 
expected based on current knowledge from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
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Environmental Impact Assessment of new nuclear power plants and 
candidate sites
In 2007, initiatives for building additional nuclear power plant units in Finland were announced. Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA) was carried out according to EIA legislation for the possible Olkiluoto 
4 and Loviisa 3 units in 2007–2009. The Competent Authority for EIA procedure for NPP’s in Finland is 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.
A new nuclear power company, Fennovoima Oy, was founded in 2007. The company started a pre-
liminary site survey process, mainly on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia (the northern gulf of the Baltic 
Sea) and on the eastern Gulf of Finland (the eastern gulf of the Baltic Sea), the northernmost candidate 
site being 20–30 km from the borderline of Sweden. Fennovoima prepared an EIA programme and sub-
sequently an EIA report for three (originally four) alternative new candidate sites in 2007–2009.
The EIA process did not reveal any major nuclear or radiation safety issues as regards the proposed 
new NPP sites or new units on the existing sites. EIA is a legal process to cope comprehensively with the 
environmental issues depending on the specific site (e.g. sea environment and eutrophication, special 
natural species and phenomena, biodiversity, Natura natural reserve assessment, fisheries, salmon mi-
gration, combined heat and power production) and to increase the opportunity for citizens and other 
stakeholders to receive information, become involved in the planning and express their statements and 
opinions on the project.
Comments were requested from altogether nine countries near the Baltic See by the Finnish En-
vironmental Ministry on the basis of so called Espoo convention. Several comments from e.g. Estonia, 
Sweden and Germany were given and considered by the Finnish authorities. Additionally, the Austrian 
Government as a party of the Espoo convention sent their statement on each EIA and requested for con-
sultation in Finland. Thus, subsequent meetings were arranged in 2008–2009 at the Finnish Ministry 
of the Environment where a Finnish delegation of experts from the utility concerned, STUK and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment gave detailed explanations to the questions provided.
Separate applications for the Decision-in-Principle for new NPP units were submitted to the Gov-
ernment in 2008 and 2009 by TVO, Fortum and Fennovoima. The relevant site-related factors potentially 
affecting the safety of a the planned new NPP units and the related nuclear facilities during their pro-
jected lifetime were evaluated for the existing Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites and for the alternative new 
sites at Pyhäjoki, Simo and Ruotsinpyhtää proposed by Fennovoima. In late 2009, Fennovoima removed 
the Ruotsinpyhtää site from its application for the Decision-in-Principle. The evaluations were reviewed 
by STUK and other expert organisations in their respective fields. In addition to the Finnish regulations, 
IAEA Safety Requirements and Safety Guides and WENRA requirements were considered in the review.
Specific issues regarding the new sites are the size of precautionary action zone (5–6 km radius in 
Finland), the limitation of maximum population within it which may be affected in a severe accident 
situation and the possibility to evacuate the population. According to the Finnish regulations, an early 
evacuation before an expected release shall be possible within a time of four hours from the evacuation 
decision. The population in 2010 in the vicinity of the Finnish candidate sites is internationally compared 
relatively small (maximum of 3000 inhabitants up to 6 km from the site at Simo).
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FIGURE 28. Hanhikivi site in Pyhäjoki selected for Fennovoima new NPP (FH-1, Feb 2016). Source: Fennovoima.
According to STUK’s preliminary safety assessments, no site related factors were found at any of 
the sites which would prevent building the proposed new NPP units and the related other nuclear fa-
cilities according to the safety requirements. More detailed evaluation of the site related factors will be 
conducted and site characterisation is accepted in connection with the Construction Licence process.
Fennovoima completed site selection process in October 2011 by selecting Hanhikivi site in Pyhäjoki. 
The company stated that the main technical arguments for site selection were bedrock intactness, lower 
seismicity, shorter cooling water tunnels and population density.
Decisions-in-Principle and safety assessments of  
new nuclear power plant units
Three new nuclear power plant units have been under consideration in Finland (see more details of the 
licensing process under Articles 7 and 17). TVO submitted application for a Decision-in-Principle (DiP) 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in 2008, Fennovoima and Fortum in 2009. In ad-
dition, two DiP applications by Posiva Oy have been handled for the expansion of the planned capacity 
of spent fuel disposal facility for Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3 units. The applications for NPP units were 
accompanied by documents of a total of seven alternative plant designs.
In the Decision-in-Principle (DiP) the Government judges whether the proposed use of nuclear 
energy is in line with the overall good of society. STUK gave the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment preliminary safety assessments of all Decision-in-Principle applications in 2009. STUK’s 
preliminary safety assessments consisted of an assessment of the safety of the plant alternatives and 
the sites as well as of an assessment of the organisations, expertise and the quality management of the 
applicant. The assessments also covered the physical protection and emergency preparedness arrange-
ments, nuclear fuel and nuclear waste management, nuclear liability and non-proliferation. STUK stated 
in its preliminary safety assessment whether any factors have arisen indicating a lack of sufficient pre-
requisites for constructing a nuclear facility as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. Safety assessment 
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was based on the Government Decrees issued under the Nuclear Energy Act. Furthermore, STUK took 
a stand on the possibility of fulfilling other requirements laid down in legislation and YVL Guides as 
regards the issues to be reviewed by STUK. The aim of the preliminary safety assessment was to find 
any “show stoppers” in sites, organisations or plant design alternatives. Seven different plant design 
alternatives were assessed during the preliminary safety assessment period: ABWR (Toshiba-Westing-
house), AES-2006 (Atomstroyexport), APWR (Mitsubishi Heavy Industry), APR-1400 (Korean Hydro and 
Nuclear Power), ESBWR (GE Hitachi), EPR (AREVA) and KERENA (AREVA).
Most of the plant alternatives reviewed in the STUK’s preliminary safety assessments did not meet 
Finnish safety requirements as such. The nature and the extent of the required modifications vary be-
tween the plant alternatives. Some plant alternatives would only require fairly minor modifications; 
some would require more extensive structural modifications. The required technical solutions were still 
open for some alternatives.
All DiP applications were handled simultaneously and in May 2010 the Government granted two 
Decisions-in-Principle, one to Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and another to Fennovoima Oy. TVO's DiP 
was granted according to the application to build Olkiluoto unit 4 (OL4), single reactor with maximum 
output of 4600 MWth. In the Fennovoima’s case Government granted DiP only for a single reactor with 
maximum reactor power of 4900 MWth, although Fennovoima applied to build one or two reactors with 
maximum reactor power of 4300–6800 MWth.
The Government also granted a Decision-in-Principle for Olkiluoto unit 4 spent fuel disposal, 
applied by the spent fuel management company Posiva Oy. For Fennovoima’s spent fuel disposal, the 
Government gave two options. By mid 2016, Fennovoima shall present a co-operation agreement of spent 
fuel disposal with TVO and Fortum (the owners of Posiva) or start its own EIA process for the spent 
fuel disposal. Fennovoima chose the latter option, and submitted the EIA program to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment in June 2016. EIA program will be followed by a long research phase 
until 2035. The final EIA report will be published around 2040. A separate DiP will be required for the 
disposal facility.
Regardless of the option chosen a separate DiP will later be required for disposing of the spent fuel 
from Fennovoima’s planned reactor unit. For this DiP process also the corresponding EIA report needs 
to be updated or prepared for a possible new site.
At the same time the Government rejected Fortum’s DiP application to construct a new reactor to 
Loviisa site (Loviisa unit 3), as well as the DiP application for expanding the capacity of the spent fuel 
disposal facility to include also the spent fuel from the Loviisa unit 3 was rejected.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the granted DiP’s were sent without delay to the Parliament 
for confirmation. The Parliament may reverse the Decision-in-Principle as such or may decide that it 
remains in force as such. After the hearings in the all main permanent committees, the Parliament 
ratified both granted NPP applications on the 1st of July 2010. Both the Decisions-in-Principle for new 
reactors state that the construction licence shall be applied within five years from the Parliaments con-
firmation (by the end of June 2015).
Due the delay of Olkiluoto 3-project utility TVO applied a five years extension of time to the grant-
ed Olkiluoto 4 DiP. TVO filed in May 2014 an application for complementary DiP to the Government. 
Also utility Fennovoima had to apply a complementary DiP from the Government, because they chose 
ROSATOM AES-2006 plant design, which was not presented for preliminary safety review scope of 
Fennovoima 2010 DiP. Fennovoima sent the application for complementary DiP to the Government in 
March 2014. STUK prepared its statements promptly after summer 2014. The Government did decisions 
on both applications in September 2014. Governments Decision-in-Principle was positive for Fennovo-
ima Hanhikivi 1 project and negative for extension of the validity time of the DiP applied by TVO for 
Olkiluoto 4. Hence, the Olkiluoto 4 project ended in June 2015 since TVO did not submit an application 
for construction licence.
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Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1 (FH1) construction licence phase
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the applicant may ask advice or send plans for STUK’s review before 
the applications are filed to the Government. With this mandate, the utilities and STUK had meetings 
to be prepared for the construction licence safety assessment process. STUK organised seminars in 2010, 
2011 and 2013 with licence applicants on construction licence application requirements in relation to the 
plant design processes and shared the lessons learned from the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction project. 
Process system and plant engineering (layout) design maturity in PSAR phase is dominating factor for 
successful construction licence application review.
The new set of YVL guides was published 1st December 2013 (see Annex 1). Systematic training on 
application of new YVL Guides were provided by STUK’s personnel involved in preparation of guides. 
Furthermore several training courses on YVL Guides directed for stakeholders, were provided in English. 
A further update of the guides was started in 2017 and is expected to be comleted by the end of 2019. 
The updated guides are applied as such to new facilities.
STUK has developed its requirement management (RM) to support its review process.
According to the set dead line in DiP, Fennovoima filed a construction license application (CLA) 
for Hanhikivi 1 NPP on 30 June 2015 to the Government and submitted according to the Nuclear Energy 
Decree first batch of safety, security and safeguards documentation to STUK for regulatory review and 
assessment. It was noted that Fennovoima was not able to submit a complete licensing documentation 
to the regulatory review and assessment at the same time. According to licensing auhortity, the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE), batch-wise submission of licensing documentation 
is in accordance with Finnish administrative legislation. Fennovoima was planning to complement 
its documentation during the years 2015–2017 according to the first revision of the licensing plan. The 
Government has asked STUK to give its statement and safety assessment during the year 2017, if possi-
ble. One of the main challenges in batch-wise CLA submittals and regulatory review is to have robust 
configuration management in place and self-standing document submittals in logical order. Fennovo-
ima has delivered some CLA submittals during the years 2015–2018, but main parts of the application 
submittals e.g. Hanhikivi plant specific Preliminary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR) and plant specific 
Propabilistic Safety Assessment (PRA/PSA) have not been completely submitted for regulatory review 
and assessment. The plant high level design issues, which were highlighted in STUK Preliminary Safety 
Assessment of AES-2006 design have not been fully addressed in plant and systems level design. License 
applicant Fennovoima is working with the plant vendor RAOS Projekt Oy to solve the open plant and 
system level design issues to be able to submit Hanhikivi specific licensing documentation fulfilling 
Finnish Safety, Security and Safeguards requirements. For example, the strategy of managing severe 
reactor accidents is still under discussion.
The geological surveys aiming at determining the exact location of the plant and the design basis 
of the foundations progressed from planning to implementation. The geological surveys aiming at 
determining the exact location of the plant and the design basis of the foundations progressed from 
planning to implementation. Obscurities were found in the geological site investigations and Fenno-
voima decided to conduct an internal investigation in two stages to analyse how the site geological 
investigations were managed and conducted, how the geological investigation results were recorded, 
drilling core samples stored and conclusions drawn as well as documented. Based on the results of both 
stages of the investigations and regulatory correspondence from STUK, it was deemed necessary to carry 
out additional site investigations, improve documentation presenting the results of the investigations 
and define the design basis for the plant foundations. Most of the additional investigations performed 
at the plant site were completed by the end of 2018.
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FIGURE 29. Hanhikivi site in Pyhäjoki under site preparation and additional site surveys during  
the Autum 2018. Source Fennovoima.
Discussions have continued with the licence applicant and the plant supplier on the approval and 
selection of materials for mechanical equipment. Based on the most recent meetings, the plant supplier 
has a clear vision on how the approval process in question should be carried out.
The delivery chain for I&C technology has not yet been defined as regard to design and implemen-
tation. The I&C licensing documentation to be submitted for regulatory review by authorities in the 
construction licence phase has not yet been specified in its entirety.
Fennovoima has continued the radiological baseline study of Hanhikivi site.. Fennovoima has also 
progressed in the commissioning of weather monitoring systems at the plant site, for example the 
weather mast was built in 2018.
STUK has started the CLA review of those documents that have been submitted. Until now, STUK 
has received parts of PSAR and PRA documentation for preliminary information and small part of it has 
been submitted for regulatory CLA safety assessment and review purposes. Following PSAR chapters 
have been submitted for preliminary information or for review and assessment: Introduction and Gen-
eral Plant Description, Site characteristics, Design of Structures, Systems, Components and Equipment 
Conduct of Operations, Commissioning, Analysis of transients and accidents (without SA), Operating 
Technical Specifications, Management systems and quality management, PRA(reference plant) and 
Licence Applicant’s Own Safety Assessment.
STUK is also conductiong inspections according to the inspection programme on Fennovoima, 
Plant Vendor ROSATOM, and its main sub-suppliers. STUK have conducted management system in-
spections to Fennovoima and one to the General Designer JSC Atomproekt, St Petersburg, Russia, dur-
ing the years 2015–2018 and shall conduct follow-up inspections on Fennovoima and ROSATOM main 
design organisations during the year 2019 to support its document review and assessment. Vendor and 
its supply chain need further development in design processes. Major areas of improvement within the 
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Vendors design orgainastions are design processes such as Requirment Management and Configuration 
Management supported with robust Change Management. Knowledge and understanding of Finnish 
regulatory radiation and nuclear safety regulations and safety guide requirements is a key factor and 
should be supported with engineering competence and tool set.
STUK is publishing three times per annum its overall status report on CLA review and assessment 
and complementing the public report with executive summaries of inspection findings on STUK’s web 
pages.
Fennovoima did a review of license applicant organisation capabilities and organisation structure 
during 2018 and informed the regulator body early 2019 that Fennovoima will make necessary changes 
to meet the requirements of the intelligent customer.
Fennovoima Hanhikivi 1 Construction License application review has been so far a lengthy process 
as the parties involved with the plant design has not been able to present plant and system level design, 
which fully complies the Finnish safety regulation requirements. STUK presented Preliminary Safety 
assessment findings already 2014. License applicant Fennovoima with the Vendor RAOS Project Oy (ROS-
ATOM) and its design organisations are working to agree on needed changes in plant and system level 
design of AES2006 and preparing the licensing documentation (e.g. PSAR, PRA/PSA) for regulatory review 
and assessment. Fennovoima is expecting to obtain a Construction License from the Government 2021.
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The transparency and international co-operation are one of the corner stones in the Finnish nuclear 
safety policy. Finland has signed the international conventions and treaties aiming on safe and peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. After the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, Finland signed among 130 other 
countries in the General Conference in September 2011 the IAEA Action Plan. The twelve main actions 
included in the IAEA Action Plan and the related Finnish measures are discussed in this Annex. All 
Fukushima-related decisions by STUK, the national reports and action plans have been published on 
STUK’s website.
Safety assessments in the light of the accident at TEPCO’s 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP
Undertake assessment of the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants in the light of 
lessons learned to date from the accident
Following the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of March in 2011, 
safety assessments in Finland were initiated after STUK received a letter from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEE) on 15 March 2011. The Ministry asked STUK to carry out a study on how 
the Finnish NPPs have prepared against loss of electric power supply and extreme natural phenomena 
in order to ensure nuclear safety. STUK asked the licensees to carry out assessments and submitted the 
study report to MEE on 16 May 2011. Although immediate actions were not considered necessary, STUK 
required the licensees to carry out additional assessments and present action plans for safety improve-
ments. Assessments were conducted and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 15 December 
2011. STUK has reviewed the results of national assessments, and made licensee specific decisions on 19 
July 2012 on the suggested safety improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests and submitted the national report to European 
Commission by the end of 2011. An EU level peer review on the report was completed by April 2012. The 
recommendations of the EU peer review have been taken into account in the regulatory decisions and 
were considered in the development of national regulations. In addition, Finland participated in the 
second Extraordinary Meeting of the Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) in August 2012 and prepared 
a report introducing national actions in Finland initiated as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident. STUK has prepared a National Action Plan in the framework of EU stress tests addressing the 
measures initiated on a national level and at the nuclear power plants as a result of the TEPCO Fukush-
ima Dai-ichi accident. The National Action Plan takes into account the national safety assessments and 
related regulatory decisions as well as the recommendations from the EU stress tests and Extraordinary 
CNS. All STUK’s related decisions, the national report to European Commission, the report to the Ex-
traordinary CNS, and the National Action Plan have been published on STUK’s website.
Based on the results of assessments conducted in Finland to date, it is concluded that no such 
hazards or deficiencies have been found that would require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. 
Areas where safety can be further enhanced have been identified and there are plans on how to address 
these areas. The experiences from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are incorporated into the 
legislation and revised Finnish Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides).
150 STUK-B 237 / JUly 2019
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ANNEX 6
IAEA peer reviews
Strengthen IAEA peer reviews in order to maximize the benefits to Member States
Finland regularly hosts international peer reviews and also offers its experts for the review in other 
countries. Finland also supports activities to improve peer review services and has already participated 
in the development of IAEA’s peer review services (e.g. IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) and 
the OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) missions for construction).
The latest peer reviews in Finland are the following:
• IAEA OSART safety review at Loviisa NPP in March 2018
• WANO peer review at Loviisa NPP in March 2010 with a follow-up in April 2012, and in March 
2015. The WANO review 2015 included also the WANO corporate review in January 2016. The 
WANO Follow up review took place in 2017.
• IAEA OSART safety review at Olkiluoto NPP in March 2017, and pre-OSART at Olkiluoto 3 in 
March 2018.
• WANO peer reviews at Olkiluoto NPP in 2006, with a follow-up in August 2009, in 2012 with a 
follow-up in May 2014. The next WANO review was carried out in October 2016.
• IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in Finland in 2009, 
with a follow-up mission in April 2012. The next IPPAS mission will take place during 2020.
• A Peer Review of STUK’s waste management related activities in 2009 (all EU member states were 
invited and representatives from 11 countries participated in the peer review)
• In 2011 STUK hosted a peer review of the emergency preparedness with the OECD NEA countries
• Finland had IRRT (International Regulatory Review Team) mission in 2001 and the follow-up 
mission in 2003. IRRS mission was carried out to the regulatory body in October 2012 and the 
follow-up mission in 2015. Next IRRS mission is planned for 2022.
Finland continues the hosting and participation in the international peer reviews and will report the 
findings of these peer reviews as well as progress of the action plans in the national Convention on 
Nuclear Safety (CNS) report.
Emergency preparedness and response
Strengthen emergency preparedness and response
The Finnish concept of off-site nuclear emergency response has been developed since 1976, when the 
first public authorities’ off-site emergency plan was prepared. The development has been a continuous 
process since then. The requirements for off-site plans and activities in a radiation emergency are pro-
vided for in the Decree of the Ministry of the Interior issued in 2011 (revised in 2015). Off-site emergency 
plans are prepared by regional rescue authorities. Legislation and plans define clearly the roles and re-
sponsibilities of stakeholders having a role in an emergency. Practical guidelines concerning roles and 
responsibilities as well as communication and cooperation arrangements among authorities have been 
published in November 2012 and updated in 2016. Emergency exercises are conducted annually between 
the licensee and STUK. Every third year all authorities are training together at each site involving large 
number of participating organizations from governmental, regional and local level.
The rescue planning is enhanced by the co-operation between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue services, regional police departments and STUK. Permanent coordination groups have been es-
tablished for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in order to ensure coordinated and consistent emergency 
plans, to improve and develop emergency planning and arrangements and to share lessons from the 
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exercises, regulations and other information. Further improvement of arrangements for the coordination 
of information to the public and media during emergencies is needed to ensure that messages issued 
by different authorities are consistent.
Finland participates actively in the international co-operation also in the field of emergency pre-
paredness, such as IAEA, OECD/NEA, EU/EC and HERCA. These working groups discuss i.e. cross-border 
assistance, communication, co-operation and co-ordination of actions during nuclear of radiological 
emergencies. Under these working groups Finland has actively promoted joint statements and agree-
ments for further strengthening international emergency preparedness and response activities. Nordic 
countries have published two joint documents for cooperation arrangements: the Nordic Manual (up-
dated 2015) describes practical arrangements during preparedness and response phases, and the Nordic 
Flag Book (published 2014) which describes joint guidelines and operational intervention levels for 
protective actions.
National regulatory bodies
Strengthen the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy is 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. It prepares for example licensing decisions for the 
Government. According to the Radiation Act, the overall authority in the field of the use of radiation 
and other radiation practices is the Ministry of Social affairs and Health. According to Section 3 of the 
Radiation Act and Section 55 of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for the regulatory control 
of the safety of the use of radiation and nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities of STUK are 
provided in the Radiation and Nuclear Energy Acts.
The regulatory control of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy is independently carried 
out by STUK. No Ministry can take for its decision-making a matter that has been defined by law to be 
on the responsibility of STUK. STUK has no responsibilities or duties which would be in conflict with 
regulatory control.
STUK carried out a self-assessment concerning i.a. the effectiveness of the regulatory body for the 
latest IRRS mission conducted in Finland in October 2012. STUK identified many topics to be further 
improved during the self-assessment and some additional recommendations and suggestions were also 
given during the mission. The IRRS mission team found that STUK is a competent and highly credible 
regulator and is open and transparent. It also concluded that STUK is very active in promoting expe-
rience sharing both nationally and internationally. Areas for further improvement to enhance overall 
performance of the regulatory system, included for example the following:
• although STUK operates in practice as an independent regulatory body, the Government should 
strengthen the legislative framework by establishing the regulator as a body separate in law from 
other arms of government
• the Government should seek to modify the Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly and 
unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal authorities in the authorization process for safety. In 
particular, the changes should ensure that STUK has the legal authority to both specify any 
licence conditions necessary for safety and specify all regulations necessary for safety
• Finnish legislative framework should be further developed to cover authorization for the 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the final closure of nuclear waste repositories
• STUK can further enhance the effectiveness of its inspection activities by enhancing the focus of 
inspection on the most safety-significant areas and developing a formal qualification programme 
for inspectors.
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Based on the recommendations and suggestions an Action Plan has been prepared by STUK.
The IRRS follow-up mission was conducted in 2015. The purpose of the IRRS follow-up was to review 
the measures undertaken following the recommendations and suggestions of the 2012 IRRS mission. 
The scope of the follow-up mission was same as in 2012 i.e. nuclear facilities (except the research reactor 
FiR-1), radiation sources and transport. As the result of the follow-up mission the review team concluded 
that the recommendations and suggestions from the 2012 IRRS missions have been taken into account 
systematically by a comprehensive action plan. Significant progress has been made in most areas and 
many improvements have been implemented in accordance with the action plan. The IRRS team deter-
mined that 7 out of 8 recommendations and 19 of 21 suggestions made by the 2012 IRRS mission had been 
effectively addressed and therefore could be considered closed. Two new recommendations were raised 
to amend the legislation to clarify that decommissioning of an installation and closure of a disposal 
facility require a licence amendment; and to address the arrangements for research in radiation safety. 
Recommendation on clarifying the legislation related to decommissioning of nuclear installations 
and closure of a disposal facility is partly addressed. Decommissioning license was introduced to the 
Finnish legislative framework in the beginning of 2018. Future work needs still to be carried out for 
clarifying the licensing of closure of disposal facilities.
To establish a sound base for radiation protection research, the co-operation with Finnish univer-
sities and international research platforms has been reinforced. Research funding opportunities have 
been exploited and STUK is in an active role in shaping research agendas of many of these platforms 
to ensure that national aspects of research funding are taken into account at European level. STUK has 
also set up an internal research funding mechanism. The income from expert services is partly reserved 
for research projects and researchers can apply funding for their projects biannually.
Operating organizations
Strengthen the effectiveness of operating organizations with respect to nuclear safety
The responsibility for the safety rests with the licensee as prescribed in the Finnish Radiation and Nu-
clear Energy Acts. Accordingly, it is the licensee’s obligation to assure safe use of radiation and nuclear 
energy. Furthermore, it shall be the licensee’s obligation to assure such physical protection and emer-
gency planning and other arrangements, necessary to ensure limitation of nuclear damage, which do 
not rest with the authorities.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to verify that the licensees fulfill the regulations. This 
verification is carried out through continuous oversight, safety review and assessment as well as inspec-
tion programmes established by STUK. In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s commitment 
to the strong safety culture. The obvious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these responsibilities 
are strict adherence of regulations, prompt, timely and open actions towards the regulator in unusual 
situations, active role in developing the safety based on improvements of technology and science as 
well as effective exploitation of experience feedback.
Several peer reviews have been carried out at the both Finnish NPPs during the last ten years (see 
above the section concerning IAEA peer reviews). The licensees have annually sent several peers to 
foreign peer reviews.
According to the Finnish regulatory guides, the licensees shall carry out a periodic safety review 
(PSR) at least every ten years. The Finnish PSR process and scope are in line with the IAEA guidance 
(SSG-25). PSR is seen as a very important tool for promoting the continuous safety improvement ap-
proach. The last periodic safety reviews were finalised in Loviisa in 2016 and in Olkiluoto in 2016-2018 
in context of the operating license renewal.
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STUK regularly updates the regulatory requirements based on the operational experience feedback, 
research and technical development. The procedure to apply new or revised regulatory guides to existing 
nuclear facilities is such that after having heard those concerned, STUK makes a separate decision on how 
a new or revised YVL Guide applies to operating nuclear power plants, or to those under construction.
IAEA safety standards
Review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards and improve their implementation
The most important references considered in rulemaking at STUK are the IAEA safety standards, espe-
cially the Requirements-documents, and WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association) 
Safety Reference Levels and Safety Objectives for new reactors. Finnish policy is to participate actively 
in the international discussion on developing safety standards and adopt or adapt the new safety re-
quirements into national regulations. The newly developed regulations are highly in line with the most 
recent development of the IAEA safety requirements. Lessons learned from the Forsmark event in 2006 
and the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in 2011 are incorporated into the STUK Regulations and 
the new set of YVL guides published in 2013.
After the renewal of YVL Guides in 2013, several IAEA Safety Requirements documents have been 
revised and also WENRA has updated the safety reference levels. Furthermore, the Nuclear Energy Act 
and Nuclear Energy Decree have been amended, and the radiation legislation has been renewed to im-
plement the updated international requirements (for example 2014/87/Euratom, 2013/59/Euratom and 
2014/52/EU). STUK established a project in early 2016 to update STUK’s Regulations and the YVL Guides 
to accommodate the changes in the upper level legislation. The updated regulations were published 
in December 2018. The update of the YVL Guides is still ongoing, by June 2019, 22 updated YVL Guides 
were published.
International legal framework
Improve the effectiveness of the international legal framework
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopted on 17 June 
1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came 
into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention 
and also the objectives of the Convention are complied with. Finland has regularly reported and partic-
ipated in the review meetings. Finland observes the principles of the Convention, when applicable, also 
in other uses of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. in the use of a research reactor. Finland 
has participated in the working group on effectiveness and transparency of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety and is supporting the initiatives to improve the CNS process.
The financial provisions to cover the possible damages to third parties caused by a nuclear accident 
have been arranged in Finland according to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to the revision 
of the Paris and Brussels Conventions in 2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited licensee’s lia-
bility by law (the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act). This means, that insurance coverage will be required 
for a minimum amount of EUR 700 million and the liability of Finnish operators shall be unlimited in 
cases where nuclear damage has occurred in Finland and the third tier of the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention (providing cover up to EUR 1500 million) has been exhausted. The revised law will also have 
some other modifications, such as extending the claiming period up to 30 years for victims of nuclear 
accidents. The law amendment (2005) has not taken effect yet. It will enter into force at a later date as 
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determined by government decree. The entering into force of the amending act will take place as the 
2004 Protocols amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions will enter into force.
As the ratification of the 2004 Protocols has been delayed, Finland made a temporary amendment 
in the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, implementing the provision on unlimited liability and re-
quirement of insurance coverage for a minimum amount of EUR 700 million. The temporary law came 
into force in January 2012 and will be repealed when the 2005 law amendment takes effect. In Finland, 
the finishing off the international ratification process of the convention amendments without any undue 
delay is considered to be extremely important.
Finland is a Member State of the European Union. In 2011 some amendments were done in the 
Nuclear Energy Act due to the Nuclear Safety Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom). In 2013, 
the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act were under an amendment process to implement the 
Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and 
safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the amendment 
(2014/52/EU) of Directive 2011/92/EU, and the radiation safety directive (2013/59/Euratom) were imple-
mented in amendments of Nuclear Energy Act in 2017-2018 and in the new Radiation Act that entered 
into force in December 2018. Due to the changes in the upper level legislation, STUK Regulations were 
updated and they were published in December 2018. Updating the YVL Guides is ongoing.
Member states planning to embark on a nuclear power programme
Facilitate the development of the infrastructure necessary for Member States embarking on a 
nuclear power programme
Providing support to embarking countries is considered important in Finland. Finland is a member of 
the IAEA Regulatory Co-operation Forum and has participated on the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure 
Reviews (INIR) missions organized by the IAEA. In addition, Finland participates in EU/EC INIS activities 
by providing experts and training to embarking countries as well as tutoring to experts from embarking 
countries. Finland has also organised and continues to organise training courses on the experience on 
regulatory oversight on new construction and project management, regulatory framework in Finland, 
and experts from embarking countries have participated. Experts from Finland have also lectured in 
individual IAEA training courses focused on embarking countries.
Competence building
Strengthen and maintain competence building
The competence of the licensees as well as the vendor and main subcontractors is one of the key review 
areas in the licensing processes for the use of radiation and nuclear energy and during the lifetime of 
the facilities. The requirements on the resources needed to be available for the licensee during normal 
operation as well as during emergencies are given in the regulatory guides.
The management of STUK highlights the need for competent workforce. STUK has adopted a 
competence management system and nuclear safety and regulatory competencies are also emphasised 
in STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy is reflected into the STUK’s training programmes, 
on the job training and new re-cruitments. STUK’s strategy highlights the importance of the ability 
to understand complex entities. This understanding is achieved through systematic development of 
regulatory competence.
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The national nuclear safety and waste management research programmes have an important role 
in the competence building of all essential organisations involved in nuclear energy. These research 
programmes have two roles: for the first ensuring the availability of experts and for the second ensuring 
the on-line transfer of the research results to the organisations participating to the steering of the pro-
grammes and fostering the expertise. STUK has an important role in the steering of these programmes.
The basic professional training course on nuclear safety is annually organised in cooperation between 
the main Finnish nuclear energy organisations. The first course commenced in autumn 2003. and the 
following 6-week basic professional training course will commence in autumn 2019. So far, more than 
1000 newcomers and junior experts, of whom about 100 have been from STUK, have participated in these 
courses. The content and structure of the course has been enhanced according to the feedback received 
from the participants – and also by reflecting the development and changes of the nuclear sector. STUK 
has an active role in development and steering of the training course. Furthermore, a significant number 
of STUK experts act as lecturers of the training course.
Due to planned expansion of the use of nuclear energy in Finland, a comprehensive study has been 
conducted in Finland to explore the need of experts and education of experts in Finland and to meet the 
needs of the organizations in the nuclear section. The original study was completed in March 2012. The 
update of the competence review was carried on in 2017 to reflect the current changes in the operating 
environment. The final report of the updated competence review was published in 2018.
Protection of people and the environment from ionizing radiation
Ensure the on-going protection of people and the environment from ionizing radiation 
following a nuclear emergency
During nuclear or radiological incidents and emergencies STUK is responsible for safety assessment of 
radiation situation and recommendations and advice for protective measures as defined in the Rescue 
Act. STUK provides recommendations of protective measures to authorities on local, provincial and 
governmental level. Furthermore, STUK provides advice to private sector for trade and commerce.
STUK has prepared so called VAL Guides, which contain the intervention strategy in Finland. VAL 
Guides contain protective measures and intervention levels in early and intermediate phases of a nuclear 
or radiological emergency, for various types of emergencies (such as fallout from nuclear detonation, 
severe accident in a NPP, malicious acts, contamination due to radioactive substances etc.). VAL Guides 
contain reference levels of exposure during the first year and factors, other than radiation, affecting 
choice of protective measures and protective measures to be considered during nuclear or radiological 
emergencies and transition to recovery. VAL Guides contain criteria when protective measures are needed 
and when those can be lifted or modified. Criteria are given for each countermeasure as a projected dose 
and as an operational intervention level. They also include triggers such as plant condition, or emergen-
cy action levels such as duration of a protective measure. VAL Guides include principles for reducing 
exposure of various parts of society (e.g. actions concerning population, exercising own profession in a 
contaminated area, decontamination, handling of waste containing radioactive substances etc.). VAL 
Guides are to be put into force by the Ministry of the Interior.
In Finland, there is an automatic external dose rate monitoring network consisting of about 250 
stations throughout the country. Results are available in real time (every 10th minute). In addition, a 
network has 22 stations with spectrometers situated around the Finnish NPPs and in Helsinki. Nuclear 
power plants have trained monitoring teams capable of making dose rate and air concentration meas-
urements. STUK has trained monitoring teams for dose rate monitoring, mobile spectrometers and a 
laboratory vehicle which has state of the art monitoring equipment for gamma (HPGe), alpha and air 
sampler. Results can be obtained in 30 second interval.
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There is also a network of environment and foodstuffs laboratories which have the capability to 
measure gamma radioactivity levels in the food and environmental samples. STUK coordinates operation 
and provides technical support if needed. In addition, STUK has delivered regional hospitals monitor-
ing equipment for monitoring iodine in thyroid. This measuring capability is meant for screening the 
public for contamination of iodine.
In addition to actual emergency rescue planning, roles and responsibilities of authorities for longer-
term actions following a nuclear accident have been defined. Longer-term actions include e.g. decontam-
ination of environment, management of waste containing radioactive substances, radiation monitoring 
and surveys, health control of the population, measures concerning agricultural and other production 
and measures to ensure uncontaminated food and feeding stuffs.
Communication and information dissemination
Enhance transparency and effectiveness of communication and improve dissemination of 
information
Interest in nuclear power in Finland is increasing, due to ongoing new-build projects and public debate 
about future prospects of so-called SMRs. With this in mind, communication and information sharing 
with media and the general public on nuclear and radiation safety has become an increasingly important 
success factor for STUK and utilities. Regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear and understand-
able to general public. Risks related radiation should be communicated realistically. Due to the challenge, 
STUK has carried out a number of development projects to develop its strategic communications and 
the use of modern communication tools. In particular, STUK has focused on communication capacity 
building of the staff, focused on developing key-messages to communicated radiation and nuclear risks, 
and continued to develop its crisis communication capability.
The Decree on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (618/1997) defines STUK’s tasks. 
One of the tasks is to inform about radiation and nuclear safety matters and participate on training 
activities in the area. STUK utilises many means to communicate with the public and interested stake-
holders, such as meetings, seminars, and training courses. All these are tailored and targeted to different 
stakeholders and stakeholder groups. Emergency exercises arranged with stakeholders regularly include 
a communication element.
STUK pays special attention to using internet and social media to inform public and interested 
stakeholders about nuclear and radiation safety. In example, we communicate about risks related to 
radiation and use of nuclear energy, safety requirements, roles and responsibilities of STUK, current 
activities and operating experience, significant regulatory decisions taken, events and publications and 
safety research. STUK web pages can be found (www.stuk.fi) in Finnish, Swedish and English.
What comes to radiation emergencies and hazards, according to the Rescue Act and the Decree of 
the Ministry of the Interior concerning informing public during nuclear or radiological emergencies, 
the authority in charge is responsible for informing public on protective measures and other activities 
to be carried out. Authorities at governmental, provincial, and municipal level provide information on 
their own activities and give instructions regarding their own sphere of responsibility. In case of a nu-
clear power plant accident there are many organisations providing information. Thus special attention 
needs to be paid to coordination of timing and contents of information.
Further improvement of arrangements for the coordination of information to the public and media 
during emergencies is needed to ensure that the messages issued by different authorities are consist-
ent. Guidelines for co-operation among authorities have been written in a guidebook published by the 
Ministry of Interior in November 2012, which contains the detailed information of the arrangements 
in the Finnish society in the case of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Even more general principles 
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and guidance of coordination or public communication during emergencies are given in the guidance 
by prime ministers office.
In an accident situation the principal information route of warnings to the public is FM radio, TV 
and internet. The first outdoor warning to the public close the NPP is given by general warning signal 
via sirens or loudspeakers. By arrangement with broadcasting companies, urgent RDS-notifications can 
be transmitted promptly over the FM-radio and TV. There is a specific law for warning messages via 
radio and TV.
Finland has bilateral agreements with Sweden, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, Denmark and Germany 
on early notification of nuclear or radiological emergencies and exchange of information on nuclear 
facilities. In addition, STUK has done bilateral arrangements with several foreign regulatory bodies, 
which cover generally the exchange of information on safety regulations, operational experiences, waste 
management etc. Such an arrangement have been made with NRC (USA), ASN (France), FANR (United 
Arab Emirates), NSSC and KINS (Republic of Korea), TAEK (Turkey), ENSI (Switzerland), SUJB (Czech 
Republic), Rostechnadzor (Russian Federation), CNSC (Canada), AERB (India), ONR (Great Britain), 
HAEA (Hungary), NNR (South Africa), NRA ( Japan) and SSM (Sweden).
Research and development
Effectively utilize research and development
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 to ensure funding for a long term nuclear safety and nu-
clear waste management research in Finland. Money is collected annually from the licence holders to a 
special fund. Regarding nuclear safety research the amount of money is proportional to the actual thermal 
power of the licensed power plants or the thermal power presented in the Decision-in-Principle. For the 
nuclear waste research, the annual funding payments are proportional to the current fund holdings for 
the future waste management activities. In 2016 the Nuclear Energy Act was amended and the tempo-
rary increase of the money collected to the nuclear safety research fund was introduced. The purpose of 
temporary increase of the research funding is to renew the ageing infrastructure for the nuclear energy 
related research. The increased funding is collected in between the years 2016 and 2025. At the first stage 
the additional funding was allocated for the new hot cells at VTT Center of Nuclear Safety (CNS) and 
at the second stage it will be allocted for the thermohydraulic laboratory at Lappeenranta University of 
Technology. The investment for the VTT CNS hot cells laboratory was about 18 million euros.
The research projects are selected so that they support and develop the competences in nuclear safety 
and to create preparedness for the regulator to be able to respond on emerging and urgent safety issues. 
These national safety research programmes are called SAFIR and KYT. The structure for SAFIR2018 (2015-
2018) enhanced multidisciplinary co-operation within the research programme. Research areas were 1) 
Plant Safety and Systems Engineering, 2) Reactor Safety and 3) Structural Safety and Material. The key 
topics of the recent nuclear safety research programme (SAFIR2018) were automation, organisation and 
human factors, severe accidents and risk analysis, fuel and reactor physics, thermal hydraulics, structural 
integrity and development of research infrastructure. The amount of money collected from the licensees 
since year 2016 has been about 9 million € for nuclear safety research. Out of this 4 million € is used to 
research projects and the rest is for the enhancement of the infrastructure. The research projects have 
also additional funding from other sources. The total volume of the programme in 2016 to 2018 has been 
between about 7 million € each year. An international evaluation of the programme was performed at the 
beginning of the year 2018. The scientific level and performance of the programme was found very good.
The new period for the national publicly funded nuclear safety research programme SAFIR2022 was 
planned and initiated in year 2018. The research issues of the new programme continue the main areas 
of previous SAFIR2018 research programme. However, new research issues concerning the changes in the 
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operating environment are integrated into the programme such as use of 3D-printing for components 
important to safety, small modular reactors, machine learning etc.
The objective of KYT (Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear Waste Management) is to ensure the 
sufficient and comprehensive availability of the nuclear technological expertise and other capabilities 
required by the authorities when comparing different nuclear waste management ways and implemen-
tation methods. KYT2018 (2015–2018) was divided into three main categories:
• new and alternative technologies in nuclear waste management
• safety research in nuclear waste management and
• social science studies related to nuclear waste management.
The main emphasis in the research programme will continue to be devoted to safety related research. 
The funding of the research programme is provided mainly by the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund (VYR) into which those responsible for nuclear waste management pay annually 0.13 % of their 
respective assessed liability. The current level of annual funding is 1.9 million €.
Similar to SAFIR, the new period for the Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment, KYT2022, was planned and initiated in year 2018. The programme continues the traditions of 
previous periods with the main research areas of:
• safety research in spent nuclear fuel management
• near-surface disposal
• low and intermediate nuclear waste management
• decomissioning
• new and alternative technologies in nuclear waste management and
• social science studies related to nuclear waste management
In Finland, the Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT) is the largest research organisation in 
the field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 200 experts are working in the field of nuclear energy, half of 
them full-time. Other important research organizations are GTK (Geological Survey of Finland), LUT 
(Lappeenranta University of Technology) and Aalto University (former Helsinki University of Technol-
ogy, HUT).
Finland also participates in international research activities, such as OECD/NEA/CSNI working 
groups, consortium which builds the Jules Horowitz research reactor ( JHR) in France, Scandinavian NKS 
research programme, EU programmes, and bilateral co-operation with several countries. The Finnish 
technical support organisations are active parties of TSO organisations co-operation such as ETSON in 
Europe and IAEA TSO Forum.
